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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 42242 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
HONORABLE MICHAEL MCLAUGHLIN 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
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Date: 8/21/2014 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: CCTHIEBJ 
Time: 11 :22 AM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 3 Case: CV-PC-2013-00248 Current Judge: Michael McLaughlin 
Christopher A Pentico, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Christopher A Pentico, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
1/4/2013 NCPC CCSWEECE New Case Filed - Post Conviction Relief Magistrate Court Clerk 
PETN CCNELSRF Verified Petition for Post Conviction Relief Magistrate Court Clerk 
APPL CCNELSRF Application for Public Defender Magistrate Court Clerk 
1/7/2013 CERT CCNELSRF Certificate Of Mailing Magistrate Court Clerk 
1/10/2013 ORPD TCEMERYV Order Appointing Public Defender Kevin Swain 
3/26/2013 MOTN JVWARDCM Motion for summary dismissal Magistrate Court Clerk 
BREF JVWARDCM Brief in support of motion for summary dismissal Magistrate Court Clerk 
ANSW JVWARDCM Answer Magistrate Court Clerk 
4/30/2013 NOTC TCEMERYV Notice of Intent to Grant Summary Dismissal Kevin Swain 
CERT TCEMERYV Certificate Of Mailing Kevin Swain 
5/20/2013 MISC CCOSBODK Petitioners Response To States Motion For Magistrate Court Clerk 
Summary Disposition 
RQST CCOSBODK Request For Judicial Noticfe Magistrate Court Clerk 
6/11/2013 ORDR TCWEGEKE Order Granting Request for Judicial Notice Michael McLaughlin 
6/13/2013 ORDR TCEMERYV Order Granting Summary Dismissal Kevin Swain 
CERT TCEMERYV Certificate Of Mailing Kevin Swain 
CDIS CCWATSCL Civil Disposition entered for: State Of Idaho, Magistrate Court Clerk 
Other Party; Pentico, Christopher A, Subject. 
Filing date: 6/13/2013 
STAT CCWATSCL STATUS CHANGED: Closed Magistrate Court Clerk 
7/5/2013 APDC CCNELSRF Notice of Appeal Magistrate Court Clerk 
7/8/2013 AMEN CCNELSRF Amended Notice of Appeal Magistrate Court Clerk 
CAAP CCNELSRF Case Appealed: Magistrate Court Clerk 
STAT CCNELSRF STATUS CHANGED: Reopened Magistrate Court Clerk 
CHGA CCNELSRF Judge Change: Administrative Michael McLaughlin 
7/9/2013 CCNELSRF Notice of Reassignment Michael McLaughlin 
7/17/2013 ORDR TCLYCAAM Order Governing Procedure on Appeal Michael Mclaughlin 
HRSC TCLYCAAM Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal Michael McLaughlin 
01/23/2014 02:00 PM) 
8/16/2013 PROS PRSMITTJ Prosecutor assigned Brian Naugle Michael McLaughlin 
9/11/2013 PROS PRFLEMSM Prosecutor assigned Christopher C Mccurdy Michael Mclaughlin 
9/23/2013 BAAT PDPRECJR ATTORNEY REASSIGNED BY BATCH 
PROCESSING (batch process) Heidi M Tolman, 
8478 removed. PD GARDUNIA #32 assigned. 
BAAT PDPRECJR ATTORNEY REASSIGNED BY BATCH 
PROCESSING (batch process) PD GARDUNIA 
#32 removed. Lance L Fuisting, 7791 assigned. 
11/25/2013 BREF CCOSBODK Petitioners Brief Michael Mclaughlin 
12/23/2013 BREF CCNELSRF Respondent's Brief Michael McLaughlin 
1/8/2014 BREF CCHOLMEE Petitioner's Reply Brief Michael McLaughlin 
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Date: 8/21/2014 
Time: 11 :22 AM 
Page 2 of 3 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-PC-2013-00248 Current Judge: Michael Mclaughlin 
Christopher A Pentico, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
User: CCTHIEBJ 
Christopher A Pentico, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
1/14/2014 CONT TCEDWAAM Continued (Oral Argument on Appeal Michael Mclaughlin 
02/06/2014 04:00 PM) 
TCEDWAAM Notice of Hearing Michael Mclaughlin 
[unable to locate document] 
2/4/2014 MOTN CCMARTJD Motion to Continue Michael Mclaughlin 
2/6/2014 HRVC TCEDWAAM Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal Michael Mclaughlin 
scheduled on 02/06/2014 04:00 PM: Hearing 
Vacated 
2/11/2014 ORDR TCEDWAAM Order to Continue Michael McLaughlin 
HRSC TCEDWAAM Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal Michael Mclaughlin 
02/13/2014 03:30 PM) 
2/13/2014 DCHH DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal Michael Mclaughlin 
scheduled on 02/13/2014 03:30 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: SUSAN GAMBEE 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: LESS THAN 100 pages 
2/19/2014 DEOP DCABBOSM Memorandum Decision and Order Michael Mclaughlin 
CDIS CCNELSRF Civil Disposition entered for: State Of Idaho, Michael Mclaughlin 
Other Party; Pentico, Christopher A, Subject. 
Filing date: 2/19/2014 
STAT CCNELSRF STATUS CHANGED: Closed Michael Mclaughlin 
3/10/2014 PETN CCNELSRF Petition for Rehearing RE: Memorandum Michael Mclaughlin 
Decision & Order 
3/14/2014 HRSC TCEDWAAM Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/24/2014 02:00 Michael Mclaughlin 
PM) 
TCEDWAAM Notice Of Hearing Michael Mclaughlin 
3/24/2014 MEMO CCNELSRF Memorandum In support of Petition for Rehearing Michael Mclaughlin 
RE: Memorandum Decision and Order 
3/28/2014 CONT TCEDWAAM Continued (Motion 05/01/2014 02:00 PM) Michael Mclaughlin 
TCEDWAAM Notice Of Hearing Michael Mclaughlin 
4/29/2014 RESP CCRADTER State's Response to Petitioner's Memorandum in Michael Mclaughlin 
Support of Petition for Rehearing 
5/1/2014 HRHD CCNELSRF Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Michael McLaughlin 
05/01/2014 02:00 PM: Hearing Held 
Court reporter Dianne Cromwell less than 50 
pages 
5/20/2014 DEOP DCABBOSM Memorandum Decision on Motion for Michael McLaughlin 
Reconsideration 
CDIS CCNELSRF Civil Disposition entered for: State Of Idaho, Michael Mclaughlin 
Other Party; Pentico, Christopher A, Subject. 
Filing date: 5/20/2014 
6/20/2014 NOTC CCMURPST Notice of Appeal Michael McLaughlin 
APSC CCTHIEBJ Appealed To The Supreme Court Michael Mclaughlin 
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Date: 8/21/2014 
Time: 11 :22 AM 
Page 3 of 3 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-PC-2013-00248 Current Judge: Michael McLaughlin 
Christopher A Pentico, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
User: CCTHIEBJ 
Christopher A Pentico, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code 
8/21/2014 NOTC 
User 
CCTHIEBJ 
Judge 
(2) Notice of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court Michael McLaughlin 
Docket No. 42242 
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Christopher A. Pentico 
120 N.W. Carrie Circle 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Telephone No.: (208)587-7322 
Email: pentico@mindspring.com 
Pro Se Petitioner 394SWAlN 
~~.:0 _l-2013- __ ..;_ 
r· r 
CHRISTOPf1ER D. RICH, Clerk~, --
By CHRISilNE SWEET ,~· 
DEPUTY---
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
vs. 
...P,l~ 
l!tt-.spo11Jen t 
ell, 
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO, 
Petitioner. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CV PC 1300248 
CASE NO.:CR MD 2008-0005321 
VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF 
I. Petitioner, Christopher A. Pentico, currently resides at 120 N.W. Carrie Circle 
Mountain Home, Idaho, 83647. 
2. In Ada County, Magistrate Court Number CR MD 2008-0005321, Mr. Pentico was 
charged with criminal trespass. The charge arose from a citation issued on April 2, 2008, 
after Mr. Pentico was stopped, handcuffed and detained at the comer of State and 8th 
Street in Boise, Idaho. 
3. On April 21, 2009, Mr. Pentico was convicted of criminal trespass in violation ofl.C. 
§ 18-7008(8) based upon the allegation that "on April 2, 2008, he willfully trespassed 
upon property of the State ofldaho, by returning to and entering the Governor's Office in 
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the Borah Building, without permission or invitation, after being verbally notified within 
the previous year not to do so by Trooper Pattis, an authorized agent of the State." 
4. While prosecution was pending, Mr. Pentico was prejudiced by being illegally placed at 
risk of facing additional charges if, at any time prior to March 25, 2009, he made an 
attempt to visit his legislator at the Capital Annex (the seat of the Idaho Legislature in 
2008-2009) or to visit any other public official at either the Governor's Office or the 
Idaho State Department of Education. 
5. On Mayl l, 2009, despite the State's request that he be sentenced to 90 days of jail (with 
85 suspended) and a $500 fine (with $300 suspended), ordered to pay Court costs and 
placed on probation for two years with no right to visit the public property at issue, Mr. 
Pentico was placed on probation for 30 days, ordered to pay Court Costs of $75.00 which 
were then waived, and, though it was not requested, placed at risk of losing any future 
ability to secure a withheld judgment by being granted a withheld judgment in this matter 
(which he has never sought to pursue). 
6. Mr. Pentico was represented at throughout the proceedings in the Magistrate Court by 
Allen Derr., Esq. 
7. Mr. Pentico appealed from the judgment and sentence to the District Court. 
8. On May 13, 2010, District Judge Kathryn A. Sticklen affirmed the judgment of 
conviction. 
9. Mr. Pentico appealed from the determination of the District Court. 
10. On October 17, 2011, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction. 
11. Mr. PenticC? filed a timely Petition for Review in the Idaho Supreme Court. 
VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 2 
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12. On January 5, 2012, the Idaho Supreme Court denied the Petition for Review and the 
matter was remitted to the District Court. 
13. Acting on a pro bono basis, Attorney Bruce S. Bistline and legal intern and eventually 
Attorney Heidi Tolman represented Mr. Pentico at all stages of appeal. 
14. With respect to this conviction, Mr. Pentico has not filed any other petitions for post-
conviction relief nor has he filed, in State or Federal Court, any Petitions for Habeas 
Corpus or any other petitions or motions other than the appeals noted above. 
15. That, as demonstrated by the Application for Public Defender, filed herewith, Petitioner 
does not have the resources to retain counsel nor to pay the costs of prosecuting this 
matter and requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis and that counsel be appointed to 
represent Petitioner. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
A Conviction For a Violation of Idaho Code §18-7008(8) Which Is Premised Upon the 
Demand That a Citizen Leave Public Property Which Is Otherwise Open To the Public 
for the Same Purposes for Which It Is Being Used by the Citizen in Question and 
Which Is Made in the Absence of Evidence of any Inappropriate Conduct, Is a 
Violation of Due Process Protections Afforded by Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution and the 5111 Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
16. The record in the trial of this matter contains not a scrap of evidence to suggest that Mr. 
Pentico was engaged in any inappropriate conduct on public property on March 25, 2008, 
nor that he was doing any activity for which the Capital Annex property was not, on 
March 25, 2008, otherwise open to the public. 
17. To the extent that Idaho Code § 18-7008(8) can be read as permitting a citizen to be 
ordered off of public property when the citizen is appropriately engaged in the very 
activity for which the property is otherwise open to the public, it is facially overbroad and 
VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 3 
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vague. It allows law enforcement officers to order citizens off of public property for any 
reason or no reason at all, and thus necessarily empowers law enforcement to engage in 
arbitrary and discriminatory behaviors. The statute fails to provide any apparent limits or 
constraints to guide law enforcement or the Courts or to provide citizens with meaningful 
guidance so that they can conform their conduct to the standards of the law and be free to 
use public property without fear of discriminatory or arbitrary law enforcement. 
18. The Court of Appeals' decision, while holding that the statute is not overbroad or vague 
because it makes clear that a citizen must leave the property once he is ordered to do so 
and must not return within one year, never addressed or resolved the question of whether 
it is Constitutional to read that statute as affording law enforcement officers the power to 
order a citizen off of public property for any reason or no reason at all. 
19. The Court of Appeals concluded that on it face the statute permitted Mr. Pentico to be 
ordered to leave the Capital Annex for any reason or no reason at all, and that this 
interpretation was supported by State. v Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 69 P.3d 126 (2003). 
20. Neither the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho nor the Court of Appeals of the State of 
Idaho has ever held that Idaho Code § 18-7008(8) can properly or constitutionally be read 
as permitting a citizen to be ordered off of public property when the citizen is 
appropriately engaged in the very activity for which the property is otherwise open to the 
public. 
21. As Mr. Pentico's conviction is, based on the evidence in the record, premised upon the 
fact that on March 25, 2008, he was, for no apparent reason, ordered off of public 
property which was otherwise open to the public and that the only authority offered to 
VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 4 
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" . 
justify that conviction is Idaho Code § 18-7008(8), that conviction is unconstitutional and 
should be set aside. 
Why Relief Should Be Granted. 
Idaho Code§ 19-4901(1) affords a convicted person the right to seek to set aside an 
conviction which was entered in violation of the Constitution of the United States or of the State 
of Idaho. Petitioner was convicted of a violation of a statute, I.C. § 18-7008(8), which cannot be 
constitutionally applied to criminalize his actions and which has never been applied to permit a 
prosecution such as the one to which Petitioner has been subjected. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
A Conviction/or a Violation of Idaho Code §18-7008(8) Which Was Premised Upon 
The Fact That A Citizen, Having Been Ordered to Leave Public Property Which Was 
Otherwise Open to the Public/or the Same Purposes/or Which it Was Being Used by 
the Citizen in Question and Which Was Made in the Absence of Evidence of Any 
Inappropriate Conduct, Subsequently Reentered Public Property is a Violation of Due 
Process Protections Afforded by the Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution 
and the 5th Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
22. The record in the trial of this matter contains not a scrap of evidence to suggest that Mr. 
Pentico was engaged in any inappropriate conduct on public property on March 25, 2008, 
nor that he was engaged in any activity for which the Capital Annex property was not, on 
March 25, 2008, otherwise open to the public. 
23. To the extent that Idaho Code § 18-7008(8) can be read as permitting a citizen to be 
ordered off of public property when the citizen is appropriately engaged in the very 
activity (including constitutionally protected activity) for which the property is otherwise 
open to the public and then to be prosecuted for, at any time during the following one (1) 
year period, using that property in a otherwise lawful and constitutionally protected 
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manner, it is facially unconstitutional. It allows law enforcement officers to deprive 
citizens of the right to engage in lawful and constitutionally protected conduct for a 
significant period of time without affording those citizens any meaningful procedure or 
process to challenge either the exclusion or the duration of the exclusion. 
24. Neither the Idaho Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals of the State of Idaho has ever 
held that Idaho Code § 18-7008(8) can properly or constitutionally be read as permitting a 
citizen to be barred from the lawful and constitutionally protected use of public property 
for a full year regardless of the reason that the citizen was asked to leave the public 
property in the first place. 
25. As Mr. Pentico's conviction is based on a statute which deprives him of significant 
liberty rights and which affords no meaningful or adequate due process procedures in 
association with the deprivation of those rights, that conviction is unconstitutional and 
should be set aside. 
Wlty Relief Sltould Be Granted. 
Idaho Code § 19-4901 (1) affords a convicted person the right to seek to set aside a 
conviction which was entered in violation of the Constitution of the United States or of the State 
ofldaho. Petitioner was convicted of a violation of a statute, I.C. § 18-7008(8), which cannot be 
constitutionally applied to criminalize his actions and which has never been applied to permit a 
prosecution such as the one to which Petitioner has been subjected. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
Petitioner was Denied tlte Rigltt to fully Cltallenge tlte Constitutionality of Ida/to Code 
§ 18-7008(8) as Applied to /tis Conduct. 
VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 6 
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26. Trial Counsel's performance was deficient because: 
a. He failed through testimony or offer of proof to develop an adequate record to 
demonstrate that Mr. Pentico had entered the grounds of the Capital Annex on 
March 25, 2008, for the purpose of finding and speaking to Representative Lenore 
Barrett in hopes of securing her advise and assistance with a matter of 
governmental action which was of concern to Mr. Pentico. 
b. He failed through testimony or offer of proof to develop an adequate record to 
demonstrate that prior to being confronted by officers on the grounds of the 
Capital Annex, on March 25, 2008, Mr. Pentico had done nothing more than cross 
the street and start to walk in the direction of the entrance to the building with the 
intent of speaking to a legislator in hopes of securing her advise and assistance 
with a matter of governmental action which was of concern to Mr. Pentico. 
c. He failed through testimony or offer of proof to develop an adequate record to 
demonstrate that Mr. Pentico's chose to visit the public reception area of the 
Governor's Office on April 2, 2008, to hand deliver his letter to the Governor (as 
opposed to mailing it) for the specific purpose of making a statement both about 
the importance of the matters addressed in the letter to Mr. Pentico and about his 
opposition to what he perceived was an unconstitutional attempt to bar him from 
accessing public property in the same manner as and for the same reasons ( some 
of which are constitutionally protected rights) that the property in question was 
open to all other members of the public. 
VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 7 
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d. He failed to inquire into the specific basis upon which Officer Partis relied for 
contending he was the authorized agent of the owner of the property and to 
determine whether there was any basis in fact to support a conclusion that Officer 
\ 
Partis even knew about let alone had been vested with sufficient authority to 
override, the Governor's standing invitation for Mr. Pentico to visit the 
Governor's office. 
e. He failed to timely raise a claim that Idaho Code § 18-7008(8) could not 
constitutionally be applied to criminalize Mr. Pentico's entry into the Governor's 
office on April 2, 2008, because: 
1. there was no constitutionally sufficient basis for asking Mr. Pentico, on 
March 25, 2008, to leave the traditional public forum of the seat of the 
legislature (the "ask to leave") where he is entitled to go to speak, observe, 
and to petition his government for the redress of grievances, and, if the 
"ask to leave" is not lawful, then the "do not return for 1 year" prong of 
the statute cannot be triggered and the visit to the public reception area of 
Governor's office on April 2, 2008 cannot be treated as a trespass under 
LC. § 18-7008(8); 
11. even if the "ask to leave" was itself not constitutionally defective, the 
statute could not constitutionally be applied to criminalize Mr. Pentico's 
subsequent entry on to property other than the property upon which he was 
standing at the time that the "ask to leave" occurred. The language of the 
statute provides no sufficient notice that it could be applied to criminalize 
VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 8 
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a subsequent entry on to property other than the property upon which an 
individual was standing at the time that an "ask to leav~" occurred. Given 
the inherent vagueness of the statute relative to its application to Mr. 
Pentico' s conduct, using it to criminalize his visit to the public reception 
area of the Governor's Office on April 2, 2008, would violate the 
procedural due process protections afforded to Mr. Pentico by Art. I, Sec. 
13 of the Idaho Constitution and the 5th Amendment of the United States 
Constitution; 
111. even if the "ask to leave" was itself not constitutionally defective and the 
statute could be permissibly extended to criminalize a visit to the property 
other than the property on which the "ask to leave" occurred, the statute 
could not constitutionally be applied to criminalize Mr. Pentico's visit to 
the public reception area of the Governor's Office on April 2, 2008, 
because that visit was, based upon facts not placed in the record, more 
than mere conduct and was thus constitutionally protected speech; and, 
1v. even if the "ask to leave" was itself not constitutionally defective, and the 
statute could be permissibly extended to criminalize a visit to the property 
other than the property on which the "ask to leave" occurred, the statute 
could not constitutionally be applied to criminalize Mr. Pentico's visit to 
the public reception area of the Governor's Office on April 2, 2008. The 
statute works an impermissible deprivation of rights by precluding any 
person and Mr. Pentico in particular, who has not done anything more than 
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approach the functioning Capital Building for the purpose of speaking to a 
legislator, from thereafter exercising substantial rights and liberties 
(including constitutionally protected rights) available to all other citizens 
for a period of one year and provides no meaningful remedial process for 
challenging either the exclusion or the duration of the exclusion. Given 
the lack of any meaningful due process to provide protection from 
arbitrary, unreasonable and material exclusions from public property, the 
statute in general and as applied to Mr. Pentico, violates procedural due 
process protections afforded to citizens, including Mr. Pentico, by Art. I, 
Sec. 13 of the Idaho Constitution and the 5th Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. 
27. The failure to make an adequate evidentiary record precluded Mr. Pentico from 
demonstrating that his communications with the Governor were in fact relevant to the 
proceeding because, if Officer Pattis was not aware of the standing invitation for Mr. 
Pentico to visit the Governor at his office and was not vested with the authority to 
override that invitation, then, he was in fact not the "authorized agent for the owner" with 
respect to his direction that Mr. Pentico stay away from the Governor's office. 
28. The failure to make an adequate evidentiary record precluded Mr. Pentico from 
demonstrating to the Trial Court and the Appellate Courts that the statute was 
unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Pentico. 
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29. The failure to raise all constitutional defenses precluded Mr. Pentico from demonstrating 
to the Trial Court and the Appellate Courts that the statute could not constitutionally be 
applied to criminalize Mr. Pentico's visit to the Governor's office on April 2, 2008. 
Why Relief Should Be Granted. 
A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment has been 
incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the 
states. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). Idaho law also guarantees a criminal 
defendant's right to effective counsel. Idaho Const. Art. I,§ 13; LC. § 19-852. 
In general, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon the state or 
federal constitution, is analyzed under the familiar Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984), standard. In order to prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) that counsel's 
performance was deficient in that it fell below standards of reasonable professional performance; 
and 2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. at 689. The prejudice prong of the test is shown if there is a reasonable probability that a 
different result would have been obtained in the case if the attorney had acted properly. Id. 
Here, Trial Counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to create a sufficient 
factual record to support a demonstration that Officer Pattis was not in fact authorized to direct 
Mr. Pentico's activities with respect to visits to the Governor's office. 
Trial Counsel's performance was also deficient because he failed to create a sufficient 
factual record to support critical constitutional defenses to the charge and he failed to raise 
critical constitutional defenses so that they were before the Trial Court for consideration and 
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preserved for appeal. Trial Counsel focused on the constitutionality of the prosecution for the 
trip to the public reception area of the Governor's office but never presented available evidence 
that demonstrates that the trip itself was intended as a form of speech. Trial Counsel does not 
appear to have realized, until perhaps at sentencing proceeding, that there was nothing wrongful 
about the trip to the Governor's office if there was no valid "ask to leave" in the first instance 
and that the "ask to leave" was not and could be treated as valid because it was itself a violation 
of Mr. Pentico's constitutionally protected rights. Moreover, Trial Counsel never framed and 
presented the obvious due process challenges. In the absence of any available evidence of 
inappropriate conduct on March 25, 2008, the "ask to leave" was arbitrary and capricious and the 
statute, to the extent it permits such an exclusion, is unconstitutional. Even if the drafters 
intended for the statute to permit an "ask to leave" one parcel of property to be extended to other 
separate parcels, this intent is in no manner made clear by the clear and unambiguous language of 
the statute, and the statute, to the extent it intends such an extension, is void for vagueness. 
Finally, the application of the statute to permit even a lawful "ask to leave" to prevent a return to 
public property for up to one (1) year generates a deprivation of substantial rights without any 
meaningful procedural due process and renders the statute facially unconstitutional and 
unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Pentico. 
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.. . ... 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Petitioner requests the following relief 
A. That counsel be appointed; 
B. That the judgment be vacated and either the matter should be dismissed or a new trial 
be granted; and/ or 
C. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of January, 2013. 
Pro Se Petiti()ner ~ 
~a 
VERIFICATION OF PETITION 
I, Christopher A. Pentico, being duly sworn under oath, state: 
I know of the contents of the foregoing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and that the 
matters and allegations set forth are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
~-a~ christopher.entico 
fA.. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this_!!_ day of January, 2013 
c~ cJnavu2cf 
Notary Public for the State ofldaho 
Residing at: 623 W. Hays, Boise, Idaho 83702 
My commission expires: ~ a~ .;?O Jg 
13 
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J 
• PLEASE PRINT 
(If defendant is a minor, a form must also be completed 
by parent or legal guardian) 
1300248 
~o. ~~ A.M.---·\r:,,_ 
JAN O 4 2013 
APPLICATION FOR PUBLIC DEFENDER CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clark 
By CHRISTINE SWEET 
DEPUTY lhri sbf?lher IL fe11.tl,o fpJ)fi~t·s Mam , /t ~ f !..cLlJ L-& r: r: L e,__ ,__ t r c, e. 
stw.,yt AddrEJSS • / / I j I 
ru,unr;a..al 11(>111.e.. 7 aa.no City State 
Mailing Address (if different from above) 
City State' 
EMPLOYMENT 
thri .s toe her A fe11 ti to 
Nj1,i!e of C!rrept~ J.pstEmployer !t 
rr, o unr.a. t II. tJPJ1U?e , I1t..an o 
i ity ~o State elrl)r(i!M in flate End Date Time on the Job 
Zip Code 
Zip Code 
587-7322. 
o ... z~Code 
Hours Per Week 
Paid by the month D hour D Rate of Pay $_~/~~~---· ~Q~()~-
Social Security Number Birth Date(Month/DayNear) 
Driver's License Number 
Home Phone Work Phone 
M~1\~ L _Of_ ~n Qt r 
~)f\~6,1~ 
Name of Spouse's Current or Last Employer Phone 
City State Zip Code 
Begin Date End Date Time on the Job Hours Per week 
Paid by the month D hour D Rate of Pay$ ______ _ 
-D-at_e_U-ne_m_p-lo_y_m-en_t_ -Da-te_U_n_e_m_p-lo-ym_e_n_t s Monthly Unempl. (or Ia.trt a.fl ,1tde1et1de11,t codrie...tt> r tJJ :t/1 
Benefits Began Benefits Terminate (anticipated income) J.L.e., ti A ]....... J. d" .h1a· .,,.1-o{I ~,, 
(or will begin) vf" .-/f I a.m. 1,ra. 1,(15 S.C>fll.€, ,,, ITlf..t..,,"lflce 
vn.so,ne~k uJ ;t:"),t /111 f ZLren ~~ _.FoY"' ro o r,1 cl.lld J:u,a:rd, 
1 hot,e. tn_, S c...la..n t1e~ e/ie. exf_ en Ge 5 
FINANCIAL 11 t - ()) It 
No. Children You Are Supporting _fl_ Monthly Support$ ____ Nf ~ildre! i~ :t~ You "if£:. A~ /I a 5 . e a 
Child Support Current? YesD No IQ"" Amount in Arrears$ ____ _ 
ASSETS 
Rent Dor OwnD Your Home 
Equity in Home 
Equity in Other Land or Property 
Year and Make of Vehicle(s) _____ _ 
Equity in Vehicle(s) 
Cash on Hand 
Cash in Checking Accounts 
Name of Bank __________ _ 
Cash in Savings Accounts 
Name of Bank __________ _ 
Other Assets __________ _ 
APPLICATION FOR PUBLIC DEFENDER-1 
:± 
$ D 
$ 2.6 .(Ji)_ 
$ 
------
$ ~(}/J.OD 
$ ---··--·" 
No. Adults Living With You __ Relationships _____ _ 
Mortgage Loan Balance $ 0 
Property Loan Balance $ {) 
Vehicle Loan Balance $ () 
Checking Acct. No. {)_ 
Savings Acct. No. J ~ {)b:2 {J '30Diw 
[REV 3-2000) 
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• 
HOUSEHOLD MONTHLY INCOME 
Your Wages (Take-home, Before Garnishments) s 2.~D. D.D.~~ 
Spouse's Wages (Take-home) $ 
--
Other Household Member Wages $ 
-
$ -A.F.D.C. 
Social Security $ 
-
S.S.I. I S.S.D. $ 
-
Unemployment Insurance $ 
Veterans Benefits $ 
-----
Retirement/Pension $ 
-
$ -Child Support/Alimony 
Other $ ----··· 
Total Monthly Income $ 2. ~D. o D.11,t15 
Amount of money remaining at the end of each month $ ______ _ 
If you are under legal age, who is your parent or guardian? 
Name 
City 
STATE OF IDAHO 
County of Ada 
State 
ss. 
Phone 
Zip Code 
• 
Continued on Reverse 
HOUSEHOLD MONTHLY DEBTS 
Rent or Mortgage Paid By You $ () 
Car Payment $ l> 
Food $ I) 
Utilities $ () 
Transportation $ () 
Auto Insurance $ () 
Day Care $ D 
Educational Loans $ {) 
Credit Cards $ 6 
Medical $ 0 
Child Support/Alimony $ 3 
Court Fines $ 0 
Other $ 0 
Total Monthly Debts $ 6 
Who will assist you financially? 
Name Phone 
City State Zip Code 
I am requesting that a lawyer be appointed to represent me, and I understand that I may be required to reimburse the public defender at the end 
of my ca . I swear under penalty of erjury that the answers above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge . 
.. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me on~:\~'(). 
APPLICATION FOR PUBLIC DEFENDER - 2 
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FILED 
Monday. January 07. 2013 at 10:40 AM 
CHRISTOPHER D. RI , CLERK OF THE COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHRISTOPHER A PENTICO, PLAINTIFF 
Plaintiff(s) 
vs 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEFENDANT 
Defendant(s) 
CASE NO. CV-PC-2013-00248 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I 
have mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the: VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF as notice pursuant to Rule 77 (d) I.R.C.P. to each of the parties 
or attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes addressed as follows: 
CHRISTOPHER A PENTICO 
120 CARRIE CIR 
MOUNTAIN HOME ID 83647 
(CONFORMED COPIES HANDED OVER THE COUNTER) 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
(COPY IN FILE IF NEEDED) 
Dated:Monday, January 07, 2013 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Court Reference 
1/1 
,,,, ....... ,, 
,,, ,,, 
.... ~ '(\ \\)DIC!,4 ,,, 
.., .. s..'\. o•••••o /_ A , .. , 
..,... .,., •• •• u/. , 
.., ~ •• "'E•• i.P '!. ~ ~ • s1f>;• • ;;, ., CHRISTOPHER J~>.O:RH:H «,.,,_<;, •. ~ ~ 
..; 0 • .,., • ~- -
Clerk of the Co~rt.) : 0~ 0~" : ~ E 
- .. 0 • -
- 0 ~ • ::,,., : 
,:, , • \ ..... I'- • .1-.. .. 
'-'· • y • :< .. 
., ....... .. . .:::; :: 
;,_ ,,:- > ·- • _.,.. c.,t:::J • .:-
1/7/2013 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL D STRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ACHRISTOPHER A PENTICO 
Defendant. 
) 
) CASE NO. CV PC 1300248 
) 
) 
~ ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC DEFENDER 
) 
This matter having come before this court as to the Application for Public Defender of , and 
good cause appearing therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, That an attorney be appointed 
through the; Public Defender's Office 
200 W. Front Street Rm. 1107 
Boise ID 83702, (208) 287-7400 
for the County of Ada, State of Idaho, a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, is hereby 
appointed to represent the above named applicant in all proceedings pursuant to I.R.C.P. 75(L)(1), 
of the in the above entitled case. 
The Defendant is further advised th.at he/she may be required to reimburse the Court for all 
or part of the cost of court appointed counsel. 
Date: J - J D - / 3 
Clerk will provide copies to: 
2C_Public Defender 
ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC DEFENDER 
k_Plaintiff 
ftC-
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GREG H. BOWER 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Stacy L. Langton 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Juvenile Division 
6300 Denton Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 704 
(208) 577-4900 
NO. ___ ____,=,_-...,...,.....,,,,,_-
A.M. ____ F1_.Le •• ~.~s--
MAR 2 6 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By CHR:ssv WARDLE 
D21-'UTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CVPC 2013-00248 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISMISSAL 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through STACY L. LANGTON, and moves 
for summary disposition of Christopher A. Pentico's (hereafter "Petitioner") petition for post-
conviction relief pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906( c) on the general basis that, in light of the 
pleadings, answers, admissions, and the record of the underlying criminal case, the petition fails 
to raise a genuine issue of material fact and should be summarily dismissed. 
Petitioner's constitutional claims have previously been addressed and found to lack merit 
on direct appeal. Additionally, Petitioner's constitutional claims fail to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact. 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL - 1 
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Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims fail to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. 
The specific grounds for dismissal of each of Petitioner's allegations are as set forth in the 
Brief in Support of the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal. The Brief in Support and the 
State's Answer are incorporated herein. 
DATEDthis I,~ day of March 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2~ day of March 2013, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL to be placed in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Ada County Public Defender 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise ID 83702 
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GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Stacy L. Langton 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Juvenile Division 
6300 Denton Street 
Boise, Idaho 83704 
Telephone: (208) 577-4900 
NO.-----:::F,::-::LE,;::--i--= ..... ;J::-s==<-.... ,-
A.M.-----, 
MAR 2 6 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By CHRISSY WARDLE 
Dl:PUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV-PC 2013-00248 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISMISSAL 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Stacy L. Langton, provides this brief 
in support of the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal of Christopher A. Pentico's (hereafter 
"Petitioner") petition for post-conviction relief. 
I. 
Factual And Procedural History 
On April 2, 2008, Petitioner was cited for Trespass, which citation was later amended to 
allege Trespass pursuant to LC. § 18-7008. 
On November 12, 2008, Petitioner filed his Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint 
raising constitutional issues regarding the application of LC.§ 18-7008. On January 6, 2009, the 
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Trial Court held a hearing regarding the Petitioner's motion and denied the same, finding no 
constitutional infirmities. 
On April 21, 2009, a court trial was held where the Petitioner was found to have 
committed the crime of Trespass pursuant to LC. § 18-7008 and was pronounced guilty. 
Petitioner was sentenced on May 11, 2009. 
Petitioner filed his appeal with the District Court on June 22, 2009. The District Court 
affirmed the Trial Court's decision in a Memorandum Decision and Order filed on May 13, 2010. 
Petitioner filed an appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court on June 24, 2010. The Idaho 
Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's affirmation of the Trial Court when it issued its 
Remittitur on January 10, 2012. 
Petitioner filed his Verified Petitioner for Post-Conviction Relief on January 4, 2013. 
II. 
Applicable Legal Standards 
The Court of Appeals of Idaho set forth the standard of review relating to post-conviction 
relief proceedings as follows: 
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in 
nature. State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Clark 
v. State, 92 Idaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 
918, 921, 828 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct.App.1992). Summary dismissal of an 
application pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-4906 is the procedural equivalent 
of summary judgment under LR.C.P. 56. Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the 
applicant must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which 
the request for post-conviction relief is based. LC.§ 19-4907; Russell v. State, 118 
Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.2d 654, 656 (Ct.App.1990). An application for post-
conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action, however, for 
an application must contain much more than "a short and plain statement of the 
claim" that would suffice for a complaint under LR.C.P. 8(a)(l). Rather, an 
application for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within 
the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records.or other evidence 
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supporting its allegations must be attached, or the application must state why such 
supporting evidence is not included with the application. LC. § 19-4903. In other 
words, the application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence 
supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal. 
Idaho Code Section 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of an application for 
post-conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own 
initiative. Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence 
has raised no genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in the applicant's 
favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. If such a factual issue is 
presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 
759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct.App.1991); Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 
146, 754 P.2d 458, 459 (Ct.App.1988); Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 89, 741 
P.2d 374, 376 (Ct.App.1987). Summary dismissal of an application for post-
conviction relief may be appropriate, however, even where the state does not 
controvert the applicant's evidence because the court is not required to accept 
either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible 
evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 
647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct.App.1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 
715 P.2d 369,372 (Ct.App.1986). 
Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 330-331, 971 P.2d 1151, 1154-1155 (Ct. App. 1998). 
III. 
Petitioner's Claim Should Be Summarily Dismissed 
Petitioner raises three general reasons why he believes that his petition for relief should 
be granted. Petitioner's allegations 16-21 which form his basis for his "First Cause of Action" 
reference the same constitutional argument that allegations 22-25 raise in his "Second Cause of 
Action." Verified Petition for Post Conviction Relief at 3-6. Because the "causes of actions" are 
identical in the sense that both challenge the constitutionality of the law under which Petitioner 
was charged and convicted, the State will address them as one "cause of action." 
Petitioner's allegations 26-29, on its face, allege that Petitioner was denied effective 
assistance of counsel because his counsel "was denied the right to fully challenge the 
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constitutionality of Idaho Code § 18-7008(8) 1. Verified Petition for Post Conviction Relief at 6. 
However, the State asserts that this label is disingenuous, and a closer reading of Petitioner's 
"Third Cause of Action" reveal that it is simply an attempt to reassert the constitutional 
challenges that Petitioner has made and remade at every stage of this proceeding. 
Because all of the allegations are redundant and do not raise an issue of material fact, the 
State respectfully asks this Court to summarily dismiss Petitioner's request for post-conviction 
relief. 
A. Petitioner Fails to State Any Ground Upon Which Relief Can be Granted 
Petitioner reasserts that his conviction occurred in violation of his rights under both the 
Idaho and the U.S. Constitutions. By reasserting his previous arguments and by relying solely on 
a constitutional argument, Petitioner has failed to raise any facts whatsoever, much less raise 
facts that would give rise to an issue of material fact. Where there are no factual allegations, the 
Petitioner is unable to take advantage of the presumption that case law requires a court "to accept 
the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, but need not accept the petitioner's conclusions." 
Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517,236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (Idaho 2010). 
Petitioner's request for relief is rife with conclusion and contains no facts to assert that 
there exists a question of material fact. Accordingly, the State respectfully asks this Court to 
summarily dismiss Petitioner's request as it fails to state any ground upon which relief can be 
granted. 
1 Petitioner's assertion that he was denied effective assistance of counsel based on the Court's ruling that 
his constitutional challenge was infirm is more accurately characterized as a general constitutional 
challenge to I.C. § 18-7008, which is simply a restatement of his other two "causes of action.". 
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B. Petitioner's Allegations Are Bare and Conclusory and Raise No Issue of Material Fact 
Petitioner's request for Post-Conviction Relief contains bare and conclusory allegations 
unsubstantiated by affidavits, records, or other admissible evidence as required by LC. § 19-
4906( c ). As previously stated, the Court "need not accept the petitioner's conclusion." Kelly v. 
State, supra. Because the Petitioner raises no new facts, but instead uses unsubstantiated 
pronouncements and erroneous conclusions of law as his basis for his requested relief, the State 
respectfully asks this Court to summarily dismiss Petitioner's request for relief. 
C. Petitioner Had Previously and Unsuccessfully Raised These Issues Both with the Trial 
Court and On Appeal 
Petitioner's claims were heard and rejected on direct appeal and were deemed 
unactionable under the principle of Res Judicata. Whitehawk v. State, 116 Idaho 831, 833, 780 
P.2d 153, 155 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989). In Whitehawk and while addressing the scope of a post-
conviction relief action the Court of Appeals of Idaho stated, "A convicted defendant may not 
simply relitigate the same factual questions in his application, in virtually the same factual 
context already presented in a direct appeal." Id. See also, Parsons v. State, 113 Idaho 421, 745 
P.2d 300 (Ct.App.1987); State v. Darbin, 109 Idaho 516, 708 P.2d 921 (Ct.App.1985). Because 
Petitioner is attempting to relitigate the constitutional issues previously decided at Trial Court 
level and on direct appeal, the State respectfully asks this Court to dismiss Petitioner's request 
for relief as it contrary to both established case law and not permitted by Idaho statute. 
D. To the Extent that Petitioner's Constitutional Claims are Different than Those 
Previously Asserted Before the Trial Court and On Appeal, Petitioner Has Defaulted His 
Right to Assert Those Issues 
Petitioner raises three reasons that his conviction was unconstitutional. Petitioner's "First 
Cause of Action" focuses on the argument that a citizen cannot be trespassed from public 
property during the civic exercise of the right the freedom of speech. Petitioner's "Second Cause 
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of Action" focuses on Petitioner's perception that there was no evidence of his inappropriate use 
of the public property from which he was trespassed. Petitioner's "Third Cause of Action" argues 
that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because the Trial Court refused to allow his 
attorney to illicit sufficient testimony or make an adequate evidentiary record. Each of these 
allegations focuses on the same general constitutional issues that have previously been heard on 
direct appeal. To the extent that these new constitutional claims differ in nuance from the claims 
previously raised, the State asserts that these new constitutional arguments have not been 
persevered for consideration because they have been procedurally waived as each of these issues 
could have been raised on direct appeal. 
LC. § 19-4901(b) states, "Any issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but 
was not, is forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings, unless it appears 
to the court, on the basis of a substantial factual showing by affidavit, deposition or otherwise 
that the asserted basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of 
guilt and could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been presented earlier." Because the 
request for relief asserts no factual basis for relief and because the Petitioner has previously 
raised and was unsuccessful with his constitutional challenges to the Trial Court's rulings, the 
Petitioner's request for relief is barred by LC.§ 19-4901(b). 
Because the Petitioner's constitutional claims have previously been raised on direct 
appeal and even if there are subtitle nuisances distinguishing these claims from the previous 
claims, the State respectfully asks this Court to summary dismiss Petitioner's request for relief 
because Petitioner's claims have been waived under LC.§ 19-4901(b). 
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E. Petitioner's Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Is Not Cognizable Under I.C. § 
18-4901(a) 
Petitioner fails to state claim that is cognizable under I.C. § 19-4901(a) because his 
assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel is merely the reassertion of the same constitutional 
challenges paired with a different name. Petitioner has consistently reasserted his perceived 
constitutional defects. His insistence on asserting this challenge lead to one telling exchange 
between the Trial Court and his trial counsel during the trial held on April 21, 2009. 
THE COURT: ... That's a legal question and I've ruled. We're not going 
to have a testimony about whether Mr. Pentico's actions were justified 
under the First Amendment. 
MR. DERR: I see. And, of course, the Court understands we've ordered 
that before. We think that's the basic element of this case, is the ---
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Derr, I'm very concerned. You don't have to 
agree with my ruling. 
MR. DERR: I know. 
THE COURT: But you have to follow it. You can appeal. But we're not 
going to have testimony about the First Amendment in this trial. 
Transcript at 5-6. 
The record indicates that Petitioner's trial counsel reluctantly complied with the Trial 
Court's ruling. Equating trial counsel's compliance with a Trial Court's order and terming it 
ineffective assistance of counsel is a claim not cognizable under I.C. § 19-4901. 
In the alterative, the application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), leaves 
the Petitioner a legally insufficient claim. Petitioner's claim that his legal counsel was ineffective 
is bare and conclusory, and contradicted by clear evidence in the court record. Accordingly, the 
State respectfully asks this Court to summarily dismiss the Petitioner's requested relief as it is 
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not an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but simply reasserts the previously adjudicated 
issues dealt with on appeal. 
IV. 
Purpose of State's 30 Day Filing Requirement 
While the State notes that its Answer is not in compliance with the 3 0 day filing 
requirement as set forth in LC. § 19-4906, the State has taken steps to remedy the delay and to 
timely frame the issues presented to this Court for consideration in light of Bjorklund v. State, 
130 Idaho 373, 941, P.2d 345 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997). In Bjorklund, the State had filed an 
untimely Answer to a petitioner request for a post-conviction relief action. Id. at 378, 941 P.2d at 
350. The petitioner in that case asserted that the delay should have prevented the district court 
from summarily dismissing the application. Id. The Court of Appeals of Idaho disagreed and 
stated: 
"The question is whether the district court was satisfied, based on the documents before it, that 
there was no right to relief. . ... This determination would have to be made with no regard to the 
state's counter-assertions of fact or its argument contained in its response." Id. 
The Court of Appeals continued, "The Idaho Supreme Court, in Fetterly v. State, 121 
Idaho 417, 825 P.2d 1073 (1991), stated that the purpose of the thirty-day requirement of LC.§ 
19-4906(a) is to 'properly frame any factual and legal issues before the district court so that it can 
make an intelligent ruling.' Id at 418, 825 P.2d at 1074, citing Cherniwchan v. State, 99 Idaho 
128, 578 P.2d 244 (1978). In Fetterly, the Supreme Court declined to deem the failure to respond 
in a timely fashion reversible error." 
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CONCLUSION 
Petitioner's claims fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding both deficient 
performance and resulting prejudice. The State respectfully asks this Court to dismiss Petitioner's 
request for relief as it contrary to both established case law and not permitted by Idaho statute. 
The State is therefore entitled to summary dismissal pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906( c) and the 
State respectfully asks this Court grant the state's motion for summary dismissal.. 
DATED this ~~ day of March 2013. 
9 StL.Langt 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ::?~ day of · ~ 2013, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION to be placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Ada County Public Defender 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise ID 83702 
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GREG H. BOWER 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Stacy L. Langton 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Juvenile Division 
6300 Denton Street 
Boise, Idaho 83704 
(208) 577-4900 
ND.----F~ILE,:c-D ...... ;;s~~5-.,, --
A.M. ____ _..M ..... _~----
MAR 2 6 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By CHR:ssv WARDLE 
Dct'UTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CVPC 2013- 00248 
ANSWER 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Stacy L. Langton, and answers 
Christopher A. Pentico's (hereafter "Petitioner") petition for post-conviction relief in the above-
entitled action as follows: 
I. 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S GENERAL POST-CONVICTION 
ALLEGATIONS 
1. The State admits that Christopher A. Pentico is the petitioner in the above-referenced 
matter. As to Petitioner's current address, the State is without knowledge and therefore denies the 
same. 
2. The State admits this allegation. 
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3. The State admits this allegation. 
4. The State is without knowledge and therefore denies the same. 
5. The State admits that Petitioner was sentenced as listed in his allegation. Regarding 
arguments at sentence hearing, subjective perceptions of the Petitioner, and the potential for 
prejudice, the State is without knowledge and therefore denies this allegation in part. 
6. The State admits this allegation. 
7. The State admits this allegation. 
8. The State admits this allegation. 
9. The State admits this allegation. 
10. The State notes that the Registry of Action is silent on this claim, therefore the State 
is without knowledge and denies this allegation. 
11. The State admits that the case was appealed to the Supreme Court, however is without 
knowledge as to its timeliness, and therefore denies this allegation in part. 
12. The State admits this allegation. 
13. The State acknowledges that the Petitioner was represented by the parties mentioned, 
however the State is without knowledge as to fee arrangement and, therefore, denies this 
allegation in part with respect to fee arraignment. 
14. The State is without knowledge and therefore denies the same. 
15. The State is without knowledge and therefore denies the same. 
II. 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
16. The State denies this allegation. 
1 7. The State denies this allegation. 
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18. The State denies this allegation. 
19. The State denies this allegation. 
20. The State denies this allegation. 
21. The State denies this allegation. 
III. 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
22. The State denies this allegation. 
23. The State denies this allegation. 
24. The State denies this allegation. 
25. The State denies this allegation 
IV. 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S TIDRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
26. The State denies this allegation. 
27. The State denies this allegation. 
28. The State denies this allegation. 
29. The State denies this allegation. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Petitioner fails to state any grounds upon which relief can be granted. Idaho Code § 19-
4901(a); I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
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SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Petitioner's request for Post-Conviction Relief contains bare and conclusory allegations 
unsubstantiated by affidavits, records, or other admissible evidence, and therefore fails to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact. Idaho Code§§ 19-4902(a), 19-4903, and 19-4906. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Petitioner claims were heard and rejected on direct appeal and were deemed unactionable 
under the principle of Res Judicata. Whitehawk v. State, 116 Idaho 831, 780 P .2d 153 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 1989). 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
To the extent Petitioner's claims should have been raised on direct appeal, the claims are 
procedurally defaulted. Idaho Code § 19-4901 (b ). 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Petitioner fails to state claim that is cognizable under LC. § 19-4901(a) and Petitioner's 
claim is legally insufficient. 
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• • 
WHEREFORE, Respondent prays for relief as follows: 
a) That Petitioner's claims for post-conviction relief be denied; 
b) That Petitioner's claims for post-conviction relief be summarily dismissed; 
c) For such other and further relief as the court deems necessary in the case. 
DATED this .!l!!.._ day of March 2013. 
~ 
~ifcy L. Langton 
ep~ttorney for Ada County 
VERIFICATION 
The Respondent, by and through -~----=~,(..._~~-e--~~_.....,.=.w,ly~---·' being 
first duly sworn under oath, deposes and says: 
1) I am the attorney for the Respondent in the above-entitled matter. 
2) That the facts contained in the foregoing Answer to Petitioner's Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief are true and correct to the best of my information and belief. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
County of AoA 
) 
) ss: 
) 
I hereby certify that on this .;7&, day of ~ 2013, personally 
appeared before me Jonathan E. Roundy who, being first duly sworn, declared that he is 
representing the Respondent in this action, and that the statements contained in the foregoing 
document are believed to be true to the best of my information and belief. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal on 
the day and year first above written. 
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11' ORIE ,,, 
.... , ~ IV ,,, 
.... ····•··· ~~ ,, .:, •• •• v· '., ~ .• N •. ~,._ : •• o,- ... 7 \ 
: : ' "1.,t,. ' ,cl : 
: c,:i • ~ • ·r~ •..,.: 
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\~· •• lrc .l i 
.... v· •• •• .. . 
,,, O;;, •••••••• .... . 
'•,,, ID A 'fl O ,,,, .. 
,,,,,., .... ,,,, 
~~~~ 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at: &.:s:6 , Idaho 
My Commission Expires: /:7 /4o;/cz 
" 7 State of Idaho 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this .;7~ day of ';?k~ 2013, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER to be placed in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid, addressed to: 
Ada County Public Defender 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise ID 83702 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF _THE FOU~.TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT Of0THE 
STAT~ OF IDAH~:·~.AND FO~ THE COUNTY OF ADA A~======-~FrLCei:~~i""JT/tri£qr-ro-A--: 
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO, 
Petitioner, 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-PC-2013-00248 APR 3 a 2013 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent, 
. ) 
) 
) 
) 
CHRISTOPHER D RI 
By VICKY EMER~H, Clerk 
DEPUTY 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO GRANT 
SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
The court hereby gives notice to the parties pursuant to Idaho Code sec. 19-4906(b) of 
its' intent to grant the Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal for the reasons that 
the Petition attempts to re-litigate issues previously heard and decided on direct appeal, 
and for failing to state claims upon·':"hich relief can be granted. 
•'·, 
,.j. ,,. 
~ ...... . 
Kevin Swain - Magistrate Judge ·. :: f; .' ,: . , 
·-.,! - .... ··'! ;· 
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IN THE DIST ui~T COURT OF THE FOURTu . ., UDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
NO. ___ ""i:iii:~-,-.-+-r.-
COUNTY oF ADA "-"'" FIL~~- 1 ; 4o = . 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
APR 3 0 2013 
CHRtSTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By VICKY EMERY 
DEPUTY 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. Christopher A. Pentico, 
) CASE NO. CV-PC-2013-00248 
) 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Vicky Emery, the undersigned Court Clerk do hereby certify that I 
have mailed, postage prepaid, by United States Mail, one copy of the notice 
of intent to grant summary dismissal, to each of the parties of record in this 
cause in envelopes addressed as follows: 
Ada County Prosecutor's Office 
Interoffice Mail 
Ada County Public Defender's Office 
Interoffice Mail 
Dated this 30th day of April, 2013. 
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419 
: ____ Flleo..r .• M i:A}~ 
MAY 2 0 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By SARA WRIGHT 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHRISTOPHER PENTICO, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_______________ .) 
Criminal No. CV-PC-2013-248 
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO 
STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION 
Petitioner Christopher Pentico submits the following in opposition to the State's 
motion for summary disposition. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
It is well known that an application for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. While an 
applicant for post-conviction relief must eventually prove the allegations upon which the 
application is based, summary disposition is not appropriate unless the applicant's evidence 
raises no genuine issue of material fact. This Court should determine whether a genuine issue of 
fact exists based upon the record of the criminal case along with the pleadings, and together with 
any affidavits on file. In doing so, it must liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences 
in favor of the non-moving party. Only if the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the 
applicant to relief may the trial court dismiss the application without holding an evidentiary 
PETITIONERS RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
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hearing. Kelly v. State,_ Idaho_,_ p.3d _, 2010 WL 2901795 *2 (2010). Here, as 
will be demonstrated below, Mr. Pentico has presented evidence which if true would entitle him 
to relief. Therefore, the State's motion must be denied and the matter should be set for an 
evidentiary hearing. 
B. ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION 
There was a court trial in this case which ended in a conviction. Mr. Pentico filed an 
appeal. He then filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. Pending before this Court is 
the State's motion for summary dismissal. This brief is in opposition to the State's motion 
1. Petitioner's asserts three causes of action for which relief can be granted. 
(a) Substantive Due Process. 
Mr. Pentico asserted on direct appeal that the initial ask to leave on March 25, 2008 was a 
violation of his substantive due process rights. The initial "ask to leave" was never addressed 
and the Courts concluded that the issue was not preserved for appeal. In essence the record was 
inadequate because no facts were put forward which would tend to corroborate or substantiate 
that on March 25, 2008 Mr. Pentico was engaging in constitutionally protected conduct when he 
was asked to leave the Capital Annex for apparently no reason at all. 
Idaho Code § 19-4901 (1) affords a convicted person the right to seek to set aside a 
conviction which was entered in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the State of 
Idaho. LC. 18-7008(8) cannot be constitutionally applied to criminalize his actions and the facts 
are now before this Court to establish that his conduct was protected on March 25, 2008. See 
Affidavit of Christopher Pentico Attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
(b) Procedural Due Process 
Mr. Pentico asserted on direct appeal that the initial ask to leave on March 25, 2008 was a 
PETITIONERS RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
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violation of his procedural due process rights. Because Mr. Pentico was engaged in appropriate 
behavior on March 25, 2008 the one year absolute ban on his return is facially overbroad because 
his is being banned from public property for a full year without recourse and without a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard. Because Mr. Pentico's conviction is based on a statute 
which deprives him of significant liberty interests and which affords him no meaningful or 
adequate due process the conviction is unconstitutional and should be set aside. 
Idaho Code § 19-4901(1) affords a convicted person the right to seek to set aside a 
conviction which was entered in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the State of 
Idaho. LC. 18-7008(8) cannot be constitutionally applied to criminalize his actions. 
Furthermore, this issue was raised on direct appeal but the Court of Appeals never addressed the 
issue of procedural due process. Whether it was an oversight or unintentional is unclear, 
however, Mr. Pentico is entitled to have the .issue addressed. See Affidavit of Heidi Tolman 
attached hereto as Exhibit B; and The opinion of the Court of Appeals in State v. Pentico Docket 
No. 37834. 
( c) Ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The Defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment has been 
incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the 
states. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). Idaho law also guarantees a criminal 
defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. Idaho Const. Art. I, § 13; LC. § 19-852. 
Trial Counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to create a sufficient factual record 
and he failed to raise critical constitutional challenges and defenses which were then not 
addressed by The Court of Appeals because they were not preserved for appeal. 
PETITIONERS RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
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To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Pentico must show that the 
attorney's performance was deficient, and that he was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). To establish deficiency, the applicant has the burden 
of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988) The Idaho courts have long 
adhered to the proposition that tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second 
guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of 
relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 
231,233, 880 P.2d 261,263 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to adequately traise constitutional 
challenges to the statute as it applied to him on March 25, 2008. The Court in its opinion held 
that the record was inadequate to allow review for claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The record has now been made clear and Mr. Pentico is entitled to a hearing regarding his claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel. Please see Affidavit of Alan Derr attached hereto as Exhibit 
C and Affidavit of Bruce Bistline attached hereto as Exhibit D. The facts contained within the 
affidavits, if looked at in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, raise genuine issues 
of material fact that should at the least be addressed at an evidentiary hearing. 
2. Petitioner's allegations are not bare and conclusory. 
As stated above the petitioner has supplemented the record with the affidavits of trial 
counsel Alan Derr and appellate counsel Bruce Bistline. While it is true that this Court does not 
need to accept the petitioner's conclusions this Court must address the facts that have now been 
introduced which when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party raise a 
genuine is~ue of material fact that must be addressed at an evidentiary hearing. 
PETITIONERS RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
Page 4 
000045
3. Petitioner Has Previously Raised The Constitutional Issues With The Court On 
Appeal However His Claims With Regard To Substantive And Procedural Due 
Process Were Not Addressed In The Court's Opinion. 
The state asserts that the petitioner is attempting to re-litigate the constitutional issues 
previously decided at the trial court level and on direct appeal and that this Court should 
summarily dismiss the petitioner's request for relief as it is contrary to both established case law 
and not permitted by Idaho statute. However it is Mr. Pentico's position that with respect to the 
first and second cause of action he is not attempting to re-litigate the issues, he is attempting to 
have the issues decided. On appeal Mr. Pentico raised procedural and substantive due process 
issues specifically with respect to March 25, 2008. Those issues were not decided by the trial 
court, nor were they addressed by the court on appeal. Mr. Pentico is entitled to have those 
claims addressed. (see Affidavit of Heidi Tolman, Exhibit A). Mr. Pentico never waived these 
issues as the State claims because they were raised on appeal, they just were never addressed by 
the court in its decision. (see Affidavit of Heidi Tolman, Exhibit A; and The opinion of the Court 
of Appeals in State v. Pentico Docket No. 37834). 
4. Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel at trial in violation 
of the Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel Under Strickland v. 
Washington. 
The petitioner has supported this section with affidavits demonstrating the evidence 
which was available at the time of trial, its significance and the failure of the courts to address 
them on direct appeal because the issues were not preserved for appeal by trial counsel. The 
Court of Appeals in its decision held that the record on appeal was not adequate to allow it to 
review Pentico's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and it declined to do so. The 
affidavits provided to this Court with regard to March 25, 2008 and the Motion in Limine state 
that it was not a tactical or strategic decision of trail counsel not to raise those issues. Further the 
PETITIONERS RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
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affidavit of Bruce Bistline asserts that there would or could be no strategic reason as to omit of 
recognize the importance of the March 25, 2008 date. Please see Exhibit C, and Exhibit D. 
C. CONCLUSION 
If the allegations are true, The facts at issues are material. Mr. Pentico was convicted of a 
trespass in violation of Idaho Code § 18-7008(8) which is a violation of his substantive due 
process rights because this statute cannot be applied to criminalize actions which are 
constitutionally protected First Amendment rights. Further the idea that an individual can be 
banned from public property for one year without regard to any meaningful or adequate due 
process procedures is unconstitutional and a violation of Mr. Pentico's procedural due process 
rights. Finally, Mr. Pentico was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by 
the United States Constitution. The facts at issue are material, and if the allegations are true, this 
court should deny the State's Motion for Summary Disposition and set this matter for an 
evidentiary hearing. 
Respectfully submitted this J-D day of May 2013. 
Heidi Tolman 
Attorney for Petitioner 
PETITIONERS RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this 20th day of May, 2013, I hand delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to the: 
ADA COUNTY PRSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Stacy Langton 
PETITIONERS RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO, 
PETITIONER, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
RESPONDENT. 
STATEOFIDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV PC 1300248 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO 
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO, being first duly sworn, upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am over the age of 18 and I make this affidavit based upon my own personal 
knowledge. 
2. On March 25, 2008, I wanted to speak Representative Lenore Barrett with whom I had 
recently spoken about my concerns about actions at Boise State University which was 
discriminating among students and programs based upon religion. I wanted to talk to her 
about my desire to obtain an opinion from the Idaho Attorney General's Office regarding 
this issue. At the time, the Legislature was in session so I went to the interim Statehouse 
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(then known as the "Capital Annex"), which was at that time the former Ada County 
Courthouse which occupies the entire block bounded by Sixth Street, Jefferson Street, 
Fifth Street and State Street. 
3. I arrived at Representative Barrett's office shortly before noon. She was not there but I 
spoke to her secretary who advised me that Representative Barrett would be back shortly 
after the lunch hour. I discussed coming back at that time and left the Capital Annex 
without, to the best of my recollection, any conversation with any other person. 
4. I went to get some lunch and returned about an hour later to make sure I was at 
Representative Barrett's office in time to catch her before the afternoon schedule which 
usually begins at about 1 :30. 
5 As I crossed the street and got to the sidewalk and reached the block on which the Capital 
Annex is located, I was approached by a State Police Trooper who spoke to me and asked 
me to wait for a moment to meet with another Trooper. After a few moments Trooper 
Partis arrived and told me that I needed to leave the grounds of the Capital Annex and 
that I was no longer approved to be at the Capital Annex, the Governor's Office, and the 
Offices of the Department of Education. He also told me that I was not to contact any 
legislators or even attempt to communicate with them by e-mail. 
6. I felt very uncomfortable with Trooper Partis standing there, but I did attempt to get an 
understanding of why I was being ordered to leave and who ordered it. I was 
stonewalled and not able to get any further information other than that my behavior was 
making people nervous and uncomfortable. I peaceably left the Capital Annex grounds 
for fear of being arrested at that time. 
7. On March 25, 2008, the only government office that I visited was the Capital Annex. 
Affidavit of Christopher A. Pentico Page2 
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8. During the time that Mr. Derr represented me, I believe that at one time or another I told 
Mr. Derr everything that is set out above but I do not recall ever having a single 
conversation in which we focused upon this information and discussed it in a complete 
manner. Mr. Derr did assert that the events of March 25, 2008, were not a crime because 
I never refused to leave the property, but other than that his arguments were focused on 
the fact that the events of April 2, 2008, were not a trespass under either of the first two 
complaints and not lawfully a trespass under the third complaint because I was engaged 
in constitutionally protected activity. Mr. Derr and I briefly discussed the possibility that 
my conduct on April 2, 2008, could not itself be a trespass if I had been 
unconstitutionally ordered off of State property on March 2511, but that argument was 
abandoned. Mr. Derr and I never discussed why he was abandoning that argument. 
FURTHER Your Affiant Sayeth Not. 
DATED this 20th day of May, 2013. 
P.002/002 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, a Notary Public in and for the State of 
Idaho, this irf" day of May, 2013. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of May, 2013, I placed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to the: 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Stacy Langton 
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419 
u 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHRISTOPHER PENTICO, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Criminal No. CV-PC-2013-248 
AFFIDAVIT OF HEIDI TOLMAN 
Heidi Tolman, being duly sworn and upon oath, hereby says: 
1) I am an attorney who has been duly licensed to practice law in the State ofldaho since 2010. 
2) I represented the Petitioner herein, Christopher Pentico in both the District Court and the 
Court of Appeals appeal proceedings in State v. Pentico, CR-MD-2008-5321. 
3) That I have read the post-conviction petition filed in this case. 
4) I am attaching hereto portions of the appellant's brief to the Court of Appeals as Exhibit A in 
which Constitutional arguments relating to substantive and procedural due process were 
raised on direct appeal, however were never addressed by the Court in its opinion, 
specifically as follows: 
i) That the request that Mr. Pentico leave the Captial Annex grounds was itself 
unconstitutional because he was there to exercise important and protected 1st 
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Amendment Rights. 
ii) That the portion of the statute which purports to criminalize the return to the property 
for one year (and in this case the "conduct" upon which Mr. Pentico was convicted) is 
unconstitutional as it pertains to entries onto State land which constitutes a 
Traditional Public Forum or a Designated Public Forum both because it is an 
impermissible prior restraint of protected I st Amendment activities and because it is a 
prohibition which affords no procedural due process mechanism by which the citizen 
can contest the initial "request to leave" or the duration of bar against returning. 
This ends my affidavit. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF ADA ) 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me, a Notary Public, in and 
for the State of Idaho, County of Ada, on this 6th day of 
Affidavit of Heidi Tolman, Page 2 
Notary Public.f 
Residing at:_-{,1->,_._.;;_;'-r---:~e,-:;--.::.....:"""""-~ 
My commission expires:___,-=--~~~;....;;_~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this 20th day of May, 2013, I placed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to the: 
ADA COUNTY PRSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Stacy Langton 
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IV. ARGUivIBNT 
A. Pentico cannot be convicted under Idaho Code 18-7008 because, based 
upon the evidence allowed by the Trial Court, the State failed to prove all 
elements of the crime and because the Court erred in preventing him from 
providing evidence of an affirmative defense. 
The Trial Court erred as a matter of law in four distinct instances when it found. 
Pentico guilty of misdemeanor criminal trespass. The statute at issue states: 
J.C. § 18-7008. Trespass-Acts constitution.-A. Every person who will:fully commits 
any trespass, by either: 
(8) except under landlord-tenant relationship, who first being duly notified in 
writing, or verbally by the owner or authorized agent of the owner of real 
property, to immediately depart from the same and who refuses to so depart, or 
who, without permission or invitation, returns and enters said property within a 
year, after being so notified. 
1. The Trial Court erred as a matter oflaw when it concluded that Pentico 
had been properly asked to leave State property without any regard for the 
conduct which triggered that request. 
I.C. § 18-7008(8) describes a crime which can occur in two ways. The first part of the 
statute criminalizes a failure to leave property after a qualifying request (herein "asked to 
leave") .. To qualify as an "ask to leave" the request must be made orally or in writing by the 
owner or his agent. The second part (herein the "no return within one year" part) criminalizes 
returning to same property within a year after there has been a qualified "ask to leave." 
A crime can, as to private property, constitutionally arise under the "ask to leave" part 
of the statute without regard to the behavior of the trespasser. State v. Missamore, 119 Idaho 27, 
03 P.2d 528 (1990). "All that is required for an LC.§ 18-7008(8) violation is that the defendant 
refuse to leave property that belongs to another after being so requested by the owner or 
authorized agent." Id. However, it is apparent that the unconstrained right to direct a person to 
Appellant's Brief 8 EXHIBI.T A 
000056
leave private property does not extend to public property. In State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 69 
P.3d 126 (2003), the defendant. who was behaving inappropriately was asked to leave public 
property and was arrested when he refused to do so. Korsen stands for the proposition that an 
inappropriately behaved citizen who has no legitimate business at a public office can be asked to 
leave by the chief administrator of that office and arrested for refusing to do so. Thus, it would 
appear clear that while a person can be asked to leave private property for any reason or no 
reason at all that the same.cannot be said about public property. 
The "no return within one year" portion of the trespass statute is the basis upon which 
conviction was entered in this case. There are no cases on point regarding the second part of the 
statute yet from the structure of the statute it is ciear that there can be no "no return within one 
·, ; year'' violation if there is no qualifying "ask to leave." It is upon the occurrence of the 
necessary "ask to leave", that the "no return within one year" provision is triggered. Thus, it 
~-
,. 
. . 
would appear that in the context of public property, before a returning within one year violation 
could be found, it would be necessary for the trier of fact to detemiine that there was a qualifying 
"ask to leave" and that means, in the case of public property, a valid reason for the "ask to 
In this matter, the Trial Court concluded so long as Pentico was asked to leave by an 
authorized person a qualifying "ask to leave had occurred". This ruling precluded evidence 
regarding Pentico's conduct and prevented the Court from having a foundation for :finding that 
i.! there was anything about Pentico's conduct which would legally trigger a valid "ask to leave." 
,., 
,, 
While Pentico objecte~ ~o this ruling the State did not. The State appeared quite content to 
proceed to trial without being given the opportunity to demonstrate that·O:fficer Pattis had any 
reasonable basis for asking Pentico to leave State land which citizens must have access to in 
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B. Idaho Code§ 18-7008(8) violates the Idaho Constitution Art. 1 Sec 13 and the 5th 
Amendment of the United States Constitution as applied to the State of Idaho 
through the 14th Amendment and therefore cannot be constitutionally applied to 
Pentico. 
Where the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance is challenged, the lower Court's 
determination is reviewed de novo. State v. Hammersley, 134 Idaho 816, 818, 10 P.3d 1285, 
1287 (2000). The party challenging a statute on constitutional grounds bears the burden of 
establishing that the statute is unconstitutional and must overcome a strong presumption of 
~-. validity. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003). Appellate Courts are 
obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute that upholds its constitutionality. Id. However, if a 
I 
!' statute "as applied" to a particular defendant infringes upon his or her First Amendment right of 
freedom of speech, the defendant's convictiop. must be reversed without showing that such 
infringement was substantial. State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885, 893, 88 P.3d 704, 712 (2004). 
The trespass statute as applied under the circumstances of this case is unconstitutionally 
overbroad and vague and therefore violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
The statute in question LC. §18-7008(8) did not adequately notify Pentico about what conduct 
gives a governmental agent legal cause to demand that Pentico leave a particular piece of public 
property which is a·public forum at the risk of criminal prosecution. The statute does not provide 
any procedural due process but if taken upon its face results in an automatic one year exclusion. 
For this period the statute would, if taken on its face, create an impermissible prior restraint upon 
subsequent attempts to enter a public forum to exercise constitutionally protected rights .. 
Idaho Code § 18-7008(8) as it has been applied to Pentico is unconstitutional both 
because it works to deny him substantive due process and procedural due process. Early in the 
proceedings in this matter the Trial Court ruled that the Statute was constitutional as applied to 
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Pentico and refused to allow either party to put on any eviclence regarding his conduct on or 
before March 25, 2008 (date he was asked to leave). The District Court concluded that Pentico 
had failed to preserve any constitutional challenge other than claim that he was engaged in 
constitutionally protected conduct on April 2, 2008. 
1. Pentico should not be precluded from raising all relevant constitutional 
challenges to the application ofl.C. § 18-7008 to his presence upon State 
land which was a public forum. 
a) Pentico did what he could to raise his constitutional challenges to 
the Statute but was precluded from adequately doing so by the 
erroneous rulings of the Trial Court. 
Pentico raised the constitutionality of that statute before the Trial Court. It is true that 
, -·: trial Counsel did not state the various constitutional challenges with the pr.ecision with which 
they have been raised on appeal but he did raise the issue .. He cited from his brief a discussion 
founded upon a quotation from State v. Korsen in-which the Supreme Court acknowledges that if 
Idaho Code_§ 18-7008(8) was applied against a person on public property in order to exercise his 
free speech rights then the statute could be challenged on an "as applied" basis.43 Trial Counsel 
also called the Trial Court's attention to fact that the properties at issue in this case were all 
public forums and that restrictions on the use of those properties requir~d strict scrutiny._44 
.-. 
··: 
.·. ~ 
At that point in the proceedings, the Trial Court found that the statue was constitutional 
as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction ( a odd finding conside~g he had and would 
allow no evidence regarding the conduct that caused Pentico to be asked to leave) and he 
thereafter consistently refused to allow any party to put on any _evidence regarding the events that_ 
lead up to the "ask to leave." Consistent with this ruling the Trial Court maintained that the only 
43 TR Mtn 10:5-16 
44 TR Mtn 16:3-26 
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') 
issues to be tried regarding the "ask to leave" were whether it happened and whether the person 
who made the request had authority to do so. 
From that point on, Pentico,.s Trial Counsel was, absent choosing to violate the Court's 
order, confined to challenging application of the "no return within one year" prohibition to 
Pentico's conduct. Trial Counsel did try one additional time to alert the Trial Court to the 
constitutional problems inherent in the prosecution when he argued during closing argument at 
trial that this case could not be treated as an ordinary simple trespass, that the initial trespass ( ask 
to leave) was not valid and that he had been precluded by the Court's orders from even going 
into the "as applied" challenge to the statute. 45 
On ~s record it is not appropriate to conclude that Pentico failed to make an attempt to 
advise the Court that the prosecution was· unconstitutional as applied to Pentico because there 
was no constitutionally valid "ask to leave." On this record it ·is appropriate to conclude that 
Pentico has preserved the right to challenge the constitutionality of the statute as it was being 
applied on all due process grounds because (a) he had been asked to leave a· traditional public 
forum where he had been exercising his First Amendment rights for no apparently adequate 
reason and, (b) because without due process he was being precluded for a period of one year 
I 
f:'"' from entering other traditional public forums to reasonably exercise his First Amendment rights. 
b) Even if the Court determines that Pentico has not preserved for 
appeal all of his due process claims the Court can still address 
those claims. 
The Idaho Appellate Courts have generally held that the constitutionality of a statute will 
not be considered for the first time o~ appeal. See State v. Fox, 130 Idaho ·385, 387, 941 P.2d 
357, 359 (Ct. App. 1997) (refusing to consider whether an arson statute was unconstitutionally 
45 TR Trial 60:19 to 62:21 
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vague or overbroad where the defendant had failed to raise the issue before the Trial Court). 
Tb.ere are, however, two exceptions to this rule: 
First, an Appellate Court may address the constitutionality of a statute where the issue 
has not been preserved if persuaded that it would be :fundamental error for the Court to allow a 
defendant to waive the right at issue. State v. Hollon, 136 Idaho 499, 503, 36 P.3d 1287, 1291 
(Ct.App.2001) (in the circumstances of that case the waiver of vagueness and overbreadth 
challenges were not considered to be :fundamental error). "Error that is fundamental must be such 
error as goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights or must go to the foundation of the 
case or take from the defendant a right which was essential to his defense and which no Court 
could or ought to permit him to waive." State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 716, 215 P.3d 414, 
!~ 436 (2009). In this case, the right implicated-the right to petition government for redress of 
.:·:, 
~ :;·.: 
,···, 
grievances-is a liberty safeguarded by the Bill of Rights and is intimately co~ected both in 
origin and in purpose with other First Amendment rights of free speech and press. United Mine 
Workers of America, Dist 12 v. lllinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967). Moreover, 
the impairment of that right which arises from Officer Partis' mandate that, for no apparent 
permissible reason, Pentico should leave State land, which is a traditional public forum, goes to 
the very foundation of the criminal charge in this case. On this basis, it is appropriate to review 
on appeal under the fundamental error doctrine the merits of Pentico' s constitutional challenges 
even if they were not raised at the Trial Court level. 
The second justification for considering constitutional arguments for the first time on 
appeal is in the event of ineffective assistance of c<;>unsel. State v. Y_akovac, 145 Idaho 437, 442-
443 (Idaho 2008). The constitutional arguments are, in the circumstances of this case, such an 
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important aspect of the defense to this charge that it cannot be said there would be a valid 
strategic reason for trial counsel to waive those arguments, (if he in fact did). 
2. Enforcement of LC. §18-7008(8) violates Pentico's Substantive Due 
Process rights because it is, as applied to him under the circumstances of 
this case unconstitutionally overbroad. 
Any application of the Bill of Rights to limit State action falls within the rubric of 
substantive due process. Most rights included in the Bill of Rights are incorporated against the 
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States 
Supreme Court has long recognized that the right to petition goverilment· for a redress of 
I grievance is a liberty safeguarded by the Bill of Rights and is intimately connected both in origin 
i. 
I 
I. 
,~-
I. 
'I' 
I 
r 
i 
and in purpose with the other First Amendment rights of free speech and press. United Mine 
Workers of America, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217,222 (1967). 
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of people to peaceably assemble, and to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Const. Amend. I. Although this right is not 
absolute and does not guarantee unlimited access to government property for expressive 
purposes; restrictions must not be content based and the property designation must be taken into 
consideration in determining whether any restriction is permissible. 
a) The Trial Court erred as a matter of law when it failed to consider 
Pentico's "as applied" overbreadth challenge 
The concept of overbreadth of criminal laws rests on principles of substantive due 
process which limits the obstruction of certain individual freedoms. The principal issue is,. . 
whether the language of the statute, given its normal meaning, is so broad that its sanctions may 
apply to conduct protected by the Constitution. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 
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665, 92 L.Ed. 840. The overbreadth doctrine is a means of challenging the constitutionality of a 
statute on its face or as· applied to particular conduct. If the statute is being challenged "as 
applied" then the application of the statut~ is unconstitutional if it infringes upon constitutionally 
protected conduct and does not serve to protect a significant state interest. State v. Poe, 139 
Idaho 885, 893, 88 P.3d 704, 712 (2004). 
LC. § 18-7008 has been held not to be overbroad on its face. State v. Korsen, 138 
Idaho at 713. Examination of Korsen reveals the findings in that case were very fact specific and 
that the District Court that initially reviewed the conviction in Korsen was prescient. The 
District Court found the statute facially overbroad b_ecause the ~atute could be applied to people 
entering the Capitol to meet with legislators. The District Court asserted that because the threat 
of prosecution under the trespass statute "potentially chills such clearly protected activity, the 
court finds that the statute is unconstitutional in a substantial portion of the cases to which it 
applies." Korsen, 138 Idaho at 715. The. Idaho Supreme Court dismissed this concern and held 
that the statute will not be invalidated for overbreadth merely because it is possible to come up 
with a hypothetical situation in which the statute is unconstitutional as applied. Id., citing 
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 2126. In this regard the U.S. 
Supreme Court states that ''there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly 
compromise recognized first Amendment protections of parties not before the court." Id. 
However, the Idaho Supreme Court did acknowledge that if a criminal trespass 
prosecution was initiated pursuant to LC. § 18-7008(8) against a person on public property who 
is exercising his or her free speech rights, the statute could be attacked as applied to that 
constitutionally protected conduct. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 716. The scenario which was 
considered too hypothetical to sustain an "in toto" oyerbreadth challenge in Korsen is now 
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before the Court in an "as applied" overbreadth challenge. Korsen rather than supporting 
·-----· -··------ ·Pentie0!s-pr0seeuti0n-aetual-l-y-undermin.es-it.--· -·- -·--·-- -- .. -- -·-·-··· ···----·- ______ . ·--·--------........ __ ··- . _________ .. __________ _ 
Unlike Korsen, Pentico was cited based upon returning to State land after being asked 
. . 
to leave State land on which he had been engaging in protected First Amendment activity. In the 
absence of any evidence that he was, in the first instance, engaged in anything other than pure 
and protected First Amendment conduct the Trial Court could not _foreclose the possibility that 
the "ask to leave" pursuant to the statute was an unreasonable and therefore an unconstitutional 
restriction upon Pentico's ri$hts with. the effect that the statute was overly-broad as being applied 
to Pentico. Faced with the lack of any evidence to support a one year ban from State property 
upon which Pentico might legitimately engage in First Amendment protected activity, the Trial 
Court could not foreclose the possibility that the absolute one year ban pursuant to the statute 
wa~ an impermissible prior restraint and therefore an unconstitutional restriction upon Pentico's 
rights with the effect that the statute was overly-broad as being applied to Pentico. 
In this case, Pentico's actions at the Capitol Annex, and in visiting the Governor's 
office cannot, based upon the record, be said to be anything other than pure First Amendment 
':;:l speech. There is no need for a restriction upon these actions to be substantial in order for that 
. . 
· / restriction to be unconstitutional. State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885, 893 (2004). Clearly, the Trial 
-· 
·.-: 
Court did not have an adequate record upon which to justify that the statute was constitutional as 
it was being applied to Pentico. 
b) 
Appellant's Brief 
Based upon the record available it is apparent that LC. § 18-
7008 (8) is impermissibly overbrdad as applied to ask Pentico to 
leave State land as _it was applied to criminalize his return to State 
land. 
20 
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When the appropriate legal analysis is utilized, it is appropriate to conclude that I. C. 
·-·-·· ··· ··-··-····-S-ec-18·=-7008{8-)-eannot--be-eonstitutionally-applied--either-as-a--justi:fication-for-asking-Eentico-to. -··-· __ 
leave the Capitol Annex on March 25, 2008 nor for charging him with a crime for visiting the 
Governor's office on April 1, 2008. 
. ••:• 
·; 
.:-• 
. .. 
. • 
1. Analysis of the permissibility of a governmental restriction 
requires first a determination of what the restriction is. 
The first step in determining whether a restriction is permissible is to know what the 
restriction is. In this case there are two restrictions placed upon Pentico's First Amendment 
Rights. First, as I. C. § 18-7008(8) was applied by the Trial Court, he was subjected to being 
asked to leave public property for any reason or no reason at all. The record with respect to this 
. ) 
restriction is compromised by the Trial Court's decision to exclude testimony regarding 
Pentico's conduct prior to being asked to leave and, as a consequence, the most that can be 
discerned from the record is that some legislators were nervous about him. While this fact 
appears to have nothing to do with the _Trial Court's application of that statute, it provides the 
only evidence related to Officer Pattis' request that Pentico leave and not return. 
Second, as I.C. § 18-7008(8) was applied by the Trial Court, Pentico was subjected 
to a one year period during which he could not return to certain parcels of State land to exercise 
his First Amendment rights for the sole reason that he had been, for no apparent valid reason, 
asked to leave and not come back. 
c) 
Appellant's Brief 
The category of the forum determines the appropriate test for 
weighing the government's ability to place restrictions on the 
expressive actions of fndividuals on public property . 
21 
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Whether restrictions placed on access to public property imper:missibly infringe on free 
-- ··--·-·-·-·· --··- speech-rights-depends-largely-on-the-nature-of the-preperty-at-issue;--:Pe-ny-Edue;--A-ss..!.n-v.-P-er-1:)J----·--
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983). 
The Supreme Court established in Perry a forum-based approach to classify public 
property into three distinct categories: traditional, designated, and non-public forums. Id. at 45-
46. "Traditional public forum" include places such as "streets and parks which have 
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, 8.I!d time out of mind, have been used 
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public· 
questi9ns." Id. "Designated public forums" the government has opened with the intent that they 
be used by the public as a place to engage in expressive activity. Id. at 45. Examples include 
··; university meeting facilities, municipal theatres, and school board meeting rooms. When the 
. i 
category is either "traditional" or "designated" individual exercise of First .Amendment rights can 
be restricted only when it is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the restriction is 
narrowly tailored to achieve that end. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726, (1990). 
Courts have long recognized that the capitol grounds as a whole meet the definition of 
a traditional public forum: they are open to the public, and intended to be used in a way that is 
•. 
consistent with public expression. Lederma1J. v. United States of America, 291 F.3d 36, 41, (D.C. 
Cir. 2002). Furthermore, the ~upreme Court has recognized that ''the primary purpose for which 
the Capitol was designed is legislating" and that ''the fundamental function of a legislature in a 
democratic society assumes accessibility to public opinion." Jeanette Rankin Brigade v. Chief of 
Capitol Police, 409 U.S. 972, (1972). Thus the Capitol Annex, its interior offices and its · 
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grounds are presumptively a place where individuals are allowed and even encouraged to assert 
-- ··---··---their-First-.Amenclment-righ~---
t·:' 
The principles which cause spaces within the Capitol Annex to be traditional forum 
apply equally to the Governor's office, The Governor is the chief executive officer of the State, 
an elected public official. Historically in Idaho, the Governor's office is simply an extension of 
the Capitol. The Governor is active in the legislative process consequently whatever rules apply 
to the legislators and the capitol building should also apply to the Governor and his reception 
area. Therefore, with respect to the Capitol Annex and the Governor's reception area ''the 
government's ability to permissibly restrict expressive conduct is very limited: It may enforce 
reasonable time, place, and manner regulations as long as they are narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication." 
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
To whittle away at a citizen's right to grieve government actions by restricting their 
access to buildings and in effect their elected representatives without good reason to do so 
needlessly chills free expression. Pentico was ordered off of a traditional public forum (the 
.-:-:-: Capitol Annex grounds) and the State would have him be consequently banned from all spaces 
including (traditional public forums) in the Capitol Annex, the third and fourth floor of the Borah 
Building (including the Governor's reception area), and the State Board of Education offices and 
for a period of one year. All of these locations are traditionally open to the public; they are 
encouraged to visit their elected representatives and to request action when they believe they · 
have a grievance. 
46 There is no doubt that there are private spaces within the Capitol Annex, however, there is no evidence that 
Pentico' s conduct violated any restrictions separating public forum from private space. 
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Even if this Court finds that the Capitol Annex, the third and fourth floor of the Borah 
Burlcting-and-the-S-tate-b0arcl.-ef--edueati0n-0ffiG~are-no.t-a-:..'trad.itionaLpublic.....furum ..... ..__"__,o...,r'-----""-a ____ _ 
"designated public forum" but "a non-public forum" the restrictions upon an individual's rights 
can still be unreasonable. A "non-public forum" is public property not open by tradition or 
designation to the public for expressive activities; it consequently is governed by different 
standards for evaluating restrictions on expression. Perry, 460 U.S. 37 at 45. Jails, and military 
bases are examples of non-public forums. Both content neutral time, place, and manner 
restrictions and "reasonable" content-based restrictions are permissible in non-public forums, so 
long as the restrictions are "not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials 
oppose the speaker's view." Id. 
Reasonableness "must be assessed in light of the purpose of the forum and all the 
surrounding circumstances." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 809 
(1985). Furthermore the "existence of reasonable grounds for limiting access to a non-public 
forum ... will not save a regulation that is in reality a fa.yade for view-point-based 
discrimination." Id. 
d) Restrictions which are content-based are presumptively invalid 
and will be upheld only if necessary to serve a compelling 
governmental interest and.are narrowly tailored to achieve that 
end 
Content-based restrictions arise from governmental regulation of expression based on 
what is being said. If a government regulation is determined to be content-based, it is 
presumptively invalid. When defending the use of a content-based restriction&, the gove~e1:1-~ . 
. . 
must demonstrate that the communication falls into one of the categories of low-value speech or 
must justify the regulation by showing that it is necessary to a compelling government interest. 
Appellant's Brief 24 
000068
There are two ways in which a law can be determined to be content-based: "If on its face a 
-----og,overnmenta:l-aeti-on-is-tru=geted-at-ieleas-0F-inform-atien-tb.at-gG-¥emm.etlt-seek.s..to..suppress,-ot-if....__ ___ _ 
:. : 
. / 
governmental action, neutral on its face, was motivated by an intent to single out constitutionally 
protected speech for control or penalty." American Constitutional Law (2d ed. 1988). 
If it is determined that government action is content based, then that action will be 
held unconstitutional. Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, (9th Cir. 1995). The Court in Bradley 
dealt with the claim that punishing a prisoner for the contents of a grievance against prison 
officials burdens the prisoner's ability to file grievances and impacted the prisoners 
constitutionally protected rights under the Fourteenth and First Amendments because doing so 
forced the prisoner to risk punishment in order to exercise his right to complain. Id The 
evidence demonstrated that the prisoner had submitted a written grievance regarding a guard's 
conduct (prisoner claimed the guard failed to retrieve him from his room for his law library call-
out as the guard had promised). Id. at 1278. The guar~ upon receipt of the complaint, filed a 
disciplinary report against the prisoner for his use of disrespectful language in the complaint, 
which was prohibited under Oregon Administration Rules. Id. The director of the prison argued 
that the regulations did not hinder a prisoner from filing a grievance, only punished the prisoner 
for the language used in t;he grievance. Id. at 1279. The Court held that whether the content of 
_the grievance or the act of filing the grievance is deemed to be the actus reus of the offense, the 
prisoner risks punishment for exercising the right to complain. Id. 
e) 
Appellant's Brief 
The restrictions imposed by LC.§ 18-7008(8) as applied by the 
Trial Court are unconstitutional both because they cannot be said 
to be reasonable restrictions in the time, place and manner in 
which protected rights can be exercised and because they are 
presumptively content based 
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Even if it could be said that Pentico violated a knowable restriction leading to his being 
- ----ordered-off-o-f-publie-land-where-he-was-e*e1:ei-sing-hl-s-F-irst-Arnen.dmet1.t-rightS-and-bannecLfor-..,__ ___ _ 
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year from returning without regard to the content of any future expression he may wish to engage 
I 
in upon· that land, those restrictions must still be a reasonable restriction on time, place and 
manner. In this case, as applied to Pentico's conduct, the restrictions imposed upon him by I.C. 
§ 18-7008(8) as applied by the Trial Court cannot, based on the record, be found to be reasonable 
restrictions of time, place and manner. 
The application of this principal is illustrated in Huminski v. Corsones, 386 F. 3d 116, 
.. 
152 (2nd Cir. 2004). In that case a citation for trespass was issued to an individual wh:o went to 
a courthouse to watch the day's proceedings. Huminski, 386 F.3d at 125. He also parked his 
vehicle in the parking lot with signs directly criticizing a judge of that courthouse. Id. Many 
individuals at the courthouse were concerned about his presence, although he did not exhibit any 
belligerent behavior or make any implicit or overt threats. Even so, he was provided written 
notice of a trespass with the intent that he would thereafter be banned from every courthouse in 
Vermont. Id. at 129. The Huminski Court held that even if the trespass order was justified on 
that specific day in question, the order which banned him from all courthouses in the State of 
Vermont, consisted of no tailoring and was invalid. Id. at 150. Furthermore, the Court stated· 
that whatever threats ~ey may have reasonably feared from Huminski were wildly 
disproportionate to the actual perceived threat. Id. The trespass notice was overbroad in light of 
its duration, geographic scope, and scope of proceedings covered. Id. The Court held that the 
exclusion was not ''tailored" and was therefore unconstitutional. Id. 
Pentico's prosecution is similar but more troubling to that in Huminski. On March 25, 
2008, Pentico was at the Capitol grounds to speak with a legislator who had already agreed to see 
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him. Pentico did not display any signs criticizing any legislator, there is no evidence he 
---,exhibited-an:y-belligerent_:_behavi0r-0r-mad€-anY-ilnp1i~it-or-0-v"ert-tln:eats~\V-hen-he.....wa,s_ ___ _ 
approached by Trooper Pattis who informed him that he was not welcome on the third or fourth 
floor of the Borah Building, the Capitol Annex, or the Dep~ent of Education, Pentico was 
courteous. The trooper reported that he was making "legislators nervous." 
By giving this notice with no substantive foundation, Officer Pattis effectively created 
for Pentico a no rights zone. Pentico was singled out without any basis for concluding that his 
conduct reasonably distinguished him from others engaging in the same activity - meeting with 
legislators to press their agendas. On their face, these circumstances suggest that the trespass 
notice is unreasonable. If an individual"is being disruptive and interfering with the daily course 
of business it may be that the government has a justification to ask that individual to leave. But 
even such circumstances do not warrant a one year prior restraint upon the right to petition the 
government for redress of grievance. 
Unless a person imposes a real threat for violence or disruption or violates known and 
reasonable regulations, it is not reasonable to order them to leave. Until it is clear that they 
cannot conform to a reasonable and articulated standards and regulations their access to their 
elected representatives should not be limited into the future. An "ask to leave" for no reason 
other than un-differentiated "nervousness," even in non-public forums, cannot be said to be 
reasonable and it would necessarily and impermissibly impose a chilling effect on any person 
who might wish to approach the Legislature or the Governor to exercise their- own First 
Amendment rights. A subsequent absolute ban for one year after an "ask to leave" premised 
upon undifferentiated nervousness of some people, cannot be seen as anything _other than 8:Il 
unfounded and impermissible prior restraint on protected First Amendment rights. Indeed, it is 
Appellant's Brief 27 
000071
questionable if even following a justifiable "ask to leave" an exclusion for one year thereafter 
--------ean-be--a-tole:ra0le-pri0r-restr:aint.;-EeGause-th~r-estrictions-imposed-upon-P.entico-by-I.C_§_l8=------·---
7008(8), as applied by the Trial Court, are not reasonable time, place and manner restrictions, the 
statute as applied should be held unconstitutional. 
Beyond the fact that these· restrictions were not reasonable, they were presumptively 
content-based. Officer Pattis told Pentico that legislators were uncomfortable with his presence 
and to go away and not come back. There is no evidence that these feelings had anyt:hiD;g to do 
with Pentico's conduct as opposed to the content of his message. Ordering Pentico off the 
property for breach of unspecified restrictions and for an unspecified period cannot be called a 
1 
Ii 
1 conduct which is "neutral on its face." Even if the restriction was neutral on its face, it is 
motivated by the intent to single out protected speech. Thus the restriction, whatever it is, can be 
upheld only if it does not target content. Absent evidence that Pentico ever acted in a way that 
interfered with the daily course of business, of which could be reasonably seen as inappropriate, 
the Court can only conclude that the Legislators were uncomfortable with the content of his 
I • 
speech. Thus, on this record it is impossible to conclude that Pentico, who was at ~e Capitol 
Annex to exercise protected rights, was being banned for any reason other than the content of his 
message. On this basis, contrary to the Trial Court's conclusion that the statute represented a 
reasonable time, place and manner restriction, the statute must be held unconstitutional content-
based restriction as applied to Pentico. 
3. 
Appellant's Brief 
Enforcement ofl.C. §18-7008(8) violates Pentico's Procedural Due 
Process ~ghts both because it works a deprivation ~frights with no 
meaningful remedial process and because it is, as applied to him under the 
circumstances of this case unconstitutionally vague. 
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As it has been applied to Pentico LC. § 18-7008(8) works as a violation of his rights to 
·.. ... -·· · ·· ... procedural due-process--in-twe- matecial--ways.-·-First,.-the-statu.te ... a:ffords .. him.-with .. no .. meaningful . --·--· ·-·- .. _ .. _ _ _ . 
process to respond to an arbitrary "ask to leave" or obtain any review of the reasonableness of 
"no return for one year" provision. Second, the statute is, as applied to the circumstances 
presented in this case impermissibly vague. In both respects, once Officer Pattis directed Pentico 
to leave State property, he was faced with two alternatives. Pentico could, if he could 
understand that they were at stake, accept a forfeiture of constitutionally protected .liberty 
interests or he could risk criminal prosecution. Citizens should not be placed in this position. 
a) Enforcement of LC. §18-7008(8) under the circumstances of this 
· case leads to the forfeiture of protected liberty interests. 
Tue Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution provides that a state shall not 
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw." US Const, Amend 
XIV. Determining whether a state action violates an individual's right of procedural due process 
involves a two-part test: (1) whether the state deprived the individual of a liberty or property 
interest; and (2) if so, what process was due pursuant to the deprivation. Logan v. Zimmerman 
Brush Co., 455 US 422, 428, 102 S.Ct 1148, 71 L.ED 2d 265 (1982); see also Washington v. 
Glucksburg; 521 US 702, 721, 117 S.Ct 2258, 138 L.Ed 2d 772 (1997) (noting that a particular 
right qualifies as a protected liberty interest if it is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and 
tradition," and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice 
would exist if they were sacrificed" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
Relevant to this case,. Pentico is invested with two protected liberty interests. P_en,tico 
has a :fundamental liberty interest in petitioning his government for redress of grievances. See 
McDonald v. Smith, 427 US 479, 485, 105 S.Ct. 2787 (holding that the right to petition 
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, government officials "was inspired by the same ideals of liberty and democracy that gave us the 
·----·:freedoms-te-speak,publish,-ana-assemble::,.)--In-additiQn,l?entico-has .. a-fundamentaLliberty ____ _ 
interest in traveling upon and accessing public property that all other members of the public are 
. . 
free to travel upon and access. See Williams v. Fears, 179 US 270, 274, 21 S.Ct-128, 45 L.Ed 
186 (1900) (holding that the "right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another 
according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty''); see also Kentv. Dulles, 357 US 116, 
126, 78 S.Ct 1113, 2 L.Ed 2d 1204 (1958) ("freedom of movement across :frontiers in either 
direction, and inside frontiers as well, was a part of our heritage. It may be as close to the heart 
of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads. Freedom of movement is basic 
in our scheme of values.") 
b) Pentico cannot constitutionally be deprived of protected liberzy 
interests withourprocedures which provide him with due process. 
Because of Pentico's lil?erty interest involved, the State may not interfere with those rights 
without afforclip.g him due process. Logan, 455 US at 428. Determining what process is 
sufficient to authorize such interference depends on weighing three factors: 
"(l) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation _of such interest through the 
procedures used, and probable value, if any, of additional procedural 
safeguards; and (3) the Government's interest, including the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures would 
entail." 
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 US 319,321,332, 96 S.Ct 893, 47 L. Ed2d 18 (1976). 
Under the Matthews test, application of LC. § 18-7008(8) to Pentico violates his right to 
procedural due process. First, as explained above, the interests affected were fundamental liberty 
interests. Second, while it is apparent that Pentico was ordered to leave a traditional public 
forum for no adequate reason and that he was thereafter, if the statute applies, automatically 
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precluded from returning for one year, LC. § 18-7008(8) affords citizens in this position with 
-----absolutely-no-proeess-to-eha:H.enge-an--ar-bitrary-exelusi-On-0r-an-e-x-ees-sively-l-0ng-baF-agaiE.st------
returning. Third, while the State may be forgiven for less than full procedural safeguards where it 
can show that the fiscal and administrative burdens of affording such safeguards would prove too 
great a burden, the problem here is that there are no procedural safeguards at all. Considering the 
gravity of the rights involved, the State cannot demonstrate that fiscal and administrative burdens 
justify failing to provide for even a nominal administrative hearing in front of a neutral decision-
maker. Citizens who are about to lose the privilege to drive a car for at least 90 days because 
they were caught driving with a blood alcohol level of .08 are given administrative hearings and 
afforded a right to present evidence and to have a neutral hearing officer determine if a violation 
has occurred. See LC. §18-8002A. A citizen who is being denied acknowledged and important 
First Amendment rights, for a full year is entitled to at least as much protection. 
Because, as it has been applied here, it is clear that 1 C. § 18-7008(8) generates_ a significant 
' 
deprivation of fundamental liberty interests without affording any procedure for assuring due 
process it is unconstitutional. 
c) The lower courts erred as a matter of law when they failed to 
consider an "as applied!' vagueness challenge. 
Challenges to criminal statutes based upon vagueness derive from the constitutional 
principal that procedural due process requires fair notice and proper standards for adjudication. 
If the scope of the power given to officials under a statute is so broad that the exercise of 
constitutionally protected conduct depends upon the subjective views of those officials as to the 
proprietary of the conduct, the statute is unconstitutional as a denial of due process. Lanzetta v. 
New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939). The void-for-vagueness doctrine 
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requires that when defining criminal conduct, a statute must be worded in a manner that does not 
allow-arbitrary-di-seriminatory--e:af-0Ieement.----:K0r-se-n,l~-8-Idab.G-at-7-1-1 .... -Tu.~tatute-musLb...,_ ___ _ 
worded with clarity and definiteness so that ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
prohibited. Id Furthermore, a statute may be void-for-vagueness if it does not provide adequate 
notice concerning the conduct that is being prohibited or if it fails to establish even minimal 
guidelines so that the police do not have unbridled discretion to enforce the statute. Id. Finally, 
due process requires that no one may be compelled, at the peril of loss of liberty to speculate as 
to the meaning of a penal statute. Id. (citing United States v. Smith, 795 F.2d 841, 847 n. 4 (9th 
Cir. 1986)). To succeed on an "as applied" vagueness challenge, a complainant must show that 
the statute, as applied to the defendant's conduct, failed to provide fair notice that the 
defendant's conduct was proscribed or failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that the police 
had unbridled discretion in making a determination concerning whether to arrest him. Korsen, 
138 Idaho at 712. 
It is well settled in Missamore that I.C. § 18-7008(8) does not require owners of private 
property to have any reason for asking trespassers to get off their land. However, while it is not 
clear what reasons are sufficient to support an "ask to leave'' as to public property it is clear that 
some form of inappropriate behavior. coupled with an end to the business at hand will _ be 
,. 
sufficient to support an "ask to leave" a State administrative office. See, Korsen supra. At least 
as great a justification should be .warranted when the public property in question is the seat of 
. . 
government. The Capitol Annex and the Borah Building have been the temporary home of the 
legislature and the governor during capitol renovatj.ons and as such are unique pieces of property. 
They are different from private property and administrative offices and should be treated as such. 
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The Trial Court, as argued above, erroneously determined that Pentico could be asked 
---to-leave-the-8apitel-.Annex-fer-any--reas0F1-0r-n0-I©asGn-at--all-and-fa.iled-to-gi.ve..an:y-recognitionJo~----
the inherent differences between private property and State property. As a consequence of this 
error and with the State's support, the statute has been applied to Pentico both with respect to the 
"ask to leave" portion and the "no return for one year" portion without any regard for his conduct 
or whether the statute can be said to provide reasonable notice to Officer Pattis and to Pentico 
that his conduct warranted an "ask to leave" and a subsequent one year exclusion. 
As applied in this manner the statute is unconstitutional. As the Trial Court recognized 
"whatever happened that led to Trooper Pattis' exclusion was not criminal ... " and the exclusion 
was based upon an exercise of "discretion.',47 The Trial Court failed to recognize that by not 
examining the basis for that exercise of discretion it was affording Officer Pattis unbounded 
discretion. By concluding that the enforcement of the statute could, in the circumstances of this 
case, permissibly turn upon an unbounded exercise of discretion, the Trial Court reached a 
conclusion which compels a determination that the statute is unconstitutional as applied in the 
this case. In considering this problem the District Court justified the finding that I.C. § 18-
7008(8) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Pentico by flipp~g the burden of proof on 
its head. The District Court asserted that "there is no indication that Trooper Pattis was acting 
arbitrarily in citing Pentico for trespass." See Memorandum Decision and Order, p.9. However 
this approach ignores the fact that there is no justification in the record to support a conclusion 
that Pattis was anything but acting arbitrarily and exercising unfettered discretion. 
When Officer Pattis directed Pentico to leave the Capitol Annex, on March 25, 2008, 
because he was making some people nervous and that he was "not welcome" at certain other · 
locations he failed to give anyone any meaningful information that would permit 3: determination 
47 TR Sentencing, 37:17-19. 
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that he was acting in anything but an arbitrary manner and therefore in a manner which violated 
---Pentiecfs-consti:tutional-rights-;-E-ven-if-he--was--n0t-being--arbitFary,hl~appI0ae-h-fails-t0-pr-0vidt=>------
any basis for determining that he was acting within the proper boundaries of his discretion. But 
even if this were not the case there is nothing in the statute which announces to Pentico what 
conduct triggered a lawful exercise of discretion and warranted his exclusion. The statute affords 
him no notice of what he must avoid doing in order to avoid exclusion. When the Trial Court 
refused to allow this clearly discretionary determination to be tested but chose instead to simply 
consider that exercise of unfettered discretion as a basis for a criminal conviction, the Trial Court 
. . 
applied the statue in a manner which violated Pentico's constitutional rights. 
Beyond the problems presented by the fact that "as applied" in this case the statute 
permits an arbitrary "ask to leave" there is the fact that Pentico was convicted for a violation of 
the "no return for one year" portion of the statute. Pentico was told to go away and that he was 
not welcome at or no longer authorized to be at identified locations. Pentico specifically asked 
for guidance regarding this ban, which was not provided. He was given no information 
regarding the duration of the ban and while he is presumed to know the law, that presumption is 
reasonable only if it is reasonable to think that he could have understood that I.C. § 18-7008(8) 
applied to b,is circumstances. Here, to recognize that the statute applied, he would have had to 
anticipate that a judge would have concluded that Officer Pattis could lawfully exclude him from 
State land which was a public forum for any reason or no reason at all.. Since he was given no 
information that would have allowed him to conclude that the Officer had a legitimate basis for 
asking him to leave, it is not reasonable to conclude that he would have understood that LC. § 
18-7008(8) actually could be applied to his situation. In this regard it should be noted th~t it took 
the State three attempts to identify his crime as a violation of I.C. § 18-7008(8). If trained law 
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enforcement officers and prosecutors could not identify the statute applicable to his conduct for 
--~m ..... onths--after-it-happenea,hew-was-he-supp0seel-te-de-s0~-JJ.hs-s0uld--n0t-Fsas0-nabl-y-b~xp€Gt€d~----
to know that the statute applied then it is unduly vague as applied to his situation and he cannot 
be prosecuted for returning within one year. 
I:C. § 18-7008(8) fails to provide. fair notice that Mr. Pentico's conduct was 
proscribed by the statute_ and it has been applied here in an arbitrary manner dependent 
solely upon the unfettered discretion of a law enforcement officer. As applied to Pentico, 
the statute has lead to a criminal conviction without giving him fair warning that the 
statute even applied to his conduct. In both respects it is unduly-vague as applied to 
Pentico and to a citizen's presence upon State land which is a public forum. Beyond 
these problems, the statute provides no meaningful guidelines regarding what behaviors 
will be considered un-conforming and support and an "ask to leave" and a one year 
exclusion. Moreover, the statute provides neither fair notice of its applicability nor 
requires that Pentico be provided fair notice of the reason for the ban or the duration of 
the ban. For each and all of these reasons the statute should be held unconstitutionally 
vague as applied to Pentico and to the use of State land which is a public forum. 
------- -
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHRISTOPHER PENTICO, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV-PC-2013-248 
AFFIDAVIT OF ALLEN R. DERR 
_______________ ). 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
County of Ada ) 
Allen R. Derr, being duly sworn and upon oath, hereby says: 
1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State ofldaho. 
2. That I represented the Petitioner herein, Christopher Pentico at the trial level in State v. 
Pentico, CR-MD-2008-5321. 
3. That I have read the post-conviction petition filed in this case. 
4. I did not consciously choose not to assert that based upon the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution Mr. Pentico was engaging in protected activity in a lawful and 
appropriate manner when he was asked to leave the Capital Annex grounds on March 25, 
2008, and that as a consequence he could not be charged with a violation of LC.§ 18-
EXHlB·IT u 
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7008(8) for returning to one of the identified properties on April 2, 2008. At the time of 
defending Mr. Pentico I did not recognize that was a challenge which could, based upon 
testimony that would be given by Mr. Pentico, be asserted. While I recognized and 
accepted the inherent unacceptability of prosecuting citizens for taking, as Mr. Pentico 
did, a letter to the Governor's office to protest grievances, I never really connected to the 
concept that the trip to the Governor's office on April 2, 2008, could not itself be 
criminalized if the original "request to leave" on March 25, 2008, was itself 
unconstitutional. I believe that this occurred because in the first two versions of the 
charge the question of whether there was a violation turned entirely upon the events of 
April 2, 2008, and when the State finally filed the charge under I.C.§18-7008(8) it appears 
that I never shifted my analysis away from the constitutional issues related to charging 
Mr. Pentico with trespass for delivering a letter to the Governor's office. 
5. It never occurred to me that there were both Substantive Due Process and Procedural Due 
process challenges that could be made based upon the fact that the one year exclusion 
provision of LC. 18-7008(8) - the provision under which the State sought to criminalize 
Mr. Pentico's visit to the Governor's office on April 2, 2008 - would as to First 
Amendment rights constitute an impermissible prior restraint and a bar to exercise of 
protected right for which there were not procedural due process protections. 
6. The Motion in Limine which was filed on December 30, 2008, was not intended to 
preclude any evidence of conduct on March 25, 2008, which led to the initial "request to 
leave" but rather to specifically preclude I.RE. Rule404(b) evidence as to 
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other events. This is a motion which is typically filed in a criminal defense matter 
which is about to go to trial and in which the State has not given I.R.E. Rule 404(b) 
disclosures. Since I was not focused on the legality of the "request to leave" I did not 
consider the impact that such a motion would have on evidence of events of that day 
leading up to the "request to leave." 
FURTHER Your Affiant Sayeth Not. .. , .. 7 
, •... /······ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this '}&___~ay of May, 2013. 
\ A..:0, .. 0,.A,, (, ~ ~-
NoTary Public~ o =-
Residing at:___,¥::i'--'o'cJ..~)I....,._. ---~-+-=--+--
My commission expires ( { ·1..--0 ( 1/4 t 7 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this 20th day of May, 2013, I placed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to the: 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Stacy Langton 
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHRISTOPHER PENTICO, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV-PC-2013-248 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE S.BISTLINE 
_______________ ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
County of Ada ) 
Bruce S. Bistline, being duly sworn and upon oath, hereby says: 
1) I am an attorney who has been duly licensed to practice law in the State ofldaho since 1976. 
I have actively practiced trial law for more than 34 years. During that time I have provided 
representation to defendants in more than 150 criminal cases. While I have maintained no 
specific record, I estimate that I have been involved in defending more than 20 criminal cases 
that went to trial, and in the range of 40 that involved significant pretrial motion practice. I 
have handled post-conviction relief proceedings and assisted with and handled as lead 
counsel a drawn-out federal habeas corpus proceeding involving a death penalty conviction. 
I have handled both civil and criminal cases in which constitutional rights were significant 
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factors in the resolution of the matter. 
2) I represented the Petitioner herein, Christopher Pentico in the both the District Court and the 
Court of Appeals appeal proceedings in State v. Pentico, CR-MD-2008-5321. 
3) I have read the post-conviction petition filed in this case. 
4) I was asked to provide my opinions regarding any deficient performance of trial counsel 
regarding the development of and preservation of critical First Amendment and Fifth 
Amendment defenses to the charge upon which Mr. Pentico was tried and convicted. 
5) In conducting my review of the trial and the proceedings leading up to the trial, I have 
reviewed the following materials: 
a) The Citation; 
b) The Discovery Responses supplied by the State, 5/28/08; 
c) The Defendant's Motions to Dismiss, 6/13/08 and 11/12/08; 
d) The Memorandums filed in Support of the Motions to Dismiss; 
e) The Amended Complaints filed by the State, 10/29/08; 
f) The Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Request for Discovery and Supplemental 
Response to Plaintiff's Request for Discovery; 
g) The Defendant's First Supplemental Request for Discovery; 
h) The Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Amended 
Complaint, 11/12/2008; 
i) The Defendant's Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions, 12/29/08; 
j) The Defendant's Motion in Limine, 12/30/08; 
k) The Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Amended 
Complaint. 12/30/2008; 
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1) The State's Response to Defendant's Motion in Limine; 12/31/2008 
m) The State's Proposed Jury Instructions 12/31/08; 
n) The State's Motion to Exclude Or in the Alternative Request For Offer of Proof and 
Hearing, 12/31/08 
o) The States Objection to Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum In Support, 12/31/08 
p) Defendants' Objection to Filing Second Amended Complaint, 01/02/09 
q) The State's Response to Supplemental Request for Discovery 01/02/09 
r) The Defendant's reply to the State's Objection to Defendant Pentico's Motion to Dismiss 
and the States' Proposed Jury Instruction, 01/02/09; 
s) The Defendant's Second Supplemental Memorandum In Support of Motion to Dismiss 
Amended Complaint, 01/05/09; 
t) The Defendant's Third Supplemental Memorandum In Support of Motion to Dismiss 
Amended Complaint, 01/05/09 
u) The Second Amended Complaint 01/06/09 
v) The State's Motion In Limine/Motion for Clarification 4/16/09 
w) The transcripts of Magistrate Court Proceedings, 10/29/08 01/06/09, 2/10/09, 4/21/09, 
05/11/09; 
x) The Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed in this matter; 
y) The Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed in this matter; 
z) The Answer filed by the State of Idaho; 
aa) The State's Motion for Summary Dismissal; 
bb) The State's Brief In Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal; 
cc) The Briefs filed by the Parties in the Appeal proceedings before the District Court; 
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dd) The Opinion of the District Court, 5/13/2010; 
ee) The Briefs filed by the Parties in the Appeal proceedings in the Idaho Court of Appeals; 
and, 
ff) The opinion of the Court of Appeals in State v. Pentico, Docket No. 37834. 
6) I have interviewed Mr. Pentico and determined that he would testify under oath that on 
March 25, 2008, he was very briefly at the Capital Annex but was not at any other 
governmental buildings that day. He went there in order to speak to Representative Lenore 
Barrett about a matter of concern involving State Government. He visited her office, 
discovered she was not in, spoke to her Secretary, determined a time when he could return 
and probably have the chance to speak to Rep. Barrett an left the building and the grounds. 
He had lunch and returned to the Capital Annex. He had just crossed the street onto the 
grounds of the Capital Annex when he was approached by a State Patrolman who detained 
him until Officer Pattis arrived to tell him to leave and that he was not welcome at the State 
House (then Capital Annex); at the Governor's office and at the offices of the Department of 
Education. 
7) From my review of the documents it appears that Mr. Derr correctly recognized the need to 
challenge the application of I.C. § 18-7008(8) as being unconstitutional but it is equally clear 
that he did not make good use of the factual information that was available to him or that he 
adequately framed the important constitutional issues so that they were preserved for appeal. 
8) It appears that Mr. Derr either did not fully grasp Mr. Pentico's reasons for being at the 
Capital Annex on March 25 or never really appreciated that one year exclusion portion of the 
statute could not be triggered by an "ask to leave" which was itself an unconstitutional 
' 
application of the statute. There is no conceivable strategy-based reason for this factual 
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information not to have been presented or for failure to assert a constitutional challenge to 
the application of LC.§ 18-7008(8) on the basis that there is nothing about Pentico's conduct 
on March 25th which can constitutionally provide the basis for asking a citizen to leave State 
property (the foundational aspect of application of the statute is a "ask to leave"). Mr. 
Derr's failure to know or to grasp the facts is evidenced in his Amended Memorandum In 
Support of Motion to Dismiss, 11/12/08, in which Mr. Derr bases his arguments upon the 
understanding that the State's evidence was that Mr. Pentico was engaged in harassing 
behavior while visiting various government offices on March 25, 2008. See, Memorandum In 
Support of Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint. 11/12/08, p.3. Moreover, he did identify 
as a witness Representative Barrett's secretary. 
9) Based upon my experience and the review of the above materials, it is my professional 
opinion that trial counsel, Allen Derr, did not provide effective assistance of counsel as 
required by Strickland v. · Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and its progeny in several 
respects as set forth in more detail herein below: 
a) He failed to present for the record either by testimony, affidavit or offer of proof, a clear 
statement of the facts that would demonstrate that on March 25, 2008, Mr. Pentico was 
engaged in constitutionally protected activity while at the Capital Annex and that he had 
been at no other governmental buildings that day. 
b) While filing a Motion In Limine to prevent the admission of 404(b) evidence was a 
strategic decision that cannot be faulted, Mr. Derr, probably due to his lack of 
appreciation for or understanding of the critical facts, failed to make clear to the Court 
that the Motion was not filed to prevent evidence of Mr. Pentico's conduct on March 25, 
2008, as that evidence is of fundamental relevance to a challenge to the "ask to leave" 
Affidavit of Bruce Bistline, Page 5 
000088
1 
"" '"l, • 
prong of the statute. 
c) While he appreciated that any prosecution of Pentico under I.C.§72-7008(8) was subject 
to substantial constitutional challenges, he failed to assert significant and relatively 
obvious challenges as follows; 
i) That the request that Mr. Pentico leave the Captial Annex grounds was itself 
unconstitutional because he was there to exercise important and protected 1st 
Amendment Rights. The failure to appreciate this argument contributed to the failure 
to make a clear record of the facts and this in turn lead to the refusal of the appellate 
courts to consider this challenge. 
ii) That the portion of the statute which purports to criminalize the return to the property 
for one year (and in this case the "conduct" upon which Mr. Pentico was convicted) is 
unconstitutional as it pertains to entries onto State land which constitutes a 
Traditional Public Forum or a Designated Public Forum both because it is an 
impermissible prior restraint of protected 1st Amendment activities and because it is a 
prohibition which affords no procedural due process mechanism by which the citizen 
can contest the initial "ask to leave" or the duration of bar against returning. The 
failure to raise these arguments contributed to the fact that despite being raised on 
appeal they were never addressed. 
FURTHER Your Affiant Sayeth Naught. 
"Bctu., ~J ~(___ 
Bruce S. Bistline 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this&O day of May, 2013. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at: {J;/J:L7 /dffur 
My commission expires ~ £2.I, t/.tJlg' 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this 20th day of May, 2013, I placed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to the: 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Stacy Langton 
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419 
:~-----F-r.~ Ld d 0 
MAY 2 0 2013 
CHRISTOPHER'D. RICH, Clerk 
By SARA WRIGHT 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHRISTOPHER PENTICO, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
__ c~s §. No. CV-PC-2013-248 
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
Petitioner, Christopher Pentico, asks this Court, pursuant to I.R.E. 201(d), to take 
judicial notice of the transcripts, files, affidavits, lodged documents, exhibits and record in the 
case State v. Pentico, Ada County Case No. CR-MD-2008-5321, including the documents listed 
in the Register of Actions attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
Respectfully submitted this ;;)-D day of May 2013. 
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE Page 1 
H'd'T~~ e1 1 o man 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this 20th day of May, 2013, I placed a true and corr~ct 
copy of the foregoing in interdepartmental mail to the: 
ADA COUNTY PRSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Stacy Langton 
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE Page 2 
Jennifer Vanderhoof 
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Date: 5/Z0/2013 Fo Judicial District Court - Ada County User: PDTOLMHM 
Time: 09: 18 AM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 5 Case: CR-MD-2008-0005321 Current Judge: Kathryn A. Sticklen 
i,J:XHtsrr A Defendant: Pentico, Christopher A 
State of Idaho vs. Christopher A Pentico 
Date Code User Judge 
4/15/2008 NCRM PRFERGKE New Case Filed - Misdemeanor Magistrate Court Clerk 
PROS PRFERGKE Prosecutor assigned Ada County Prosecutor Magistrate Court Clerk 
4/21/2008 APNG TCURQUAM Appear & Plead Not Guilty/Derr Magistrate Court Clerk 
RQDD TCURQUAM Defendant's Request for Discovery Magistrate Court Clerk 
4/25/2008 CHGA TCOLSOMC Judge Change: Adminsitrative Kevin Swain 
HRSC TCOLSOMC Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Kevin Swain 
07/21/2008 08:15 AM) 
HRSC TCOLSOMC Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 08/14/2008 08:30 Kevin Swain 
AM) 
TCOLSOMC Notice Of Hearing Kevin Swain 
4/28/2008 PROS PRFERGKE Prosecutor assigned Jeanne M Howe Kevin Swain 
5/29/2008 RQDS TCURQUAM State/City Request for Discovery Kevin Swain 
RSDS TCURQUAM State/City Response to Discovery Kevin Swain 
6/13/2008 NOTC TCURQUAM Notice of Hearing Kevin Swain 
MOTN TCURQUAM Motion to Dismiss Kevin Swain 
MISC TCURQUAM Memo in Support of Motion to Dismiss Kevin Swain 
6/24/2008 HRSC TCEMERYV Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss Kevin Swain 
07/11/2008 03:00 PM) 
TCEMERYV Notice Of Hearing Kevin Swain 
7/11/2008 HRVC TCEMERYV Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss held on Kevin Swain 
07/11/2008 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
ORDR TCEMERYV Order Granting Stip Vacate Hearing Kevin Swain 
7/21/2008 HRVC TCEMERYV Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 08/14/2008 Kevin Swain 
08:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 
CONH TCEMERYV Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on Kevin Swain 
07/21/2008 08:15 AM: Conference Held 
HRSC TCEMERYV Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss Kevin Swain 
10/29/2008 04:00 PM) 
TCEMERYV Notice Of Hearing Kevin Swain 
10/29/2008 PROS PRMETIMJ Prosecutor assigned Stacy L Wallace Kevin Swain 
CONH TCEMERYV Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss held on Kevin Swain 
10/29/2008 04:00 PM: Conference Held 
HRSC TCEMERYV Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Kevin Swain 
11/18/2008 09:30 AM) 
MISC TCEMERYV Amended Complaint Kevin Swain 
TCEMERYV Notice Of Hearing Kevin Swain 
REDU TCEMERYV Charge Reduced Or Amended (118-7008 Kevin Swain 
Trespass) 
11/12/2008 MOTN TCKELLHL Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint Kevin Swain 
MISC TCKELLHL Memo in Support Kevin Swain 
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Fo1 Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
User: PDTOLMHM Date: 5/20/2013 
Time: 09: 18 AM 
Page 2 of 5 Case: CR-MD-2008-0005321 Current Judge: Kathryn A. Sticklen 
State of Idaho vs. Christopher A Pentico 
Date 
11/18/2008 
12/5/2008 
12/10/2008 
12/15/2008 
12/19/2008 
12/22/2008 
12/29/2008 
12/30/2008 
12/31/2008 
1/2/2009 
1/5/2009 
1/6/2009 
1/13/2009 
2/10/2009 
Code 
CONH: 
HRSC 
RSDD 
RSDD 
RQDD 
MISC. 
RSDD 
MISC 
MISC 
MOTN 
MISC 
MISC 
MOTN 
MISC 
MISC 
MISC 
MISC 
RSDS 
MISC 
MISC 
HRVC 
HRSC 
MISC 
TRAN 
HRVC 
User 
TCEMERYV 
TCEMERYV 
TCEMERYV 
TCKELLHL 
TCURQUAM 
TCBUCKAD 
TCBUCKAD 
TCBUCKAD 
TCBULCEM 
TCBULCEM 
TCBULCEM 
TCBULCEM 
TCGOHNST 
TCGOHNST 
TCASPIRA 
TCASPIRA 
TCASPIRA 
TCASPIRA 
TCKELLHL 
TCBULCEM 
TCBULCEM 
TCEMERYV 
TCEMERYV 
TCEMERYV 
TCEMERYV 
DCTYLENI 
TCEMERYV 
Defendant: Pentico, Christopher A 
Judge 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on Kevin Swain 
11/18/2008 09:30 AM: Conference Held 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 01/06/2009 08:30 Kevin Swain 
AM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Defendant's Response to Discovery 
Defendant's Response to 
Discovery/Supplemental 
Kevin Swain 
Kevin Swain 
Kevin Swain 
Defendant's Request for Discovery/Supplemental Kevin Swain 
Defend's Proposed Jury Instructions 
Defendant's Response to Discovery/2nd 
Supplemental 
Kevin Swain 
Kevin Swain 
Defend's supplemental proposed jury instructions Kevin Swain 
Defend's 2nd supplemental proposed jury 
instructions 
Motion in limine 
Kevin Swain 
Kevin Swain 
supplen')ental memorandum in support of motion Kevin Swain 
to dismiss amended complaint 
Response to defend's motion in limine Kevin Swain 
Motion to exclude or in the altertive request for Kevin Swain 
offer of proof and hearing 
Miscellaneous/ state's proposed jury instructions Kevin Swain 
Miscellaneous/ objection to motion to dismiss and Kevin Swain 
memorandum in support 
Reply to the state's objection to the defendant Kevin Swain 
pentico's motion to dismiss and to the state's 
proposed jury instructions 
Objection to the filing of second amended Kevin Swain 
complaint 
State/City Response to Discovery/Supplemental Kevin Swain 
2nd supplemental memorandum in support of Kevin Swain 
motion to dismiss amended complaint 
3rd supplemental memorandum in support of Kevin Swain 
motion to dismiss amended complaint 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 01/06/2009 Kevin Swain 
08:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 02/10/2009 Kevin Swain 
11:30AM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
2nd Amended Complaint 
Transcript Filed (1/6/09) 
Kevin Swain 
Kevin Swain 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Hearing result for Sentencing held on 02/10/2009 Kevin Swain 
11 :30 AM: Hearing Vacated 
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Page 3 of 5 Case: CR-MD-2008-0005321 Current Judge: Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Defendant: Pentico, Christopher A 
State of Idaho vs. Christopher A Pentico 
Date Code User Judge 
2/10/2009 HRSC TCEMERYV Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 04/21/2009 08:30 Kevin Swain 
AM) 
TCEMERYV Notice Of Hearing Kevin Swain 
4/16/2009 MOTN TCRAMISA Motion in Limine/Motion for Clarification Kevin Swain 
4/20/2009 MOTN TCKELLHL Motion to Add Witness for Defense Kevin Swain 
MISC TCKELLHL · Objection to the State's Requested Jury Kevin Swain 
Instruction 
4/21/2009 MISC TCEMERYV Def Waives Jury/ CT set Kevin Swain 
CTST TCEMERYV Hearing result for Court Trial held on 04/21/2009 Kevin Swain 
08:30 AM: Court Trial St~rted 
MISC TCEMERYV Def Found Guilty Kevin Swain 
HRSC TCEMERYV Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 05/11/2009 Kevin Swain 
11:00 AM) 
TCEMERYV Notice Of Hearing Kevin Swain 
5/8/2009 ORDR TCEMERYV Order Granting Approval to Video Record or Kevin Swain 
Broadcast of Court Proceeding 
NOTC TCBULCEM Notice of filing Kevin Swain 
5/11/2009 ORDR TCEMERYV Approving Request to Obtain Approval to Kevin Swain 
Broadcast and or Photograph a court hearing 
CONH; TCEMERYV Hearing result for Sentencing held on 05/11/2009 Kevin Swain 
11:00 AM: Conference Held 
WHJD. TCEMERYV Withheld Judgment Entered (118-7008 Trespass) Kevin Swain 
PROB TCEMERYV Probation Ordered (118-7008 Trespass) Probation Kevin Swain 
term: O years 1 month O days. (Misdemeanor 
Unsupervised) 
STAT TCEMERYV STATUS CHANGED: closed pending clerk action Kevin Swain 
SNPF TCEMERYV Sentenced To Pay Fine 0.00 charge: 118-7008 Kevin Swain 
Trespass 
6/22/2009 APDC · TCRAMISA Appeal Filed In District Court Kevin Swain 
CAAP TCRAMISA Case Appealed: Kevin Swain 
STAT TCRAMISA STATUS CHANGED: Reopened Kathryn A. Sticklen 
6/25/2009 ESTM DCNIXONR Estimate Of Transcript Cost Kathryn A. Sticklen 
6/29/2009 CHGA DCTYLENI Judge Change: Adminsitrative Kathryn A. Sticklen 
OGAP DCTYLENI Order Governing Procedure On Appeal Kathryn A. Sticklen 
7/10/2009 NOTC DCNIXONR Notice of Payment of Estimated Cost of Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Transcript 
7/21/2009 TRAN DCNIXONR Transcript Lodged Kathryn A. Sticklen 
NLT DCNIXONR Notice Of Lodging Transcript On Appeal Kathryn A. Sticklen 
8/11/2009 TRAN DCTYLENI Transcript Filed Kathryn A. Sticklen 
NOTC DCTYLENI Notice Of Filing Transcript On Appeal Kathryn A. Sticklen 
8/21/2009 MISC TCBULCEM Objection to appeal transcript Kathryn A. Sticklen 
000095
Date·: 5/Z0/2013 Fo Judicial District Court - Ada County User: PDTOLMHM 
Time: 09:18 AM ROA Report 
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Defendant: Pentico, Christopher A 
State of Idaho vs. Christopher A Pentico 
Date Code User Judge 
9/1/2009 MOTN TCBULCEM Motion to augment record Kathryn A Sticklen 
9/9/2009 AMCO DCNIXONR Amended Estimated Cost of Appeal Transcript Kathryn A Sticklen 
9/10/2009 ORDR DCTYLENI Order Re: Motion to Augment Record Kathryn A Sticklen 
MISC TCRAMISA Appellant's Motion to Extend Briefing Schedule Kathryn A Sticklen 
Pending Resolution of Motion Regarding Filing 
Transcript on Appeal and Motion to Augment 
Record 
STIP TCRAMISA Stipulation for Substitution of Counsel Kathryn A Sticklen 
9/11/2009 ORDR DCTYLENI Order Suspending Briefing Schedule and Setting Kathryn A Sticklen 
Status Conference (9/24/09 @ 1 :00 p.m.) 
HRSC DCTYLENI Hearing Scheduled (Status by Phone Kathryn A Sticklen 
09/24/2009 01 :00 PM) Parties may appear by 
TELE 
9/17/2009 NOTC' DCNIXONR Notice of Payment of Amended Transcript Kathryn A Sticklen 
9/24/2009 DCHH DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Status by Phone held on Kathryn A Sticklen 
09/24/2009 01 :00 PM: District Court Hearing Heh 
Court Reporter: cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Parties may appear by TELE-50 
9/29/2009 ESTM DCNIXONR Estimate Of Transcript Cost Kathryn A Sticklen 
9/30/2009 NLT DCNIXONR Notice Of Lodging Transcript On Appeal Kathryn A Sticklen 
NLT DCNIXONR Lodging Transcript On Appeal Kathryn A Sticklen 
10/2/2009 STIP TCBULCEM Stipulation for the prep of official transcripts for Kathryn A Sticklen 
4/21/09 motion hearing and 4/21/09 court trial 
10/6/2009 ORDR DCTYLENI Order Re: Stipulation for the Preparation of Kathryn A Sticklen 
Official Transcripts (for 4/21/09 Motions HEaring 
and Court Trial) 
10/8/2009 MISC TCBULCEM Supplemental disclosure to objection to appeal Kathryn A Sticklen 
transcript 
10/9/2009 NOTC DCNIXONR Notice of Payment of Estimated Cost of Appeal Kathryn A Sticklen 
Transcript 
10/21/2009 NOTC TCRAMISA Notice of Non-Opposition to Plaintiff/Appellee's Kathryn A Sticklen 
Objection to Appeal Transcript 
10/27/2009 NOTC DCTYLENI Notice of Filing Transcript on Appeal (of 10/29/08, Kathryn A Sticklen 
1/6/09, and 2/10/09) 
TRAN· DCTYLENI Transcript Filed Kathryn A Sticklen 
11/9/2009 NLT DCNIXONR Notice Of Lodging Transcript On Appeal Kathryn A Sticklen 
LDGD DCNIXONR Transcript Lodged Kathryn A Sticklen 
11/24/2009 STIP TCRAMISA Stipulation for Briefing Schedule Kathryn A Sticklen 
11/30/2009 ORDR DCTYLENI Order Re: Briefing Schedule Kathryn A Sticklen 
12/8/2009 NOTC DCTYLENI Notice of FIiing Transcript on Appeal Kathryn A Sticklen 
TRAN DCTYLENI Transcript Filed Kathryn A Sticklen 
1/15/2010 MISC TCRAMISA Appellant's Reply Brief Kathryn A Sticklen 
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Date Code User Judge 
2/22/2010 RSBR JVWARDCM Respondents Brief Filed Kathryn A. Sticklen 
3/12/2010 MISC TCBULCEM Appellant's Reply Brief Kathryn A. Sticklen 
3/19/2010 NOTC TCRAMISA Notice of Oral Argument Kathryn A. Sticklen 
3/31/2010 HRSC DCTYLENI Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal Kathryn A. Sticklen 
04/02/2010 02:00 PM) 
4/2/2010 DCHH CCCHILER Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal held Kathryn A. Sticklen 
on 04/02/201 O 02:00 PM: District Court Heari~g 
Held 
Court Reporter: Lisa Andersen 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 200 pages 
5/13/2010 DEOP DCTYLENI Memorandum Decision and Order Kathryn A. Sticklen 
6/24/2010 APSC TCPETEJS Appealed To The Supreme Court Kathryn A. Sticklen 
10/26/2011 MISC CCTHIEBJ Opinion - Supreme Court Docket No. 37834 Kathryn A. Sticklen 
1/10/2012 REMT CCLUNDMJ Remittitur (Affirmed) -- Supreme Ct. Docket Kathryn A. Sticklen 
#38834 
4/27/2012 CCLUNDMJ 10 Day Notice of Intent to Release Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Exhibits/Depositions 
5/7/2012 OBJE TCTONGES Defendant's Objection to the Release of Exhibits Kathryn A. Sticklen 
and Depositions 
5/16/2012 ORDR DCLYKEMA Order Re: Defendant's Objection to the Release Kathryn A. Sticklen 
of Exhibits and Depositions 
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419 
RECEIVED 
MAY 2 0 2013 
1:-.oa County Clerk 
··NO·-----;;~---:i,.....,,,..,__ 
FILED 40D A~----P.M ___ _ 
~~--1..-.~,~ 
' ~ ··---- ---"__:___ : 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By VICKY EMERY 
D!PUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHRISTOPHER PENTICO, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ .) 
Criminal No. CV-PC-2013-248 
ORDER GRANTING REQUEST FOR 
JUDICIAL NOTICE 
THE COURT, having considered Petitioner's Motion, pursuant to I.R.E. 201(d), to take 
judicial notice of the transcripts, files, affidavits, lodged documents, exhibits and record in the 
case of State v. Pentico: Ada County Case No. CR-MD-2008-5321, including the documents 
listed in the Register of Actions attached as Exhibit A to this Order, HEREBY TAKES 
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED MATERIALS. 
I ...J\Al"\e Dated this · f day of.M-ay 2013. 
Honorable Kevin Swain 
Magistrate Judge 
ORDER GRANTING REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE Page 1 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
) 
. l )"' 
. ", ) 
. ' ' ) ' 
. )' 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent, 
'. : . '') 
) 
Case No. CV-PC-2013-00248 
ORDER GRANTING 
SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
FILED P.M ___ _ 
JUN 1 3 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By VICKY EMERY 
OEPIJTY 
On April 2, 2008 the Petitioner was cited for Trespass. On November 12, 2008 the 
') . . ~ . 
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss challenging the constitutional application of l.C 18-
7008 to the facts of the case. On January 6, 2009 the Trial Court heard and denied the 
motion. On April 21, 2009 the Petitioner ·was found guilty after a court trial and was 
sentenced on May 11, 2009. 
Petitioner appealed to the District Court on June 22, 2009, and the District Court 
affirmed the Trial Court's decision on May 13, 2010. An appeal to the Supreme was 
filed on June 24, 2010. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's opinion 
when it issued its Remittitur January 10, 2012. · 
Petitioner's first and second Causes of Action are restatements of the same issues 
decided by the Trial Court and on direct appeal. The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure 
Act cannot be used as a substitute for appeal. The Petition fails to raise any issue of 
material fact with regard to the constitutional application of Idaho's trespass_ statute to the 
facts of the case. To the extent Petitioner seeks to reframe the issue as one of substantive 
1 
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and procedural due process, re-litigation of those related constitutional issues is barred by 
operation ofl.C.19-4901(b). 
Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails to raise an issue of material 
fact. Trial counsel properly raised a constitutional challenge to the application of the 
statute to the facts of Petitioner's case. That challenge was not successful. It does not 
follow that counsel's performance was deficient. 
As the Petition fails to raise an issue of material fact and seeks to re-litigate issues 
previously decided on direct appeal, Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal is 
hereby, GRANTED. 
DATED this 13th day of June, 2013 
Kevin Swain - Magistrate Judge 
2 
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IN THE DISTkICT COURT OF THE FOURTt ..... UDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA NO._ 
A.M.===-=--=--=-~FliteLeoo ----P.M. 
----
STATE OF IDAHO, ) JUN 13 2013 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. Christopher A. Pentico, 
Defendant. 
) CHA/STOPHER D 
) CASE NO. CV-PC-2013-00248 8YKELLEWEG~~t· Clerk 
) DEPUTY 
) 
) CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
) 
) 
I, Vicky Emery, the undersigned Court Clerk do hereby certify that I 
have mailed, postage prepaid, by United States Mail, one copy of the notice 
of intent to grant summary dismissal, to each of the parties of record in this 
cause in envelopes addressed as follows: 
Ada County Prosecutor's Office 
Juvenile Division / Attn: Stacy 
Interoffice Mail 
Ada County Public Defender's Office 
Interoffice Mail 
of June, 2013. 
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/ 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellant 
NO.= I 1 A.M,_""""(l_,_M..._U'"'--'FILEO - P.M ___ _ 
JUL O 5 2013 
HEIDI M. TOLMAN, ISB #8478 
Deputy Public Defender 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH, Clerk 
By JAMIE MARTIN 
DEPUTY 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent-Respondent. 
Case No. CV-PC-2013-00248 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: . THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, GREG H. BOWER, ADA COUNTY 
PROSECUTOR, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1) The above-named Petitioner-Appellant appeals against the above-named 
Respondent-Respondent to the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District of the state of Idaho, in and for the county of Ada, from the final 
Order Granting Summary Dismissal entered in the above-entitled action 
on June 13, 2013, the Honorable Kevin Swain, Magistrate, presiding. 
2) That the party has a right to appeal to the District Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders 
under and pursuant to ICR 54.1. 
3) This appeal is taking upon all matters of law and fact. 
4) A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the Petitioner-
Appellant intends to assert in the appeal, provided any such list of issues 
on appeal shall not prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on 
appeal, are: 
a) Did the magistrate court, err in summarily dismissing the 
appellant's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief? 
5) Appellant does not request any additional transcripts in this matter, as no 
proceedings in this matter were recorded or reported. 
6) Clerk's Record. The appellant requests the standard Clerk's record 
pursuant to JAR 28(b)(l). The appellant requests the following documents 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 1 
000102
... J\ .a 
to be included in the clerk's record, in addition to those automatically 
included under IAR 28(b )(1 ): 
a) Any exhibits, affidavits, objections, responses, answers, motions, 
orders, briefs or memoranda, including all attachments or copies of 
transcripts, filed or lodged by the state, the appellant, or the court 
in support of or in opposition to the dismissal of the Post-
Conviction Petition. 
7) I hereby certify that: 
a) The appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for 
preparation of the clerk's record because he is an indigent person 
and is unable to pay said fee. IDAHO CODE § 31-3220 and IAR 
24(e), ICR 54.7. 
b) Service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to ICR 54.4. 
DATED, this ~ ~ day of June 2013. 
HEIDITO~ 
Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this 5-f'1 day of~ 2013, I mailed (served) a true and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: J""j 
STACYL. WALLACE 
Ada County Prosecutor's Office 
Interdepartmental Mail 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 2 
\ 
000103
\ 
~, 
'~,, 
r ' 
N ~8 ~,et0-
A.M ___ F_,'1'M '11 = 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellant 
HEIDI M. TOLMAN, ISB #8478 
Deputy Public Defender 
JUL O 8 2013 
CHRISTOPHER O. RICH, Clerk 
By JAMIE MARTIN 
0EPUTY 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409 
NO TRANSCRIPT 
REQUESTED 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent-Respondent. 
Case No. CV-PC-2013-00248 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, GREG H. BOWER, ADA COUNTY 
PROSECUTOR, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1) The above-named Petitioner-Appellant appeals against the above-named 
Respondent-Respondent to the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District of the state of Idaho, in and for the county of Ada, from the final 
Order Granting Summary Dismissal entered in the above-entitled action 
on June 13, 2013, the Honorable Kevin Swain, Magistrate, presiding. 
2) That the party has a right to appeal to the District Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders 
under and pursuant to ICR 54.1, IAR 1 l(a) and (c), and IRCP 83(a). 
3) This appeal is taking upon all matters oflaw and fact. 
4) A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the Petitioner-
Appellant intends to assert in the appeal, provided any such list of issues 
on appeal shall not prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on 
appeal, are: 
a) Did the magistrate court err in summarily dismissing the 
appellant's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief? 
5) Appellant does not request any additional transcripts in this matter, as no 
proceedings in this matter were recorded or reported. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 1 
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6) Clerk's Record. The appellant requests that pursuant to IRCP 83(n), the 
entire court file including any minute entries and any exhibits be made 
available to the District Court. 
7) I hereby certify that: 
a) The appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for 
preparation of the clerk's record because he is an indigent person 
and is unable to pay said fee. IDAHO CODE § 31-3220 and IAR 
24(e), ICR 54.7. 
b) Service has been made on the court appealed from and on all other 
parties to the action, as required by IRCP 83(e), IAR 20 and ICR 
54.4. 
DATED, this $' day of July 2013. 
HEIDI TOLMAN 
Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this _R__ day of July 2013, I mailed (served) a true and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
JUDGE KEVIN SWAIN 
Ada County Courthouse 
Chambers Room 2193 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
STACYL. WALLACE 
Ada County Prosecutor's Office 
Interdepartmental Mail 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 3 
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FILED 
Tuesday, July 09, 2013 at 08:00 AM 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, CLERK OF THE COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Responden~Respondent 
July 9th, 2013. 
Case No. CV-PC-2013-00248 
NOTICE OF REASSIGNMENT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN That the above-entitled case has been reassigned to 
the Honorable MICHAEL MCLAUGHLIN. 
DATED Tuesday, July 09, 2013 
,,,,1111,,,, 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH .. ,,,, .ffH JU'•,,, 
Clerk of the Dis t Coult.,~'\ ••n•• :/>/n '•,, 
.. ~ C)"\J •• •• '--/: , ~ u ••• • •• -t,. ·~ 
- E--. - .• • \. .. ~ . .• "~ I .., v ,.., • 'o d ,:, 
:~o - o~: 
:ei::: -OF- OC/')• 
•£-<• :'"":l:: :c.J')• .~: 
-:, ~ •. IDAHO : ~: 
.. v- • .:....;1 .. 
,:. /, ,). .. :, ~ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ',,,~1,v0°e••eoo•••0\J"':-.<....\ .. ,,, .... 
111 PoR AD~ e,O ,,, .. 
I hereby certify that on Tuesday, July 09, 2013, I have delivered'a1.tri.ueJ'ana' 
accurate copy of the foregoing document to the following parties in the ~ethod indicated 
below: 
STACY L WALLACE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
NOTICE OF REASSIGNMENT-Civil 
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NO·-----=~-----
A.M ____ F,_,LE·~--..... #_.'j...,Q __ 
JUL 1-7 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
ByAMYLYCAN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Res ondent. 
Case No. CV-PC-2013-00248 
ORDER GOVERNING 
PROCEDURE ON APPEAL 
Notice of Appeal having been filed herein, and it appearing that a transcript of all the testimony of 
the original trial or hearing is required by Appellant to resolve the issues on appeal: 
It is ORDERED: 
1) That Appellant shall order and pay for the estimated cost of the transcript within 14 days after 
the filing of the notice of appeal. 
2) That Appellant's brief shall be filed and served on or before November 25th, 2013. 
3) That Respondent's brief shall be filed and served on or before December 23rd, 2013. 
4) That Appellant's reply brief, if any, shall be filed and served on or before January 9th, 2014. 
5) Oral Argument will be heard at the Ada County Courthouse, 200 W. Front Street Boise, Idaho 
on January 23rd at 2:00p.m. 
Dated this 17th day of July 2013. 
MICHAEL MCLAUGHLIN 
Senior District Judge 
ORDER GOVERNING PROCEDURE ON APPEAL - Page 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 17th day of July, 2013 I mailed (served) a true and correct 
copy of the within instrument to: 
Stacy L. Wallace 
Ada County Prosecutor 
Interdepartmental Mail 
Heidi Tolman 
Ada County Public Defender 
Interdepartmental Mail 
ORDER GOVERNING PROCEDURE ON APPEAL - Page 2 
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NO. ___ FILE~ t25:: 
A.M. ~ 
NOV 2 5 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RIC~. Clerk 
By DAYSHA OSBORN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHRISTOPHER A.PENTICO, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) 
, 
) 
v. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
Case No. CV-PC-13-248 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
APPEAL FROM THE MAGISTRATE COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL , 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
HONORABLE KEVIN SAWIN 
Magistrate Judge 
• ...i 
HEIDI TOLMAN 
Deputy Ada County Public Defender 
I.S.B. # 8648 
200 W. Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
208-287-7 400 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
PETITIONER 
STACY LANGTON 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Ada County Prosecutor's Office 
6300 Denton Street 
Boise, Idaho 83704 
208-577-4900 
ATTORNEY FOR 
RESPONDENT 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
,;. 
. This is an appeal from the trial court's order granting summary dismissal of Mr. 
Pentico's petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. 
General Course of Proceedings 
On April 2, 2008, Pentico was charged with trespassing, a misdemeanor violation 
of I.C. § 18-7011. On June 13, 2008, Pentico filed a Motion to Dismiss because Pentico 
had not committed a trespass as described in I.C. § 18-7011 as this sub-section is 
based on lands which are "inclosed by fences of any description sufficient to show the 
boundaries of the land inclosed." Furthermore, Pentico argued that the State failed to 
state with any specificity facts that would support its trespass charge against him 
especially because he was engaging in politically protected speech. This charge was 
amended, twice, ultimately charging Pentico with trespass under I.C. § 18-7008(8) for 
visiting the Governor's office to communicate constitutent concerns. 
Pentico filed a second Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint on November 12, 
2008. A hearing was held on this Motion to Dismiss on Janyary 26, 2009. During the 
course of that hearing Pentico, through counse, argued: 
1. Relying upon State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 69 P.3d 126 (2003), that it 
· would be unconstitutional to apply I.C. § 18-7008 to a person who was on 
property for the purpose of exercising constitutionally protected rights. 
2. That Pentico had issues with the fact that he was asked to leave public 
property in the first place on March 25, 2009. 
3. That the property involved was a public forum and that an attempt to limit a 
citizens access to such property must be strictly scrutinized. 
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During this motion hearing Pentico also urged the Court to allow him to call the 
Governor in order to demonstrate that he had an invitation to drop by the Governor's 
office to obtain an appointment and to be allowed to call a legislator in order to 
demonstrate that while Pentico could be persistent, he was not inappropriate in his 
conduct at the Capitol. 
The Trial Court appeared to appreciate that Pentico was making a due process 
argument and that he had evidence to support his claim that he was not acting 
inappropriately when he was asked to leave State land and with this knowledge the 
Court ruled that: 
1. On its face, without regard to the evidence, Idaho Code § 18-7008 was a 
very reasonable time, place and manner restriction. 
2. Pentico was not being prosecuted for the content of his communication but for 
his conduct. 
3. The statute was constitutional as applied. 
4. The scope of the trial would be very narrow, that neither the content of Mr. 
Pentico's prior communications nor his prior conduct was relevant to the 
proceedings and that the agent of the State who directed Mr. Pentico to leave 
State property on March 25, 2008, did not need to have a reason for doing so. 
Specifically the Court directed: "We are not going to have testimony from 
either side about the history that lead up to the events of April 2nd." 
5. The Court also ruled that Pentico was precluded from calling the Governor to 
present evidence that he had an invitation from him to come by the office and 
set up an appointment to speak with him. 
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Following the hearing of January 6, 2009, it appears that Pentico intended to 
enter a ~onditional plea of guilty. The Court's minute entry reflects that the case was 
"settled" and the matter was set for a sentencing· hearing. On the date set for 
sentencing, Pentico changed his mind and requested that the matter be set for trial. A 
trial was set for April 21, 2009, and at that time, Pentico waived his right to a jury trial 
and proceeded with a court trial. Prior to the beginning of trial, in the course of dealing 
with a Motion in Limine, the Court again made clear that "We are not going to have 
testimony about whether Mr. Pentico's actions were justified by the First Amendment." 
The Court went on to say that there were two issues in the case: Was Pentico properly 
advised to leave identified State land and was he subsequently on that State land. In 
this regard, the Court made clear that neither party would be permitted to offer evidence 
relative to the events that lead up to the initial exclusion. During the trial the Court, after 
hearing testimony in the case and reviewing applicable law, found that the more 
significant aspects of the case were legal issues which had previously been decided by 
the Court. The Trial Court found Pentico guilty of the misdemeanor offense of trespass 
on April 21, 2009. Pentico was sentenced on May 11, 2009. 
Pentico appealed to the District Court on June 22, 2009 and that District Court 
affitrmed the Trial Court's decision on May 13, 2010. An appeal to the Supreme Court 
was filed on June 24, 2010. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's 
opinion when it issued its Remittitur January 10, 2012. 
Pentico filed his verified Petition for Post-Conviction relief on January 4, 2013, in 
which three causes of action are alleged. The State filed its Answer, Motion for 
Summary Dismissal and Brief in Support on March 26, 2013. The Trial Court filed its 
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I 
Notice of Intent to Grant Summary Dismissal on April 30, 2013. Pentico filed his 
Response to the State's Motion for Summary Disposition on May 20, 2013. The Trial 
Court Granted Summary Dismissal on June 13, 2013. This appeal follows. 
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ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Did the trial court err by granting Summary Dismissal without a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard? 
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ARGUMENT 
It is well known that an application for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. While an 
applicant for post-conviction relief must eventually prove the allegations upon which the 
application is based, summary disposition is not appropriate unless the applicant's evidence 
raises no genuine issue of material fact. This Court should determine whether a genuine issue of 
fact exists based upon the record of the criminal case along with the pleadings, and together with 
any affidavits on file. In doing so, it must liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences 
in favor of the non-moving party. However, until the allegations in a verified application for 
post-conviction relief are controverted by the state, they must be deemed to be true for the 
purpose of determining if an evidentiary hearing is to be held. Only if the alleged facts, even if 
true, would not entitle the applicant to relief may the trial court dismiss the application without 
holding an evidentiary hearing. Kelly v. State,_ Idaho_,_ p.3d _, 2010 WL 2901795 
*2 (2010). A motion to dismiss, unsupported by affidavits, depositions or materials does not 
controvert the allegations in the petition. Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 
1190 (1975). Thus the state's motion for summary disposition, which was unsupported by any 
evidentiary material, did not controvert any of the allegations in the verified petition for post-
conviction relief. Mr. Pentico presented evidence which if true would entitle him to relief. 
Therefore, the Trial Court erred when it granted summary dismissal without an evidentiary 
hearing. 
Summary dismissal of a petition for postOconviction relief is the procedural equivalent of 
summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56 and this Court must determine whether a genuine issue of 
material fact exists, with inferences liberally construed in favor of the petitioner. Charboneau v. 
State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004). The applicant must prove the allegations 
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in the request for relief only by preponderance of the evidence. State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 
560, 199 P.3d 123, 135 (2008). Further, when an appellant asserts the violation of constitutional 
rights this court exercises free review over the trial court's determination as to whether 
constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Pearce, 146 
Idaho 241,248, 192 P.3d 1065, 1072 (2008). 
There was a court trial in this case which ended in a conviction. Mr. Pentico filed an 
appeal. He then filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. Pending before this Court is 
the Trial Court's Order Granting Summary Dismissal of Mr. Pentico's Verified Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief without a hearing. 
1. Petitioner's asserted three causes of action for which relief can be granted. 
(a) Constitutional causes of action. 
Mr. Pentico asserted on direct appeal that the initial ask to leave was a violation of due 
process .. His arguments addressed both substantive and procedural due process issues. Those 
specific issues were never addressed by either the District Court or The Idaho Court of Appeals. 
Mr. Pentico is entitled to have those claims addressed. The issues raised in post-conviction are 
not the same issues decided by the trial court and affirmed on direct appeal. In fact the issues 
raised were not addressed by the trial court due to ineffective assistance of counsel and therefore 
were not addressed on appeal because they were not preserved by the trial counsel. 
Mr. Pentico submitted the Affidavit of Christopher Pentico and Heidi Tolman in support 
of the constitutional causes of action. Those affidavits raise genuine issues of material fact that 
should have at the lease have been addressed at an evidentiary hearing. 
(b )Ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Mr. Pentico submitted the Affidavit of Bruce Bistline and Alan Derr in support of his 
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claim for post-conviction relief. Those affidavits raise genuine issues of material fact that should 
at the least have been addressed at an evidentiary hearing. 
2. Petitioner's allegations were not bare and conclusory. 
As stated above the petitioner has supplemented the record with the affidavits of trial 
counsel Alan Derr and appellate counsel Bruce Bistline. While it is true that this Court does not 
need to accept the petitioner's conclusions the Trial Court should have addressed the facts that 
were introduced, which when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party raise a 
genuine issue of material fact that should have been addressed at an evidentiary hearing. 
3. Petitioner has previously and unsuccessfully raised the constitutional issues with 
the trial court and on appeal. 
The Trial Court in its order Granting Summary Dismissal state the first and second causes 
of action are a restatement of the same issues decided by the Trial Court and on direct appeal. 
However _it is Mr. Pentico's position that with respect to the first and second causes of action he 
is not attempting to re-litigate the issues he is actually attempting to have the issues decided. On 
appeal Mr. Pentico raised procedural and substantive due process issues specifically with respect 
to March 25, 2008. Those issues were not decided by the trial court nor were they addressed by 
the court on appeal. Mr. Pentico never waived these issues as the State claims because they were 
raised on appeal, they just were never addressed by the court in its decision. The only issues 
which was decided on appeal was with respect to Mr. Pentico's return to the Governor's office 
on April 2, 2008 not the initial ask to leave and the Constitutionality of that request on March 25, 
2008. 
4. Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel at trial in violation 
of the Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel Under 
Strickland v. Washington. 
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A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment has 
been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the 
states. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). The Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee the right to counsel on appeal. Douglas v. 
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). This right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance 
of that counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985). The Idaho Constitution also 
guarantees a criminal defendant's right to counsel. Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 13; I.C. § 19-852. 
In general, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon the state or 
federal constitution, is analyzed under the familiar Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984), standard. In order to prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) that counsel's 
performance was deficient in that it fell below standards of reasonable professional performance; 
and 2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. at 689. The prejudice prong of the test is shown if there is a reasonable probability that a 
different result would have been obtained in the case if the attorney had acted properly. Id. 
Courts will not attempt to second-guess trial counsel's strategic decisions unless those decisions 
are made upon the basis of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other 
shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho at 145, 139 P.3d at 
747. 
The Trial Court held that the Petitioner's claim for ineffective assistance of counsel failed 
to raise an issue of material fact. Mr. Pentico supported his claims with affidavits which were 
attached to his Response to State's Motion for Summary Disposition. The Trial Court also 
seems to have overlooked the record of the trial proceedings, which establish the factual basis for 
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most of the claims, which largely consist of errors of omissions at trial. Thus, Mr. Pentico has 
done far more than make bare and conclusory allegations which entitled him to a hearing on the 
merits of his claim 
The United States Supreme Court has said that the duty of the defense lawyer "is to make 
the adversarial testing process work in the particular case." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 
S.Ct. 2052 (emphasis added). Thus, it is defense counsel's specific performance in Mr. Pentico's 
case which matters, not his body of work over a career or his reputation. The purpose of the 
effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to castigate the lack of diligence or 
talent of the mediocre lawyers or to lionize the career accomplishments of the best lawyers. 
"The purpose is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial." Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 6809. 
Mr. Pentico has shown that defense counsel rendered deficient performance in several 
instances and the state did not controvert this evidence. The petitioner has supported this section 
with affidavits demonstrating the evidence which was available at the time of trial, its 
significance and the failure of the courts to address them on direct appeal because the issues were 
not preserved for appeal by trial counsel. The Court of Appeals in its decision held that the 
record on appeal was not adequate to allow it to review Pentico's claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, and it declined to do so. The affidavits provided to this Court with regard to March 
25, 2008 and the Motion in Limine state that it was not a tactical or strategic decision of trail 
counsel not to raise those issues. Further the affidavit of Bruce Bistline asserts that there would 
or could be no strategic reason as to omit of recognize the importance of the March 25, 2008 
date. 
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... ~ . ... 
CONCLUSION 
The facts at issues were material and the State did not controvert the allegations by 
affidavits, depositions or any other type of evidence. Talcing the allegations as true, and viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Pentico, he has demonstrated a material issue of 
fact as to the deficient performance of counsel and that the performance resulted in prejudice Mr. 
Pentico is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the matter. Because In light of the above, the 
Trial Court erred by granting Summary Dismissal without a hearing and this Court should 
remand and order the Court to set this matter for an evidentiary hearing. 
Respectfully submitted this ~5""' day of November 2013. 
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This case is on appeal to the District Court from the Magistrate Court's decision that 
Christopher Pentico (Pentico) is not entitled to post conviction relief following his conviction for 
Trespass. The State argues that the Magistrate Court correctly dismissed the petition for post-
conviction relief because it failed to allege any genuine issues of material fact and contained issues 
that have been, or should have been, brought on direct appeal. 
Facts and Procedural History 
On April 2, 2008, Pentico was cited for Trespass, which was ultimately amended to 
Trespass pursuant to LC. § 18-7008. On November 12, 2008, Pentico filed his Motion to 
Dismiss Amended Complaint, raising constitutional issues regarding the application of LC. § 18-
7008. On January 6, 2009, the Trial Court held a hearing on the motion and denied it, finding no 
constitutional infirmities. In so holding, the trial court found that the statute placed reasonable 
restrictions on the time place and manner in which constitutional rights could be exercised. State 
v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906,910,265 P.3d 519, 523 (Ct. App. 2011). Subsequently, Pentico filed 
a motion in limine that sought to limit testimony regarding any of his prior bad acts or wrongs. 
Id. This motion was granted by the Magistrate as it pertained to any prior dealings Pentico had 
with government officials on days other than April 2, 2008. Id. 
A court trial was held on April 21, 2009. Pentico was found guilty of Trespass under LC. 
§ 18-7008, and was sentenced on May 11, 2009. 
Pentico filed his appeal with the district court on June 22, 2009. Judge Kathryn Sticklen 
affirmed the Trial Court's decision in a Memorandum Decision and Order filed on May 13, 2010. 
Pentico appealed this decision to the Idaho Supreme Court on June 24, 2010. 
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On October 17, 2011, the Court of Appeals issued an opinion affirming Judge Sticklen's 
decision .. Pentico, 151 Idaho at 909, 265 P.3d at 522. The Supreme Court denied review, and 
remittitur was issued on January 10, 2012. 
Pentico filed his Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Petition) on January 4, 
2013. On June 13; 2013, the trial court issued an Order Granting Summary Dismissal. In the 
order, the trial court held that to the extent that Pentico seeks to relitigate constitutional issues, 
such relitigation is barred by LC. § 19-4901(b). Additionally, the trial court held that the Petition 
failed to raise an issue of material fact, and that the constitutional challenge was previously 
raised, unsuccessfully, on direct appeal. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
The State rephrases the sole issue on appeal. 
1. Whether the trial court erred by granting Summary Dismissal without a hearing on the 
Petition for post-conviction relief. 
Standard of review 
An application for post-conviction relief under the Uniform Post Conviction 
Procedure Act (UPCP A) is civil in nature. Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the 
applicant for post-conviction relief must prove by a preponderance of evidence the 
allegations upon which the application for post-conviction relief is based. Unlike 
the complaint in an ordinary civil action, however, an application for post-
conviction relief must contain more than "a short and plain statement of the 
claim" that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). Rather, an 
applicant for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within 
the personal knowledge of the application. The application must include 
affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations, or must state why 
such supporting evidence is not included. 
Summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief is appropriate if the 
applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact. On review of a 
dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, 
this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the 
pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and will 
, liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving 
party. A court is required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, 
but need not accept the petitioner's conclusions. When the alleged facts, even if 
true, would not entitle the applicant to relief, the trial court may dismiss the 
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application without holding an evidentiary hearing. Allegations contained in the 
application are insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly 
disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a 
matter of law. 
Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517,521,236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010). 
Argument 
In the Petition, Pentico alleges three causes of action. The First Cause of action is that 
Pentico's Due Process Rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution were violated. The Second Cause of action 
likewise deals with violations of the same rights, but for different conduct. The Third Cause of 
action alleges that Pentico was denied the right to fully challenge the constitutionality of LC. § 
18-7008(8) as applied to this case. 
Although there is only one overarching issue on appeal, there are multiple subparts that 
need to be addressed. There are three reasons why the Magistrate's decision to summarily 
dismiss the case without hearing was correct. Specifically those are: the Petition did not raise 
any allegations of material fact; the issues raised in the Petition were previously and 
unsuccessfully raised at trial and on direct appeal; and that to the extent any of the issues in the 
Petition are different than those previously asserted, those issues are forfeited due to LC. § 19-
490l(b). 
A. The trial court did not err in dismissing Pentico's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
without a hearing because the allegations raised no material issue of fact. 
As stated above, summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief is appropriate 
if the applicant's evidence raised no genuine issue of material fact: 
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the 
application when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any 
affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
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LC. § 19-4906. Absent a genuine issue of material fact, a petition for post-conviction relief may 
be properly dismissed without a hearing. LC. § 19-4906(b). 
To fully analyze whether a genuine issue of material fact has been alleged, it is necessary 
to view the alleged facts in light of the case law. "A material fact has 'some logical connection 
with the consequential facts[,]' Black's Law Dictionary, 991 (7th Ed.1999), and therefore is 
determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties." State v. Yakovac, 
145 Idaho 437,444, 180 P.3d 476,483 (2008). 
Therefore in this case, it is necessary to analyze whether the alleged facts would create a 
genuine issue in the context of the applicable law. Idaho Courts have previously adopted the 
standard for ineffective assistance of counsel set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984). See Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 525, 164 P.3d 798, 805 (2007). However, the 
nature of this appeal does not reach the prongs articulated in Strickland. Rather, this appeal is 
dealing with the threshold issue of whether any of the alleged facts might rise to the level of 
material fact. Given this, it is more pertinent to analyze the nature of an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim: 
When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this Court does not 
second-guess strategic and tactical decisions, and such decisions cannot serve as a 
basis for post-conviction relief unless the decision is shown to have resulted from 
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings 
capable of objective review. 
State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444, 180 P.3d 476,483 (2008) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 
581,584, 6 P.3d 831, 834 (2000)). The holding in Yakovac clearly narrows the possible scope of 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and, accordingly, limits the facts that might be 
material or consequential. 
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The facts as alleged in the Petition do not fit within the scope of an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim. What the Petition alleges to be failures, can more accurately be deemed tactical 
decisions made by counsel. For example, Pentico filed a Motion in Limine to prevent evidence 
of other bad acts from coming into evidence at trial. The Court of Appeals correctly concluded 
that this tactical decision limited the testimony before' the Magistrate Court, and ultimately 
limited the record on appeal. State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906,913,265 P.3d 519, 526 (Ct. App. 
2011). Such a decision does not constitute inadequate preparation or ignorance of the law, but 
rather a calculated decision in the context of a trial. 
Additionally, as discussed below, many of the Constitutional issues were addressed on 
direct appeal and should not be at issue on post-conviction. It appears that the majority of the 
issues presented in the Petition fall into this latter category, and for that reason, any facts related 
to previously litigated, issues are not material for purposes of post-conviction relief. Therefore, 
the magistrate court correctly held that summary dismissal was appropriate. 
B. The issues raised in the Petition were previously and unsuccessfully raised at the 
trial court and on direct appeal. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has previously held that "[g]enerally speaking, a claim or 
issue which was or could have been raised on appeal may not be considered in post-conviction 
proceedings." Whitehawkv. State, 116 Idaho 831, 832-33, 780 P.2d 153, 154-55 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Going further, the Court of Appeals held that "[a] convicted defendant may not simply relitigate 
the same factual questions in his application, in virtually the same factual context already 
presented in a direct appeal." Id. This holding is consistent with I.C. § 19-4901(b) which states 
in part: 
This remedy is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the 
proceedings in the trial court, or of an appeal from the sentence or conviction. Any 
issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and 
may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings, unless it appears to the 
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court, on the basis of a substantial factual showing by affidavit, deposition or 
otherwise, that the asserted basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the 
reliability of the finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due diligence, 
have been presented earlier. 
The bulk of the Petition is clearly an attempt to relitigate the constitutional issues 
previously decided at the trial court and on direct appeal to the Court of Appeals. For example, 
the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether I. C. § 18-7008(8) is facially 
unconstitutional. State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906, 913, 265 P.3d 519, 526 (Ct. App. 2011). 
Additionally, the Court of Appeals addressed whether the statute was unconstitutional as applied 
to Pentico. Id., at 914,265 P.3d at 527. On this point, the Court of Appeals held that the statute 
was not unconstitutionally overbroad as it applied to Pentico's conduct on April 2, 2008. Id. On 
the issue of vagueness, the Court of Appeals first noted that the issue was not properly preserved 
for appeal, but went on to analyze the statute and determined that the statute is not vague as 
applied. Id., at 915, 265 P.3d at 528. 1 
Because many of the issues in the Petition are either attempts to relitigate or rephrase 
issues, the State respectfully asked the trial court to dismiss the Petition. 
C. To the extent that any issues in the Petition are different than those previously 
asserted, Pentico has forfeited his right to pursue those issues under J.C. § 19-
4901 (b ). 
All three of the causes of action alleged by the Petition touch on constitutional issues that 
previously asserted at a different stage of litigation. However, to the extent that the issues raised 
in the Petition differ from those previously asserted, those issues have been procedurally waived 
by operation ofl.C. § 19-4901(b) as applied by the Court of Appeals in cases like Whitehawk. 
1 It should be noted that the Court of Appeals' analysis of this issue effectively mitigated any 
potential ineffective assistance of counsel related to the preservation of an issue on appeal. 
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Conclusion 
It is clear that the Magistrate Court correctly granted summary dismissal on the Petition 
without a hearing. Many of the issues brought on post-conviction dealt with matters previously 
addressed by the trial court or the Court of Appeals. As such, addressing those issues here would 
amount to a second bite of the apple in contravention of I.C. § 19-4901(b). For any of the 
remaining issues, there are no alleged genuine issues of material fact that would necessitate a 
hearing on the Petition. Therefore, we ask that the Court affirm the decision of the Magistrate 
Court. 
DATED this 23 day of December 2013. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
B~~ 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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true and correct copy of the foregoing document to: Lance Foisting, Ada County Public 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The State's defense of the Summary Dismissal entered in this action for Post-
Conviction Relief, attempts to perpetuate the failure of the State's attorney, the Trial 
Court and Mr. Pentico's Trial Counsel to appreciate that guilt for a violation of I.C. § 18-
7008(A)(8) requires the occurrence of two distinct events which must occur in a 
prescribed order such that the lawful occurrence of the first is a necessary predicate to 
the criminality of the second. Either one of these events is, in the context of public land 
which is a traditional public forum, open to challenge upon Constitutional grounds. 
Before a person can be prosecuted for being on a parcel of land which he has 
previously been asked to leave he must return to that parcel within one year of being 
there and being asked to leave. Obviously, if the first event, the "ask to leave," is 
defective for some reason then the second event, "the return," is not criminal conduct. 
An ongoing lack of recognition that these two very distinct and separate events warrant 
independent factual, legal and Constitutional analysis allows the State's arguments to, 
at first blush, seem to be rational. But, when the events are analyzed separately, as 
they must be, it is apparent that the State's assertion that Mr. Pentico's Constitutional 
challenges have all be addressed is erroneous. As these unresolved Constitutional 
challenges could not be made on appeal because they were not recognized, raised, or 
preserved by Trial Counsel; the claim that Mr. Pentico has failed to frame an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim is equally erroneous. 
I.C. § 18-7008(A)(8), at least facially, is focused upon the rights of private 
property owners. Because of the lack of clear application to public land (which has 
custodians but no owners), it is possible to understand, though not accept, Trial 
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Counsel's failure to appreciate the issues which surround the "ask to leave" when the 
statute is applied to public property. It is clear beyond question that the "ask to leave" 
could, as to private property, be defective if the person making that request was not the 
owner or an authorized agent of the owner or if the person being asked to leave was not 
on the property (and thus unable to "depart"). It is also clear and appropriate that, as to 
private property, there is no need for there to be any reason for asking a person to leave 
other than their mere presence. 
The limits, upon the power to "ask to leave" are a good deal less clear when it 
comes to public property. To this point much, indeed an excessive amount of, reliance 
has been placed by the State and the Courts upon State v. Korsen 138 Idaho 706, 69 
P.3d 126 (2003). It is true that the Idaho Supreme Court determined in Korsen that a 
person exercising protected rights could under the circumstances present in that case 
(business being conducted on State property was complete and Mr. Korsen had 
become loud and threatening) be asked to leave State administrative offices. However, 
Korsen cannot be read as holding that a person who is upon State property which is a 
traditional public forum (affording greater protection than visits to administrative offices) 
for the purpose of exercising protected rights can, at risk of prosecution, be asked to 
leave that property for any reason or no reason at all (a substantially lower standard for 
the request that was present in Korsen). 
Thus, where I.C. § 18-7008(A)(8) is being applied to public land which is a 
traditional public forum and consequently open to the public for the exercise of the 
freedoms guaranteed to them by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
the "ask to leave" itself must be based upon conduct which is sufficient to truncate the 
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protected exercise of those rights. In other words, while an "ask to leave" can occur on 
private property for any reason or no reason at all, an "ask to leave" on public property 
must perforce be based upon a justification which is constitutionally sufficient. The 
State is not capable of citing any authority to the contrary. 
In the criminal proceedings at issue here no one seems to have given any 
consideration to the question of whether there was a constitutionally sufficient basis for 
anyone to ask Mr. Pentico to leave the grounds of the interim Statehouse when he was 
there to speak to a legislator about a matter of concern to him. Yet, if this conduct was 
constitutionally protected, as it clearly is, than, either the statutory authority to "ask to 
leave" is constitutionally defective ( overbroad and vague as applied) and not 
enforceable or the "ask to leave" was itself defective. If the "ask to leave," on March 25, 
2008, was defective then the "return within one year," on April 2, 2008, was itself not a 
violation of the statute. Mr. Pentico's Trial Counsel clearly not recognize these issue 
and as a consequence he did not raise them. 
The failure to recognize that criminality under the statute turns upon the 
succession of two significant and separate events lead to the failure to raise additional 
constitutional arguments. As they were not raised they were not considered and 
addressed on appeal. First, even where it true that a person can be asked to leave a 
traditional public forum for any reason or no reason at all (a proposition for which there 
is not one iota of authority), that statute is facially overbroad to the extent that it provides 
for an automatic exclusion from that parcel for a full one year following the ask to leave 
without any regard for the otherwise protected rights being exercised on the return (in 
other words and impermissible prior restraint of speech). Second, even if the "ask to 
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leave" were not defective and if, as the Court of Appeals concluded, an "ask to leave" 
parcel A where the intruder is standing can be extended to allow exclusion form parcels 
8 and C, how can the unambiguous language of the statute be read as providing 
constitutionally sufficient notice of the criminality of a subsequent entry onto parcel 8 or 
C (in other words a vagueness as applied problem that was never raised or decided). 
Third, even if the "ask to leave" were not defective, how, in the absence of any 
procedural due process can the "ask to leave" be applied to preclude subsequent entry 
for constitutionally protected purposes onto public land which is open to the public for 
the exact purpose for which it was subsequently used. 
None of these challenges were presented to the Trial Court and none were 
resolved by the Trial Court. They were not presented because trial counsel did not 
appreciate their role and as a consequence he did not develop the record to include, at 
least by offer of proof, the available facts that would have supported argument on these 
issues and he did not raise these issues by motion, briefing or argument. 
Thus, in sum, Mr. Pentico was wrongfully convicted because he received 
inadequate assistance of Counsel and because the extent to which I. C. § 18-7008(A)( 4) 
is Constitutionally defective as applied in this case to public land was never fully 
presented to or considered by the Courts. 
II. ARUGMENT 
A. The Verified Petition and Supporting Documents Present the Court with Material 
Facts Which if Taken as True, Support the Relief Requested. 
Faced with Mr. Pentico's Verified Petition setting forth the events, the actions, the 
omissions and the claims being made based on these events, actions and omissions 
accompanied by Trial Counsel's affidavit detailing his thought process and the defenses 
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that he did not recognize and an affidavit of Mr. Pentico's expert detailing the errors 
made by Trial Counsel, the Trial Court concluded Petitioner had failed "to raise an issue 
of material fact." Order Granting Summary Dismissal pp. 1 & 2. This is, of course, not 
the standard by which the Petition should be judged. The question to be evaluated is 
whether the Petition and the supporting documents present facts which, if taken to be 
true, would entitled the Petitioner to the requested relief and are material to the 
requested relief. Fenstermaker v. State 128 Idaho 285, 287,912 P.2d 653, 655 (Ct.App. 
1999) ( overruled on other grounds State v. Porter, 2005 Ida. App. Lexis 1 ). 
The State has not controverted any of the facts or opinions placed into the record 
by Petitioner. The State has not challenged the facts and claims set forth in the 
Petition or sought to strike or otherwise challenge the affidavits filed by Mr. Pentico. 
The State has not demonstrated that Mr. Pentico's Constitutional challenges are without 
merit. The State merely appears to contend that the facts and opinions placed in the 
record by Mr. Pentico are not material for the reason even if taken to be true they do not 
warrant the relief sought. This is a bit of a curious position given that the State also 
argues that Mr. Pentico cannot raise Constitutional arguments because they are barred 
by I.C. 4901(b) which applies to issues which could have been but were not raised 
below. If these unchallenged Constitutional arguments are barred because they were 
not raised by Trial Counsel is that not in and of itself material and substantial evidence 
of ineffective assistance of counsel? In any event the States claim that the record is 
devoid of material facts is contrary to the record. 
The Verified Petition and the supporting affidavits demonstrate a factual basis for 
an argument that there was no legally and constitutionally sufficient "ask to leave" and 
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thus the return could not be itself criminal conduct. For the purpose of this proceeding it 
must be assumed that Mr. Pentico had, immediately prior to the "ask to leave" just 
arrived upon the grounds of the interim Statehouse for the purpose of speaking with a 
Legislator to seek help in getting an Attorney General's Opinion. There is no evidence 
that he had behaved inappropriately or in a manner that would truncate his rights as a 
member of the public to go to the Statehouse for exactly that purpose. This argument 
was raised on appeal but, the State's assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, 
Respondent's Brief, p.8, the Court did not address, as in resolve, this issue. Indeed the 
Court specifically stated: "Therefore, the only challenge preserved for appeal is whether 
the statute was unconstitutional as applied to Pentico on April 2 when he delivered a 
letter to the Governor's Office." State v. Pentico 151 Idaho 906, 913, 265 P.3d 519,526 
(Ct.App.2011 ). 
The record reflects that Trial Counsel, has acknowledged that he did not see or 
consciously choose not to raise this defense because he was instead focused on what 
he considered to be the wrongfulness of charging Mr. Pentico for what he considered to 
be protected activity on April 2.1 Mr. Pentico's expert, opined that there was, based on 
an interview with Mr. Pentico, and adequate factual basis for a legal and Constitutional 
challenge to the "ask to leave" and that the failure to make a record of the facts and to 
assert this defense was not based upon any conceivable strategy decision and 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.2 . Neither the Trial Court nor the State 
1 Affidavit of Allen R. Derr, Filed with the Court as Exhibit C to Petitioner's 
Response to State's Motion for Summary Disposition, p. 4 (hereinafter Aff. Derr). 
2 Affidavit of Bruce S. Bistline, Filed with the Court as Exhibit D to Petitioneros 
Response to State's Motion for Summary Disposition, pp. 7, 8, 9(a) (hereinafter Aff. 
Bistline) 
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have demonstrated how these facts are not sufficient to warrant the relief requested; a 
new trial based upon Trial Counsel's failure to provide an effective defense by 
challenging the legality of a predicate event and by creating an adequate records to 
support raising and preserving important factual, legal and Constitutional defenses.3 
The Verified Petition and the supporting affidavits demonstrate that even if there 
was a legally sufficient and Constitutional "ask to leave," the statute was, for reasons 
not raised before the Trial Court, constitutionally defective when applied to a visit to the 
Governor's office on April 2, 2008. The identified defects are a lack of procedural due 
process associated with an automatic 1 year exclusion of the identified properties even 
though those properties are open to the public and commonly used for the exercise of 
Constitutionally protected rights and the lack of substantive due process associated with 
the fact that the statute did not, given its clear and unambiguous language, give fair 
notice that an "ask to leave" occurring upon one property could be extended to 
properties other than the one upon which the ask to leave occurred. The claim to these 
challenges and the failure to raise them are set forth in the Verified Petition.4 The State 
erroneously claims that these arguments were resolved by the Court of Appeals. The 
3 The State does argue that all of Mr. Pentico's constitutional challenges have 
been previously presented to and resolved. It is true that Mr. Pentico's arguments 
regarding his claim that the trip to the Governor's office on April 2 was protected speech 
were resolved; but they are not raised again. It is equally true that Mr. Pentico 
attempted to raise his other constitutional arguments relative to the "ask to leave," the 
one year exclusion, and the vagueness of the statute to the extent it was applied to 
allow the "ask to leave" to be extended from the property on which it occurred to other 
properties. These are the arguments raised here. See, Exhibit A to the Affidavit of 
Heidi Tolman, itself Exhibit A to Petitioner's Response to State's Motion For Summary 
Disposition. But the State cannot point to any judicial determination of these issues, 
other than the determination that they had not been preserved in the record and could 
not be raised on appeal. 
4 See, Verified Petition, Second Cause of Action 
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Court of Appeals did not even discuss the procedural due process issues but only 
concluded that as applied to Mr. Pentico's trip to the Governor's office it was not 
overbroad. Id. 914, 265 P.3d at 526. 
The Court did, in dicta (having already decided the issue was not preserved for 
appeal) discuss the vagueness challenge. However, the Court's conclusion in that 
regard is, like much dicta, not fully reasoned out. In this instance, the Court relied upon 
its earlier, and completely inappropriate, "construction" of the clear and unambiguous 
language of I.C. §18-7008(A)(8) in a manner that allowed a person being asked to leave 
the property upon which he was standing, to be simultaneously excluded from other 
properties upon which he was not standing at the time of the "ask to leave." This 
"construction" of the statute resulted from the Court's conflation of the rules of statutory 
"interpretation" with the rules of statutory "construction" applicable only when there is an 
ambiguity. As a consequence the Court perceived that it had the power to read the 
clear and unambiguous language of the I.C. §18-7008(A)(8) to mean something other 
than what it clearly states so as to avoid a judicially perceived absurdity. This approach 
has been soundly and clearly discredited by the Idaho Supreme Court. Verska v. St. 
Alphonsus Regional Med. Ctr. 151 Idaho 889, 895-896, 265 P .3d 502(505-506) (2011 )). 
However, since the issue of the Constitutionality of applying such a strained reading to 
otherwise clear language was not preserved for Appeal, Mr. Pentico has, as yet not had 
the chance to challenge this statute, read in this manner, as void for vagueness. 
The failure of Trial Counsel to assert these procedural and substantive due 
process claims is set forth in the Third Cause of Action, 26(e)(ii) and (iv). Trial 
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Counsel acknowledged that he did not recognize these due process based challenges.5 
Mr. Pentico's expert opined that these were readily recognizable defenses which should 
have been raised.6 Neither the Trial Court nor the State have demonstrated how these 
facts, if true, are not sufficient to warrant the relief requested; a new trial based upon 
Trial Counsel's failure to provide an effective defense by creating an adequate record to 
support raising and preserving important constitutional defenses. 
B. Dispositive Constitutional Issues Were Not Decided Below 
The Magistrate Court has, without explanation, concluded that the Verified 
Petition seeks to raise the same Constitutional issues that were decided by the Trial 
Court, that the Verified Petition fails to raise "any issue of material fact with regard to the 
constitutional application of Idaho's trespass statute to the facts of the case ... " and that 
an attempt to "reframe the issue as one of substantive and procedural due process" is 
barred by operation of I.C. § 19-4901(b). Order Granting Summary Dismssal pp. 1-2. 
Apparently the Magistrate Court does not recognize, as the Court of Appeals did, that 
the events of March 25th present different issues than are presented relative to the 
events of April 2. While the Court of Appeals understood that Mr. Pentico sought to 
challenge the "ask to leave" and the subsequent one year automatic exclusion from 
both the property on which the "ask" occurred but on properties other than the one on 
which the "ask" occurred, it ruled that Trial Counsel had failed to properly preserve this 
for appeal and that they could not therefore be considered on appeal. 
5 Aff. Derr p. 5 
6 Aff Bistline pp. 7, 9(b). 
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The State attempts to justify the Magistrates conclusion that the Constitutional 
arguments asserted in the Verified Petition were resolved in the criminal proceedings by 
pointing to portions of the Court of Appeals decisions, discussed above, in which the 
Court "addressed" (but having ruled it was not preserved did not resolve) over breadth 
as to March 25, ruled that statute was not overbroad as applied to April 2 (which is not a 
resolution of that question as to March 25) and discussed vagueness in clear, and as it 
turns out incorrect, dicta. What the State does not do is to show how the Constitutional 
arguments being asserted in this proceeding, either have been resolved in any part of 
the criminal proceeding involving Mr. Pentico or in any other action in this State. Nor 
does the State provide any basis upon which this Court could conclude that these 
Constitutional arguments are not substantial and dispositive. For the purpose of this 
proceeding those arguments, standing as they are uncontroverted, must be taken as 
valid. 
The State also makes no attempt to demonstrate how the facts presented 
relative to Mr. Pentico's conduct on March 25, taken as true, are not material to and 
sufficient support for the Constitutional arguments which he contends preclude a 
conviction for trespass in violation of I.C. §18-7008(A)(8) 
The State, while willing to jump on the band wagon relative to the Magistrates 
reliance on I.C. §19-4901(b), makes no attempt to explain how the matters which Mr. 
Pentico is, in the Courts eyes, seeking to reframe as procedural and substantive due 
process issues are not either issues which, to the extent they preclude conviction, he is 
entitled to have resolved now, or alternatively, if they really should have been raised 
earlier, issues which were waived by virtue of ineffective assistance of counsel. In any 
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event the mere suggestion that there are issues which are precluded now because they 
should have been presented in the criminal proceeding is an admission that there are 
issues which were not resolved in the criminal proceeding and which were waived by 
virtue of Trial Counsel's lack of awareness of them. 
In any event, Mr. Pentico has clearly stated constitutional issues which he is 
entitled to have resolved and which were expressly not resolved in any proceeding to 
this point. He has provided a factual record to support those challenges. He has 
alleged that asking him to leave a traditional_ public forum on March 25, 2008, when he 
was using that forum for the exact purpose for which it was intended is an 
unconstitutional predicate event for a violation of I.C. 18-7008 (A)(8).7 He has alleged 
that applying the statute in a manner which allows for absolute and automatic exclusion, 
for 1 year, from public properties identified during the "ask to leave" which was open to 
the public for the exact purpose for which Mr. Pentico sought use it is a violation of 
substantive and procedural due process both facially and as applied to him.8 
The State, other than attempting to ignore these issues, has not demonstrated 
how or where these issues have been heard and decided in any judicial proceeding. 
All that has happened to this point is that the Court of Appeals recognized the desire to 
have the challenges addressed and then specifically concluded that Mr. Pentico could 
not raise his challenges relative to the "ask to leave" on March 25th. He was precluded 
from doing so both because they were not preserved for appeal by Trial Counsel and 
7 Verified Petition for Post Conviction Relief, First Cause of Action pp.3-4, 
(hereinafter the "Petition.") and Affidavit of Christopher A. Pentico pp. 2-6 (hereinafter 
"Aff Pentico"). 
8 Petition, Second Cause of Action. 
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because the record developed by Trial Counsel was inadequate to permit that 
determination that either challenge could be treated as a fundamental error. State v. 
Pentico 151 Idaho 906,913,265 P.3d 519,536 (Ct.App. 2011). 
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel is Manifest on the Face of the Record. 
l. Trail Counsel's representation of Mr. Pentico was ineffective. 
The circumstances of this case presented obvious and for the purposes of this 
proceeding presumptively dispositive Constitutional and legal challenges to a 
prosecution of Mr. Pentico for a violation of I.C. §18-7008(a)(8). Because those 
challenges were not made; no record of the available evidence was created. Because 
there was no record Mr. Pentico could not get the issues addressed on Appeal. 
Because the issues were not raised in the Trial Court or preserved for Appeal, Mr. 
Pentico has never had the benefit of asserting the challenges and protecting his rights. 
This series of events was set in motion because, Trial Counsel, as he admits, did 
not recognize those challenges and was focused entirely on a challenge arising from 
the claim that Mr. Pentico's trip to the Governor's Office on April 2, 2008, was itself 
Constitutionally protected activity. Trial Counsel may well have been knocked off the 
track by the State's multiple attempts to find a law under which it could prosecute Mr. 
Pentico, but that does not change the fact that Trial Counsel only represented Mr. 
Pentico with respect to one half of the elements of the charge upon which he was tried 
and consequently failed to raise and preserve over half of the critical defenses. 
2. Trial Counsel's deficient representation was not the byproduct of strategic 
decisions. 
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Trial Counsel's failure to present substantial and material defenses was not a 
byproduct of a strategic decision. Indeed it could not be the byproduct of a strategic 
decision because by definition, a strategic decision involves recognition of the options 
and a conscious election to set one or more of the options aside. Trial Counsel having 
not recognized the options9 could not make a conscious election to set one or more of 
them aside. 
The State, taking the lead of the Court of Appeals, seeks to frame Trial Counsel's 
conduct as the consequences of a strategic choice. This frame job will not sustain 
scrutiny. The potential impact of the Motion in Limine was raised sua sponte by the 
Court of Appeals. As a consequence the theory was not briefed and not fully analyzed 
and it is, for several reasons, wrong. First, it is not at all clear that the Trial Court 
intended to preclude evidence of Mr. Pentico's activities at the time he was "asked to 
leave" because it is not clear that either party intended to present such evidence. 
Moreover, it appears that the Court was ruling to exclude evidence of protected first 
amendment activities on April 2, based on its prior ruling and not based on the Motion in 
Limine and that it was specifically not intending to preclude evidence relative to March 
25, 2008.10 
In any event, a Rule 404(b) based Motion in Limine could, properly applied, 
never work to preclude evidence relative to the events of March 25, 2008. That Rule 
pertains to evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" which are offered to prove a 
person's character or that the conduct subject to trial was in conformity with prior 
9 Aff. Derr p. 6 
10 Trial Transcript, April 21, 2009, pp 5-7. In fact the Court specifically ruled that 
evidence regarding March 25th would be allowed. 
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conduct. Evidence relative to the conduct of March 25, 2008, which subjected Mr. 
Pentico to the "ask to leave" is not evidence pertaining to a different crime than the one 
charged. As evidence pertaining to the predicate event to the conduct on trial, the 
events of March 25, 2008 are an integral part of the crime charged. Moreover if offered 
to demonstrate that the "ask to leave" was legally sufficient or insufficient it would not be 
precluded by Rule 404(b ). Because Trial Counsel did not appreciate the importance of 
challenging the predicate event, the "ask to leave" on factual, legal and Constitutional 
grounds he did not even contemplate the possible confusion that might be generated by 
a Rule 404(b) Motion and having not contemplated it he did not take steps to challenge 
a misapplication of the rule, if one was in fact occurring, to excluded the evidence 
invalidating the predicate event.11 Similarly he did not take steps, by offer of proof, to 
protect the record if he was incorrectly barred from presenting evidence about 
Constitutionally protected conduct which invalidated the "ask to leave." 
3. The record, taken as true, is sufficient to demonstrate by objective review, 
that Trial Counsel failed to provide Constitutionally sufficient 
representation. I 
To present triable ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Mr. Pentico needs only 
to demonstrate that this record, if taken as true, is sufficient to support an objective 
review of the competency of the conduct of Trial Counsel and that the deficient 
performance prejudiced Mr. Pentico. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) as 
applied by State v. Yakovac 145 Idaho 437, 180 P.3d 476 (2008). For the purposes of 
this proceeding the assertion that the Constitutional challenges precluded prosecution 
remains unchallenged and therefore prejudice must, for the purposes of a Summary 
11 Aff. Derr p. 6, Aff Bistline p. 9(b) 
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Dismissal, be taken as a given. The question then is whether the failures of Trial 
Counsel can on objective review establish by a preponderance of the evidence to have 
been constitutionally deficient. The Magistrate and the State have failed to challenge 
the veracity of the demonstrated omissions. Neither the Magistrate nor the State have 
made any attempt to explain how the omissions are excusable or defend them as lying 
with the boundaries of reasonable professional performance. The State has attempted 
to attribute at least some of the problems to a strategic decision but Trial Counsel's own 
admissions refute this assertion. 
What the records shows is that, for whatever reason, a normally competent 
lawyer, failed to recognize all of the elements which must be proven by the State to 
support the conviction and as a consequence failed to bring the force of his skills to 
bare upon the weakest link in the criminal charge that was ultimately brought against his 
client. On this record, it is not possible to conclude that Mr. Pentico has failed to 
demonstrate a triable claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the forgoing reasons it is respectfully submitted that this Court should 
remand this matter to the Magistrate for an evidentiary hearing. 
Respectfully submitted this _cg-=-_ day of January 2014. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this 9th day of January 2014, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document in the above-captioned matter to: 
Ada County Prosecutor's Office 
By interdepartmental mail 
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419 
1107 
l" 
NO. · 
~t.:+DLQ::,~------
FEB O 4 20f4 
CHRISTOPHER D. AICH, Clerk 
By JAMIE MARTIN 
DEPUTv 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRISTOPHER PENTICO, 
Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Criminal No. CV PC 2013 248 
MOTION TO CONTINUE 
COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant, Christopher Pentico, 
by and through his Attorney of Record, the Ada County Public 
Defender's Office, Heidi Tolman,_ han.¢1.ling attorney, and hereby 
" ' ~ 
moves this Honorable Court for its Order to continue the Oral 
Argument now scheduled for the 6th day of February, 2014, at the 
hour of 4: 00 pm. 
states as follows: 
-In support of this motion, the defendant 
The Appellant's Counsel is in a 2 day drug DUI jury trial 
in front of the Honorable Judge James Cawthon beginning at 9 am 
on February 6, 2014. 
MOTION TO CONTINUE, Page 1 
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DATED, this __i_ day of February, 2014 . 
.. ~ Heidi To man 
Attorney for Defendant 
,' 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this ±day of February, 2014, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the: 
Ada County Prosecutor 
by depositing the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
MOTION TO CONTINUE, Page 2 
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C unW C\erk Ada O ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, ·Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419 
NO. ___ --;ciii:n--=----
FILEo A.M. ___ _,P,M ___ _ 
FEB ' 1 ·1 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By AMY EDWARDS 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Criminal No. CV PC 2013 248 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ORDER GRANTING CONTINUANCE 
CHRISTOPHER PENTICO, 
Appellant. 
For , good cause appearing, this Court hereby grants 
Defendant's MOTION TO CONTINUE. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, that the Oral 
Argument is rescheduled to the \ '6--tY' day of 
2014, at the hour of 3~ ~ 
DATED, this \ ()~ay of 
-~Fc.....,;:b=-----'. 2014. 
CC·. <:mo-t \ c.o ~; i O\m M, r,'\c, Curd'/ 
ORDER GRANTING CONTINUANCE 
fcp. 
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Mclaughlin Ellis 021314.mbee 
-
Courtroom401 
Time Speaker Note 
03:36:40 PM Penclto v. State CVPC13-00248 Oral Argument 
03:59:00 PM Heidi counsel for Petitioner 
Tolman 
··o"rs·9:os PM Christopher counsel for State of Idaho 
Mccurdy 
! 
03:59:22 PM Court appeal from Petitioner raising constitutional issues regarding 
offense charged as well as final claim raising ineffective assistance 
of counsel. Court believes Ms. Tolman may want to focus on 
ineffective claim. 
04:01:33 PM Heidi 2 Distinct events, (1) Asked to Leave 3/25 and (2) Return 04/02. 
Tolman No valid Asked to leave, don't believe can charge constitutionally on 
the Return. Fundamentally wrong to be asked to leave. Question is 
whether the petition and supporting documents support the facts. 
April 2nd has been addressed. March 25 is the issue. Asked to 
leave was never challenged. 
04: 12:26 .. PM Christopher Forfeiture of Issues. 19-4901 argued. Facts to petition were late 
Mccurdy and waived. Should be dismissed. 
' 
04:21:28 PM Heidi response. Language in Korsen that if issue brought up would have 
tolman chilling effect. March 25 was engaging in protected conduct. 
Argues ineffective assistance. 
04:26:25 PM Court will take under advisement and enter written decision 
04:26:39 PM End Case 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
8i:M-Y 
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO, 
Petitioner-Appellant, Case No. CV-PC-2013-00248 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
Respondent. 
ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT: HEIDI TOLMAN 
ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT: STACY LANGTON 
This case is before the Court on the Petitioner's (Mr. Pentico's) appeal from the 
decision of Magistrate Judge, Hon. Kevin Swain, summarily dismissing his petition 
seeking post-conviction relief. For the reasons that follow, Judge Swain's decision will 
be affirmed. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The following procedural statement is taken from Mr. Pentico's brief and appears 
to essentially be undisputed: 
On April 2, 2008, Pentico was charge~_w.i~h trespassing, a misdemeanor 
violation of I.C. § 18-7011 ... A trial was set for April 21, 2009, and at that 
time, Pentico waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded with a court trial 
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. . . The Trial Court found Pentico guilty of the misdemeanor offense of 
trespass on April 21, 2009. Pentico was sentenced on May 11, 2009. 
Pentico appealed to the District Court on June 22, 2009 and the District 
Court affirmed the Trial Court's decision on May 13, 2010. An appeal to 
the Supreme Court was filed on June 24, 2010. The Idaho Supreme Court 
affirmed the District Court's opinion when it issued its Remittitur January 
10, 2012. 
Pentico filed his verified Petition for Post-Conviction relief .on January 4, 
2013, in which three causes of action are alleged. The State filed its 
Answer, Motion for Summary Dismissal and Brief in Support on March 26, 
2013. The Trial Court filed its Notice of Intent to Grant Summary Dismissal 
on April 30, 2013. Pentico filed his Response to the State's Motion for 
Summary Disposition on May 20, 2013. The Trial Court Granted Summary 
Dismissal on June 13, 2013. This appeal follows. Appellant's Brief, at 2-5. 
Beginning in 2007, the Idaho Capitol closed to the public for renovation 
and the Governor's office was temporarily moved to the third floor of the 
nearby Borah Building. On March 25, 2008, an officer stopped Pentico on 
state property, in the vicinity of the Capito.I Annex, and informed Pentico 
that he was no longer authorized to be at the Capitol Annex, the third and 
fourth floors of the Borah Building, and the department of education. On 
April 2, 2008, Pentico visited the Governor's office on the third floor of the 
Borah Building. After Pentico left the Borah Building, he was cited for 
trespass in violation of I.C. § 18-7011. Months later, the state filed an 
amended complaint charging Pentico with trespass in violation of I.C. § 
18-7008. State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906, 909, 265 P.3d 519 (Ct. App. 
2012).1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When a district judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judge (not involving 
a trial de novo), the district judge is acting as an appellate court, not as a trial court . 
. ',• 
"
1The record is somewhat sparse as to the reason for Pentico's exclusion from those properties. This is 
so, in part, because the magistrate granted Pentico's motion in limine, prohibiting references to other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts of Pentico. We note, too, that such evidence was ruled irrelevant by the 
magistrate because of a determination that I.C. § 18-7008(A)(8) was not unconstitutional as applied. On a 
portion of a video recording, the officer referred (outside of Pentico's presence) to Pentico as having been 
'harassing people at the Governor's office.' This part of the recording was disregarded by the magistrate 
at Pentico's request. At sentencing, there were references to Pentico having been involved in causing a 
disturbance at the department of education and that he had recently become persistent in contacting 
members of the Governor's staff regarding his issue with the department of education.'' Pentico, 151 
Idaho at 909 n.1, 265 P.3d at 522 n.1. 
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State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 596, 826 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1992). The interpretation of 
law or statute is a question of law over which the Court has free review. State v. Miller, 
134 Idaho 458, 462, 4 P.3d 570, 574 (Ct. App. 2000). 
"When reviewing a . . . court's decision to grant or deny a petition for post-
conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing, this Court will not disturb the ... 
court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. A claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of fact and law. When faced with a 
mixed question of fact and law, the Court will defer to the ... court's factual findings if 
supported by substantial evidence, but will exercise free review over the application of 
the relevant law to those facts." Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 617, 262 P.3d 255, 260 
(2011) (internal citations omittedf 
"A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a civil, rather than criminal, 
proceeding, governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Like plaintiffs in other civil 
actions, th_e petitioner must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon 
which the request for post-conviction relief is bas·ed. A petition for post-conviction relie~ 
differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action, however, in that it must contain more 
than 'a short and plain statement of the claim' that would suffice for a complaint under 
I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1). The petition must be verified with respect to facts within the personal 
knowledge of the petitioner, and affidavits, ·records or other evidence supporting its 
allegations must be attached, or the petition must state why such supporting evidence is 
not included. In other words, the petition must present or be accompanied by admissible 
evidence supporting its allegations, or it will_ be subject to dismissal." Schultz v. State, 
153 Idaho 791, 795-96, 291 P.3d 474, 478-79 (Ct. App. 2012). 
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"Idaho Code Section 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition for 
post-conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own 
initiative, if 'it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions and agreements of facts, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is 
no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.' I.C. § 19-4906(c). When considering summary dismissal, the district 
court must construe disputed facts in the petitioner's favor, but the court is not required 
to accept either the petitioner's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible 
evidence, or the petitioner's conclusions of law. Moreover, because the district court 
rather than a jury will be the trier of fact in the event of an evidentiary hearing, the 
district court is not constrained to draw inferences in the_ petitioner's favor, but is free to 
arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Such inferences 
will not be disturbed on appeal if the uncontroverted evidence is sufficient to justify 
them." 153 Idaho at 796, 291 P.3d at 479. 
"Claims may be summarily dismissed if the petitioner's allegations are clearly 
disproven by the record of the criminal proceedings, if the petitioner has not presented 
evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims, or if the 
petitioner's allegations do not justify relief as a matter of law. Thus, summary dismissal 
of a claim for post-conviction relief is appropriate· when the court can conclude, as a 
matter of law, that the petitioner is not entitled to relief even with all disputed facts 
construe~ in the petitioner's favor. For this reason, summary dismissal of a post-
conviction petition may be appropriate even w~en the State does not controvert the 
petitioner's evidence." Id. 
Memorandum Decision and Order 4 
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"Conversely, if the petition, affidavits, and other evidence supporting the petition 
allege facts that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the post-conviction claim 
may not be summarily dismissed. If a genuine issue of material fact is presented, an 
evidentiary hearing must be- conducted to resolve the factual issues." 153 Idaho at 796-
97, 291 P.3d at 479-80. 
"On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, we apply the same standards 
utilized by the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner's admissible evidence 
asserts facts which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Over questions of law, 
we exercise free review." 153 Idaho at 797, 291 P .3d at 480. 
"To prevail on an ineffective assistance· of counsel. claim, the defendant must 
show that his attorney's performance was deficient and that the defendant was 
prejudiced by the deficiency. To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the burden of 
showing ' that the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. To establish prejudice, the·. applicant must show a reasonable 
, 
probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the 
proceeding would have been different." Id. 
ANALYSIS 
In this appeal, Mr. Pentico asserts that Judge Swain erred by granting summary 
dismissal "without a meaningful opportunity to be heard[.]" Appellant's Brief, at 6. 
Judge Swain stated the following in his order granting summary dismissal: 
Petitioner's first and second Causes of Action are restatements of the 
same issues decided by the Tria! Co_urt and on direct appeal. The Uniform 
Post-Conviction Procedure Act cannot be· used as a substitute for appeal. 
The Petition fails to raise any issue of material fact with regard to the 
constitutional application of Idaho's trespass statute to the facts of this 
case. To the extent Petitioner seeks to reframe the issue as one of 
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substantive and procedural due process, re-litigation of those related 
constitutional issues is barred by operation of I.C. 19-4901 (b). 
Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails to raise an issue 
of material fact. Trial counsel properly raised a constitutional challenge to 
the application of the statute to the facts of Petitioner's case. That 
challenge was not successful. It does not follow that counsel's 
, performance was deficient. 
As the Petition fails to raise an issue of material fact and seeks to re-
litigate issues previously decided on direct appeal, Respondent's Motion 
for Summary Dismissal is hereby, GRANTED. Order Granting Summary 
Dismissal, at 1-2. 
1. First and Second Claims 
Mr. Pentico's petition for post-conviction relief asserted the following grounds: (1) 
"a conviction for a violation of Idaho Code § 18-7008(8) which is premised upon the 
demand that a citizen leave public· property which is otherwise open to the public for the 
. ·:. 
same purposes for which it is being used by the citizen in question and which is made in 
the absence of evidence of any inappropriate conduct, is a violation of due process 
protections afforded by Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution and the 5th 
Amendment of the United States Constitution." (Verified Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief, at 3); (2) "a conviction for a violation of Idaho Code § 18-7008(8) which was 
premised upon the fact that a citizen, having been ordered to leave public property 
which was otherwise open to the public for the same purposes for which it was being 
used by the citizen in question arid which w~s made in the absence of any inappropriate 
conduct, subsequently reentered public property is a violation of due process 
protections afforded by the Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution and the 5th 
Amendment of the United States Constitution." (Id., at 5); and (3) "petitioner was denied 
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the right to fully challenge the constitutionality of Idaho Code§ 18-7008(8) as applied to 
his conduct." (Id., at 6).2 
Judge Swain did not err in summarily dismissing Mr. Pentico's first two 
contentions. As noted by Judge Swain, the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act 
specifically provides: 
This remedy is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident 
to the proceedings in the trial court, or of an appeal from the sentence or 
conviction. Any issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but 
was not, is forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction 
proceedings, unless it appears to the court, on the basis of a substantial 
factual showing by affidavit, deposition or otherwise, that the asserted 
basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding 
of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been 
presented earlier. Except as otherwise provided in this act, it 
comprehends and takes the place. of all other common law, statutory, or 
other remedies heretofore available for 9hallenging the validity of the 
conviction or sentence. It shall be used exclusively in place of them. I.C. § 
19-4901 (7)(b). 
Mr. Pentico has not shown that these claims raise a substantial doubt about the 
reliability of the finding that he was guilty of trespass and that these claims, in the 
exercise of due diligence, cou_ld not have been ·pr~~ente~ earlier.3 
2See also Affidavit of Heidi Tolman, at 1-2 ("[T]he request that Mr. Pentico leave the Capital Annex 
grounds was itself unconstitutional because he was there to exercise important and protected 1st 
Amendment rights ... That the portion of the statute which purports to criminalize the return to property 
for one year (and in this case the 'conduct' upon which Mr. Pentico was convicted) is unconstitutional as it 
pertains to entries onto State land which constitutes a Traditional Public Forum or a Designated Public 
Forum .... "); Affidavit of Christopher Pentlco, at 1-2 ("On March 25, 2008, I wanted to speak [to] 
Representative Lenore Barrett with whom I had recently spoken about my concerns about actions at 
Boise State University which was discriminating among students and programs based upon religion ... 
so I went to the interim Statehouse ... the 'Capital Annex', which was at that time the former Ada County 
Courthouse .... "). 
3The Idaho Court of Appeals essentially found, notwithstanding Mr. Pentico's assertions in these two 
claims that his due process rights were violated because of "the absence of evidence of any inappropriate 
conduct," that the only "inappropriate conduct" required is the trespass itself. "[W]hile Pentico asserts that 
only an inappropriately-behaved citizen who has no legitimate business at a public office can be asked to 
leave and then be arrested for refusing to do so, Idaho cour:ts have construed the [trespass] statute to not 
require that public or private property owners provide a reason for asking a person to leave their land." 
State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906, 911-12, 265 P.3d 519, 524-25 (Ct. App. 2012). 
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2. Third Claim - Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Mr. Pentico's third contention is based upon his assertion that he received 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel as follows: 
(a) "[counsel] failed through testimony or offer of proof to develop an 
adequate record that [he] had entered the grounds of the Capital Annex 
on March 25, 2008, for the purpose of finding and speaking to 
Representative Lenore Barrett in hopes of securing her advi[c]e and 
assistance with a matter of governmental action which was of concern to 
[him;] (b) [counsel] failed through testimony or offer of proof to develop an 
adequate record to demonstrate that prior to being confronted by officers 
on the grounds of the Capital Annex, on March 25, 2008, Mr. Pentico had 
done nothing more than cross the street and start to walk in the direction 
of the entrance to the building with the intent of speaking to a legislator in 
hopes of securing her advi[c]e and assistance with a matter of 
governmental action which was of concern to [him;] (c) [counsel] failed 
through testimony or offer of proof to develop an adequate record to 
demonstrate that [he] chose to visit the public reception area of the 
Governor's Office on April 2; 2008, to·· hand deliver his letter to the 
Governor (as opposed to mailing it) for"the specific purpose of making a 
statement both about the importance of the· matters addressed in the letter 
to Mr. Pentico and about his opposition to what he perceived was an 
unconstitutional attempt to bar him from accessing public property in the 
same manner as and for the same reasons (some of which are 
co'nstitutionally protected rights) that the property in question was open to 
all other members of the public[;] (d) [counsel] failed to inquire into the 
specific basis upon which Officer Pattis relied for contending he was the 
· authorized agent of the owner of the property and to determine whether 
there was any basis in fact to support a conclusion that Officer Pattis even 
knew about let alone had been vested with sufficient authority to override, 
the Governor's standing invitation for Mr. Pentico to visit the Governor's 
office[;] (e) [counsel] failed to timely raise a claim that Idaho Code § 18-
7008(8) could not constitutionally be applied to criminalize Mr. Pentico's 
entry into the Governor's office on April 2, 2008, because: 
. ,:1 
i. there was no constitutionally ~ufficient basis for asking Mr. 
Pentico, on March 25, 2008, to leave the traditional public forum of 
the seat of the legislature (the 'ask to leave') where is he entitled to 
go to speak, observe, and to petition his government for the redress 
of grievances, and, if the 'ask to leave' is not lawful, then the 'do not 
return for 1 year' prong of the statute cannot be triggered and the 
visit to the public reception area of Governor's office on April 2, 
2008 cannot be treated as a trespass under I.C. § 18-7008(8)[;] ii. 
even if the 'ask to leave' was itself not constitutionally defective, the 
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statute could not constitutionally be applied to criminalize Mr. 
Pentico's subsequent entry on to property other than the property 
upon which he was standing at the time that the 'ask to leave' 
occurred. The language of the statute provides no sufficient notice 
that it could be applied to criminalize a subsequent entry onto 
property other than property upon which an individual was standing 
at the time the 'ask to leave' occurred. Given the inherent 
vagueness of the statute relative to its application to Mr. Pentico's 
conduct, using it to criminalize his visit to the public reception area 
of the Governor's Office on April 2, 2008, would violate the 
procedural due process protections afforded to Mr. Pentico by Art. 
I, Sec. 13 of the Idaho Constitution and the 5th Amendment of the 
United States Constitution[;] iii. even if the 'ask to leave' was itself 
not constitutionally defective and the statute could be permissibly 
extended to criminalize a visit to the property other than the 
property on which the 'ask to leave' occurred, the statute could not 
constitutionally be applied to criminalize Mr. Pentico's visit to the 
public reception area of the Governor's Office on April 2, 2008, 
because that visit was, based upon facts not placed in the record, 
more than mere conduct and was thus constitutionally protected 
speech; and iv. even if the 'ask to leave' was itself not 
constitutionally defective, -and the. statute could be permissibly 
extended to criminalize. a visit to _the property other than the 
property on which the 'ask to leave' occurred, the statute could not 
constitutionally be applied to criminalize Mr. Pentico's visit to the 
public reception area of the Governor's Office on April 2, 2008. The 
statute works an impermissible deprivation of rights by precluding 
any person and Mr. Pentico in . particular, who has not done 
anything more than approach the functioning Capital Building for 
the purpose of speaking to a legisl~tor, from thereafter exercising 
substantial rights and liberties (including constitutionally protected 
rights) available to all other citizens for a period of one year and 
provides no meaningful remedial process for challenging either the 
exclusion or the duration of the exclusion. Given the lack of any 
meaningful due process to provide protection from arbitrary, 
unreasonable and material exclusions from public property, the 
statute in general ahd as applied to'_ry'lr. Pentico, violates procedural 
due process protections afforded to· citizens, includin~ Mr. Pentico, 
by Art. I, Sec. 13 of the Idaho Constitution and the 5t Amendment 
of the United States Constitution. 
The failure to make an evidentiary record precluded Mr. Pentico from 
demonstrating that his communications with the Governor were in fact 
relevant to the proceeding because, if Officer Pattis was not aware of the 
standing invitation for Mr. Pentico to visit the Governor at his office and 
was not vested with the authority to override that invitation, then, he was in 
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fact not the 'authorized agent for the owner' with respect to his direction 
that Mr. Pentico stay away from the Governor's office. 
The failure to make an adequate evidentiary record precluded Mr. Pentico 
from demonstrating to the Trial Court and the Appellate Courts that the 
statute was unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Pentico. 
The failure to raise all constitutional defenses precluded Mr. Pentico from 
demonstrating to the Trial Court and the Appellate Courts that the statute 
could not constitutionally be applied to criminalize Mr. Pentico's visit to the 
Governor's office on April 2, 2008. Verified Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief, at 6-11.4 
As previously noted, Judge Swain concluded Mr. Pentico's "claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel fails to raise an issue of material fact. Trial counsel properly 
raised a constitutional challenge to the application of the statute to the facts of 
Petitioner's case. That challenge was not successful. It does not follow that counsel's 
performance was deficient." Order Granting Summary Dismissal, at 2. 
As also previously noted, "[a] claim for post-conviction relief will be subject to 
summary dismissal if the petitioner has not presented evidence making a prima facie 
case as to each essential element of the claims upon which the petitioner bears the 
burden of proof. Thus, summary dismi$sal is permissible when the petitioner's evidence 
has raised no genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the petitioner's favor, 
would entitle the petitioner to the requested relief. If such a factual issue is presented, 
4The Idaho Court of Appeals noted "Pentico asserts that his trial ·counsel was ineffective because he 
failed to adequately raise Pentico's constitutional challenge to the statute as it applied to him on March 
25. When Pentico's trial counsel filed a motion in limine to limit any testimony regarding other crimes, 
wrongs or acts of Pentico, he thereby prevented evidence from coming in regarding the events that led up 
to his being asked to leave the Capitol Annex on March 25. Filing this motion may have been a tactical or 
strategic decision of trial counsel, but there is no evidence in the record. Similarly, there is no evidence in 
the record, and Pentico does not assert that his counsel's decision was based on inadequate preparation, 
ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings c~p?~!e. ~f objective evaluation. The record is not 
adequate to allow us to review Pentico's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and we decline to do 
so." Pentico, 151 Idaho at 914,265 P.3d at 527. · 
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an evidentiary hearing must be conducted." State v. Hoffman, 153 Idaho 898, 902, 277 
P.3d 1050, 1054 (Ct. App. 2012). 
"To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must 
show the attorney's performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced 
by the deficiency. To establish a deficiency, the petitioner has the burden of showing 
that the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of 'competence 
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.' Because of the distorting effects of hindsight 
in reconstructing the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, there is a strong 
presumption that counsel's performance was within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance-that is, sound trial strategy.'' Id. 
"To justify an evidentiary hearing, the petitioner must tender a factual showing 
. . 
based on evidence that would be admissible c;1t the hearing. The petitioner must 
·: "';-,, 
support the petition with written statements from witnesses who are able to give 
testimony themselves as to facts within their knowledge or otherwise based upon 
verifiable information.'' 153 Idaho at 903,277 P.3d at 1055. 
In support of his contention that he .received ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel, Mr. Pentico submitted the affidavit of his trial counsel, Allen Derr, and the 
affidavit of another attorney, Bruce Bistline. 
In his affidavit, Mr. Derr states: 
I did not consciously choose not to assert that based upon the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution Mr. Pentico was engaging in 
protected activity in a lawful and appropriate manner when he was asked 
to leave the Capital Annex grounds on March 25, 2008, and that as a 
consequence he could not be charged with a violation of I.C. § 18-7008(8) 
for returning to one of the identified properties on April 2, 2008. At the 
time of defending Mr. Pentico I did not recognize that was a challenge 
which could, based upon testimony that .wo_uld be given by Mr. Pentico, be 
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asserted ... the provision under which the State sought to criminalize Mr. 
Pentico's visit to the Governor's office on April 2, 2008 - would as to First -
Amendment rights constitute an impermissible prior restraint and a bar to 
exercise of protected right . . . The Motion in Limine which was filed on 
December 30, 2008, was not intended to preclude any evidence of 
conduct on March 25, 2008, which led to the initial 'request to leave' but 
rather to specifically preclude I.RE. Rule 404(b) evidence as to other 
events. "5 Affidavit of Allen R. Derr, at 1-2. 
The problem with Mr. Derr's affidavit is that even assuming that such an 
argument was not previously raised, and it appears that it essentially was, and that 
counsel erred in failing to assert this argument before Judge Swain, there is nothing 
indicating a reasonable probability that this argument would have been successful and 
led to a different outcome. See, e.g., Piro v. State, 146 Idaho 86, 89, 190 P.3d 905, 908 
(Ct. App. 2008) ("In a post-conviction proceeding challenging an attorney's failure to 
pursue a motion in the underlying· ·criminal ~qti9r,i, the district court may consider the 
·. . 
.... 
probability of success of the motion in question in determining whether the attorney's 
inactivity constituted incompetent performance. Where the alleged deficiency is 
counsel's failure to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not 
have been granted by the trial 66urt, is generally determinative of both prongs of the 
Strickland test. In this case, Piro is arguing he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel for his attorneys' failure to argue Fourth Amendment grounds on his motion to 
suppress. Therefore, a conclusion that the motion would have been denied and the 
appeal affirmed is determinative of Piro's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.") . 
. .. , 
. ' ,. 
•, ' . 
5It appears that Mr. Derr filed the motion to limine to prevent the state from making inquiry concerning 
whether Mr. Pentico was restricted from certain areas because he was viewed as harassing state workers 
and officials (see n.1, supra (referencing harass~ent as~e~ions against Mr. Pentico)). See a/so n. 7, infra. 
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"In Korsen [State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 69 P.3d 126 (2003)], the Idaho 
S_upreme Court concluded that Idaho's trespass statute is not aimed at regulating 
speech or communication in any form ... and the facts of this case do not provide a 
situation where the exercise of free speech was impinged . . . Pentico was cited for 
trespass for his conduct ... not for the content of any communication. Additionally, 
physical presence, even in a public building dedicated to public uses for the purposes of 
communicating ideas, is not 'pure speech' and may not be protected under the First 
Amendment." Pentico, 151 Idaho at 914, 265 P.3d at 527. 6 
The same is true of the affidavit of Bruce Bistline, which asserts that "Mr. Pentico 
was engaged in constitutionally protected activity while at the Capital Annex" (Affidavit 
of Bruce Bistline, at 5) and "[t]hat the request that Mr. Pentico leave the Capital Annex 
grounds was itself unconstitutional becau~e he· was there to exercise important and 
protected 1st Amendment rights" (id., at 6).7 
. . . 
6See Korsen, 138 Idaho at 711-15, 69 P.3d at j31-35 ("Idaho Code Section 18-7008(8) makes criminal 
the continued presence of an individual on property that belongs to another after being notified to depart 
from the property by the owner or agent ... the statute informs the public of the prohibited conduct, that 
is, remaining willfully on property belonging to another after having been asked to leave . . . Korsen 
argues that the district court correctly interpreted the statute as seeking to curb constitutionally protected 
speech, specifically his right to petition the government for redress of grievances ... as provided by the 
express language of the First Amendment. He asserts that I.C. § 18-7008(8) sweeps too broadly and 
includes otherwise lawful activities and speech traditionally accorded protection in public places . . . 
Idaho's trespass statute is not aimed at regulating speech .or communication in any form ... Physical 
presence in a public building dedicated to public uses other than that of a public thoroughfare, even 
presence for the purpose of communicating ideas, is not 'pure speech.' Not all conduct claimed to have 
communicative purpose is protected as speech by the First Amendment ... The statute is also capable of 
application to government-owned nonpublic forums, such as government office buildings or portions of 
college campuses that, unlike traditional public forums such as a public street, public park or sidewalk, or 
the steps of the state Capitol building, are not open to the public for expressive activities."). 
7 See also January 6, 2009 Hearing Transcript, at 26-30 ("[W]ith respect to the constitutional issue, it is 
well settled that any constitutional right is subject to reasonable restrictions in the time, place and manner 
in which those rights can be exercised .. It seems to this court that the provisions of Idaho Code 18-7008 
are very reasonable restrictions. I'll also note that in nq_ Y:Jay is Mr. Pentico being prosecuted for the 
content of his communication but, rather, for his conduct and that is an important distinction. So I'm going 
to deny the motion to dismiss on constitutional grounds. I think Idaho Code 18-70[0)8 is constitutional as 
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... 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, in view of the foregoing, the district court hereby affirms Judge 
Swain's summary dismissal of Mr. Pentico's petition seeking post-conviction relief. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this / 1 day of February 2014. 
Michael McLaughlin 
Senior District Judge 
' ,, 
applied in the circumstances ... Because of this ruling, the focus of this trial is extremely narrow. The 
content of the communication and prior dealings Mr. Pentico may have had with other government 
officials is not relevant in this case ... That brings us to Mr. Derr's motion in limine which seeks to limit 
any testimony regarding other crimes, wrongs or acts of the defendant ... So the motion to that extent is 
granted and it cuts both ways. We're not going to have testimony from either side about the history that 
led up to the events of April 2nd • We're going to try this case on what happened on April 2nd and that 
needs to be everybody's focus."). 
Memorandum Decision and Order 14 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have mailed, 
by United States Mail, one copy of the MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER as notice 
pursuant to the Idaho Rules to each of the parties of record in this cause in envelopes 
addressed as follows: 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
VIA INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
VIA INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
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Memorandum Decision and Order 15 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
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CHRISTOPHER D, RICH, Clerk 
By CHRISTINE SWEET 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHRISTOPHER A.PENTICO, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) 
) 
~ ) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
-----------~) 
Case No. CV-PC-13-248 
PETITION FOR REHEARING RE: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER 
COMES NOW PETITIONER-APPELLANT, by and through his attorney of record, and 
hereby Petitions the Court, pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 83(x) and I.A.R. Rule 42, to Rehear the 
above captioned matter, by reconsidering the Memorandum Decision and Order entered on 
February 19, 2014, in which the Court affirms Judge Swain's summary dismissal of Mr. 
Pentico's petition seeking post-conviction relief. 
This Motion is based upon the record and will be supported by the Petitioner's 
Memorandum In Support of Petition for Rehearing Re: Memorandum Decision and Order, 
which will be filed in accordance with LR.A. Rule 42(B). 
The Plaintiff intends to request a hearing on this Motion and will notice that hearing at 
the time of submitting his supporting Memorandum. 
Respectfully submitted this ID day of March 2014. 
HEIDIT~ 
Attorney for Defendant 
PETITION FOR REHEARING RE: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this 10th day of March 2014, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document in the above-captioned matter to: 
Ada County Prosecutor's Office 
By interdepartmental mail 
PETITION FOR REHEARING RE: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
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FILED 
Friday. March 14. 2014 at 11: 19 AM 
CHRISTOPHER D. RIC~H K OF THE COURT 
BY: ~
___ D_e_,u"---111111::aerf'-k----
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
) CHRISTOPHER A PENTICO, PLAINTIFF 
Plaintiff, , ) Case No: CV-PC-2013-00248 
) 
Vs. ) NOTICE OF HEARING 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEFENDANT ) 
Defendant. ) 
---------------
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Motion Hearing 
Judge: 
Thursday, April 24, 2014 
02:00 PM 
Michael McLaughlin 
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE 200 W. Front Street, Boise, Idaho 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing 
entered by the Court and on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice 
were served as follows on the 14th March, 2014. 
Petitioners' Attorney: 
Heidi Tolman 
Ada County Public Defender 
Interdepartmental Mail X 
Respondent's Attorney: 
Christopher Mccurdy 
Ada County Prosecutor 
Interdepartmental Mail X 
Dated: Friday, March 14, 2014 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Court Reference CV-PC-2013-00248 
Hand Delivered Faxed 
-- --
Hand Delivered Faxed 
-- --
000171J 
Heidi Tolman 
Deputy Ada County Public Defender 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
~ . t:J 
~~t#Eelf. :· ~ 1
- ... )lM:_v '2=--
t.fAR 2 4 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D RIC 
Sy CHRISTINE "sw H, Clerk 
DEPUTY EET 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH WDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO, ) 
) 
Petitioner-Appellant, ) 
vs. ) 
) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
) 
_______________ ) 
CASE NO. CV-PC-2013-00248 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING RE: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
COMES NOW PETITIONER-APPELLANT, by and through his attorney ofrecord, and 
hereby submits to the Court, Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Rehearing 
Re: Memorandum Decision and Order. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In State v. Korsen the Idaho Supreme Court holds that § 18-7008(8) can in some 
instances be constitutionally applied to support a trespassing charge against a person, who while 
on state land, is asked to leave state land and then fails to do ~o. The Court also acknowledges 
that there might well be circumstances in which the statute could not be constitutionally applied 
to support a trespassing charge against a person on state land. As will be explained below, none 
of the constitutional challenges that were available to Mr. Pentico, but not raised by his trial 
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counsel, were addressed in State v. Korsen. Korsen provides no meaningful guidance relative to 
the resolution of those issues nor does the resolution of those issues urged by Mr. Pentico 
change, alter or undermine the power to "trespass" a citizen who improperly utilizing state land. 
II. ARGUMENT 
In the criminal proceeding in this matter, Mr Pentico's trial counsel challenged the 
constitutionality of the statute but of the 5 constitutionally based challenges that should have 
been raised, he only appreciated and raised (and therefore preserved) 1 of them. Moreover, 
despite the efforts of his appellate counsel to raise and seek resolution of all 5 of these 
challenges, the only one which was resolved on appeal was the sole defense raised by trial 
counsel. These constitutionally based challenges are: 
1. The statute cannot be applied to prevent a "return within one year" unless there is 
a predicate "ask to leave" that conforms to the statute and that since LC. § 18-
7008(8) could not be constitutionally applied, based upon Mr. Pentico's conduct 
on March 25, to legitimize the "ask to leave" on that date then Pentico could not 
be prosecuted for the "return within one year." 
2. Even if the "ask to leave" was legally sufficient, the "return within one year" 
portion of the statute is facially unconstitutional because it constitutes an 
impermissible prior restraint on the exercise of protected 1st Amendment rights. 
3. Even if the "ask to leave" was legally sufficient, the "return within one year" 
portion of the statute is both facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as 
applied in this case because it affords no meaningful procedural due process 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING RE: MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER Page 2 
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protection before imposing a substantial restri_ction upon the exercise of protected 
1st Amendment rights and other privileges of citizenship. 
4. Even if the "ask to leave" was legally sufficient, the "return within one year" 
portion of the statute is impermissibly vague as applied to Mr. Pentico's conduct 
because the clear and unambiguous language of the statute does not give a citizen 
fair notice that an "ask to leave" occurring on property A can be extended by any 
conduct on the part of the landowner to property B. 
5. Assuming that the "ask to leave" was legally sufficient, the "return within one 
year" portion of statute could not be applied to criminalize Mr. Pentico's conduct 
on April 2, 2008. 
Of these defenses, only Defense #5 has been litigated to resolution. 
Defense #1 was raised by Mr. Pentico as a basis for post-conviction relief (Ground #1, 
Verified Petition For Post-Conviction Relief, p. 3-5. Defense #1 was not raised by Mr. Pentico's 
trial lawyer. Idaho v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906, 913, 265 P.3d 519, 526 (2011). Defense #1 was 
raised by Mr. Pentico's appellate counsel. See Exhibit A to Affidavit of Heidi Tolman filed in 
response to the State's Motion for Sumrriary Dismissal (Copy of excerpts from Mr. Pentico's 
Brief on Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, pp.14-25) (hereinafter Appellate Brief). The 
.. 
factual basis for Defense #1 (that Pentico was on the Capital Annex grounds on March 25th to 
speak to a Legislator about an issue he had with State government) was not presented to the 
Court by Mr. Pentico's trial counsel. Pentico, supra. Moreover, the Court of Appeals perceived 
that presentation of a factual basis for the "ask to leave" was precluded by a motion in limine 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING RE: MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER Page 3 
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filed by Mr. Pentico's trial counsel. Despite Mr. Pentico's efforts (asserting fundamental error 
and asserting ineffective assistance of counsel) Defense #1 was not taken up or resolved by the 
Court of Appeals because the factual basis was not evident in the trial record and the Court of 
Appeals could not rule out that trial counsel's failure to develop that record was not a matter of 
tactics. Id. pp. 913-914, 526-527. The sworn statements of Mr. Pentico's trial counsel make it 
clear beyond debate that neither the failure to provide a factual basis for challenging the "ask to 
leave" on constitutional grounds nor the filing of a motion that might have precluded evidence of 
the factual basis of ( or lack thereof) the "ask to leave" were the product of a strategic decision. 
Instead, both were the result of the failure to appreciate the issues. Affidavit of Alan R. Den-, 
filed May 20, 2013, ~ 4 and 6. 
This record does not support the determination that Defense # 1 was raised before the 
Trial Court or that it could have been resolved on direct appeal in the criminal proceeding 
(Pentico made every conceivable effort to do so and was rebuffed, see, Appellate Brief pp. 14,. 
16). The record contains substantial and un-rebutted factual basis for concluding that Defense #1 
was not raised due to ineffective assistance of counsel. See Affidavit of Bruce S. Bistline, filed 
May 20, 2013, ~~ 6,7, 8, 9(a) and 9(b). Defense #1 raises issues which are not resolved by any 
existing decision of the Idaho appellate courts but which the Court in Korsen acknowledge may 
arise and may lead to a finding that the statute is unconstitutional as applied. Under these 
,. 
circumstances, the record does not support Judge Swain's determination that there is not 
substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt. Either Mr. Pentico could not raise 
this challenge despite diligent efforts or alternatively he was precluded from doing so by 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING RE: MEMORANDUM DECISION 
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ineffective assistance of counsel. Either way, Defense #1 directly undermines the conviction 
and justice requires that he be afforded the opportunity to have it litigated. 
Defenses## 2, 3, and 4 were raised by Mr. Pentico as a basis for Post-Conviction Relief 
(Ground #2, Verified Petition For Post-Conviction Relief, pp. 5-6). The record is devoid of any 
evidence that Defenses #2, 3, and 4 were raised by Mr. Pentico's trial counsel. See, Idaho v. 
Pentico, supra., 151 Idaho at 910, 265 P.3d at 523. Despite Mr. Pentico's efforts to ha~e 
Defenses #2 and 3 considered by the Court of Appeals, See Appellate Brief pp. 28-31, the Court 
of Appeals did not even acknowledge that these Defenses were asserted. Obviously, Mr. 
Pentico's appellate counsel raised Defense #4 as the Court of Appeals specifically ruled that it 
had not been raised by Mr. Pentico's trial counsel and therefore not preserved for Appeal. Id. pp. 
528, 915 and Appellate Brief pp. 31-35. Defenses## 2, 3, and 4 were not taken up or resolved 
by the Court of Appeals. 1 The sworn statements of Mr. Pentico's trial counsel make it clear 
beyond debate that Defenses ## 2, 3, and 4 were not raised because trial counsel did not 
appreciate the issues. Affidavit of Alan R. Derr, filed May 20, 2013, ,r 4 and 5. 
This record does not support the determination that Defenses ## 2, 3 and 4 were raised 
1 Defense #4 was, in dicta, partially discussed by the Court of Appeals. The Court, while 
acknowledging that the statute specifically provides that the "return within one year" provision 
pertains to .the property on which the "ask to leave" occurred, arrives without explanation at the 
conclusion that the statute gives fair notice that the "return within one year" provision also 
applies to other properties specified at the time of the "ask to leave." Such an expansive reading 
of a clear and unambiguous statute is completely contrary to the decisions of the Idaho Supreme 
Court. Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 896, 265 PJd 502, 509 
(2011). But even were permissible to read the statute so expansively, the Court of Appeals 
wholly fails to address the Defense that the statute does not give fair notice that such a reading of 
the statute is possible. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING RE: MEMORANDUM DECISION 
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. / .. 
before the Trial Court or that any of them could have been resolved on direct appeal in the 
criminal proceeding (Pentico made every conceivable effort to do so and was rebuffed). The 
record contains a substantial and un-rebutted factual basis for concluding that Defenses## 2, 3, 
and 4 were not raised due to ineffective assistance of counsel. See Affidavit of Bruce S. Bistline, 
filed May 20, 2013, ~~9(c) and 9(d). Defenses## 2, 3 and 4 raise issues which are not resolved 
by any existing decision of the Idaho appellate courts and which were not even relevant to the 
Korsen Court. Under these circumstances, the record does not support Judge Swain's 
determination that there is no substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt. 
Either Mr. Pentico could not raise these challenges despite diligent efforts or alternatively he was 
precluded from doing so by ineffective assistance of counsel. Either way Defenses## 2, 3, and 
4 directly undermine the conviction and justice requires that he be afforded the opportunity to 
have these Defenses litigated. 
III. CONCLUSION 
While it would be correct to say that the four constitutional challenges which Mr. Pentico 
has addressed above could have been raised before the Trial Court in the initial proceedings, it 
would be incorrect to conclude that either Mr. Pentico has not been trying to raise valid 
. challenges ever since his conviction or that those challenges were not raised in before the Trial 
Court because of any conscious process on the part of trial counsel. The matters are serious 
constitutional challenges which are not resolved by any reported decision in Idaho and that, if 
resolved in his favor, make a conviction both unjust and impossible. There are in this record, 
unrebutted and material facts not previously presented that, in the interest of justice, militate iri 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING RE: MEMORANDUM DECISION 
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,. ,. t'( 
favor of granting a new trial. The record provides a substantial showing that the conviction is 
contrary to established constitutional protections. Moreover, it is clear that the facts and legal 
challenges that should have been put into the record are not in the record due to oversight by trial 
counsel which had nothing to do with strategic decisions. These oversights are not, based upon 
unrebutted evidence, consistent with effective assistance of counsel. 
Mr. Pentico is entitled, in the interest of justice, to a new trial but for now he will settle 
for the opportunity to be allowed to proceed upon his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
DATED thi4day of March, 2014. 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Heidi~ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on thi~ay of March, 2014, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document in the above-captioned matter by the method indicated 
below and addressed to the following: 
Ada County Prosecutor 
200 W. Front Street, Ste. 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
_}{__ HAND DELIVERY 
U.S.MAIL 
--
OVERNIGHT MAIL 
--
FACSIMILE: 287-7700 
_ Interdepartmental Mail 
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FILED , 
Friday, March 28, 2014 at 03:55 PM 
CHRISTOPHER D. RIC RK OF THE COURT 
BY:. ___ ~~='------
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHRISTOPHER A PENTICO, 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
) 
) Case No: CV-PC-2013-00248 
) 
) NOTICE OF HEARING 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
Defendant. ) 
----------
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Motion Hearing 
Judge: 
Thursday, May 01, 2014 
02:00 PM 
Michael McLaughlin 
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE 200 W. Front Street, Boise, Idaho 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing 
entered by the Court and on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice 
were served as follows on the 28th March, 2014. 
Petitioner's Attorney: 
Heidi Tolman 
Ada County Public Defender 
Interdepartmental Mail_h_ Hand Delivered __ Faxed __ 
Respondent's Attorney: 
Christopher Mccurdy 
Ada County Prosecutor 
Interdepartmental Mail-A- Hand Delivered __ Faxed __ 
Dated: Friday, March 28, 2014 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Court Reference CV-PC-2013-00248 
000179
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Christopher C. McCurdy 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
APR 2 9 2014 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRISTOPHER PENTICO, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
________________ ) 
C)J-
Case No. ~PC-2013-00248 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO 
PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Christopher C. McCurdy, Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney for Ada County, and states response to petitioner's memorandum in support 
of petition for rehearing, for the following reasons: 
Analysis 
In the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Petition), Pentico alleged three causes of 
action. The First Cause of action is that Pentico's Due Process Rights under the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution 
were violated. The Second Cause of action likewise deals with violations of the same rights, but 
for different conduct. The Third Cause of action alleges that Pentico was denied the right to fully 
challenge the constitutionality of LC. § 18-7008(8) as applied to this case. The Petition alleges 
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that the denial stemmed from ineffective assistance of counsel rendered by the original trial 
counsel. 
In its memorandum decision and order, the district court addressed Pentico's first and 
second claims together in section one, and the third claim in section two. As to Pentico's first 
and second claims, the district court held Judge Swain did not err in summarily dismissing Mr. 
Pentico's first two claims. "Mr. Pentico has not own that these claims raise a substantial doubt 
about the reliability of the finding that he was guilty of trespass and that these claims, in the 
exercise of due diligence, could not have been presented earlier." Mem. Decision & Order, 7. 
As to the third claim, the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the district court began 
by analyzing the affidavits from Allen Derr and Bruce Bistline. Mr. Derr's affidavit addressed 
his motion in limine, and that he was unaware of any constitutional challenge flowing from the 
March 25, 2008 interaction. In addressing Mr. Derr's affidavit, the district court held that: 
"[t]he problem with Mr. Derr's affidavit is that even assuming that such an 
argument was not previously raised, and it appears that it essentially was, and that 
counsel erred in failing to assert this argument before Judge Swain, there is 
nothing indicating a reasonable probability that this argument would have been 
successful and led to a different outcome." 
Mem. Decision & Order, 12. The district court clearly provided two reasons for its holding. 
First, that the argument was essentially made previously, and properly adjudicated on the direct 
appeal. Then the district court went further, by assuming that the argument was not already 
made, but that the case law weighed against its success. 
Pentico's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Rehearing Re: Memorandum Decision 
and Order (Pentico's Memorandum) breaks down these issues differently. In Pentico's 
memorandum, the argument is arranged into five constitutional arguments. From the State's 
reading, the first four arguments appear to be various phrasings of an as applied and facial 
challenge to the constitutionality of LC. § 18-7008(8). 
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As a starting point, Pentico concedes that the fifth argument has been adjudicated fully. 
However, full adjudication is not the appropriate standard in cases like this. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals has previously held that "[g]enerally speaking, a claim or issue which was or could have 
been raised on appeal may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings." Whitehawk v. 
State, 116 Idaho 831, 832-33, 780 P.2d 153, 154-55 (Ct. App. 1989). This holding is consistent 
with LC.§ 19-4901(b) which states in part: 
This remedy is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the 
proceedings in the trial court, or of an appeal from the sentence or conviction. Any 
issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and 
may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings, unless it appears to the 
court, on the basis of a substantial factual showing by affidavit, deposition or 
otherwise, that the asserted basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the 
reliability of the finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due diligence, 
have been presented earlier. 
Therefore, in consideration of the legal standard and the holding by the district court, the proper 
starting question is whether Pentico's arguments were previously raised or should have been 
raised on direct appeal. If the answer is no, then the next question is whether there would be a 
reasonable probability of success on the argument. See Piro v. State, 146 Idaho 86, 89, 190 P.3d 
905, 908 (Ct. App. 2008). 
The bulk of the Petition and Pentico's Memorandum are attempts to relitigate the 
constitutional issues previously decided at the trial court and on direct appeal to the Court of 
Appeals. The Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether I. C. § 18-7008(8) is facially 
unconstitutional. State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906, 913, 265 P.3d 519, 526 (Ct. App. 2011). 
Additionally, the Court of Appeals addressed whether the statute was unconstitutional as applied 
to Pentico. Id., at 914, 265 P.3d at 527. On this point, the Court of Appeals held that the statute 
was not unconstitutionally overbroad as it applied to Pentico's conduct on April 2, 2008. Id. On 
the issue of vagueness, the Court of Appeals first noted that the issue was not properly preserved 
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for appeal, but went on to analyze the statute and determined that the statute is not vague as 
applied. 1 Id., at 915,265 P.3d at 528. 
Pentico now focuses on his first interaction at the Capitol on March 25, 2008, and the 
constitutional issues that may arise from there. As the district court correctly notes, the Court of 
Appeals decision on this case did address these points, though perhaps indirectly. See State v. 
Pentico, 151 Idaho 906, 911-12, 265 P.3d 519, 524-25 (Ct. App. 2012). Also, the State 
continues to argue that any inability to address these issues was due to a strategic determination 
by trial counsel. See Respondent's Br., 7. 
Conclusion 
The State's position in this case remains unchanged. Because many of the issues in the 
Petition are either attempts to relitigate or rephrase issues, the State respectfully asked the trial 
court to dismiss the Petition. To the extent that the issues raised in the Petition differ from those 
previously asserted, those issues have been procedurally waived by operation of LC. § 19-
490l(b) 
1 This addresses defense #4 in Pentico' s Memorandum. Dicta or not, the Court of Appeals 
analysis here indicates that likelihood of success for Pentico on this point. 
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DATED this 21_ day of April 2014. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the j_ °'- day of April 2014, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document to: Heidi Tolman, Ada County Public Defender, by 
the method indicated below: 
NOTIFIED AVAILABLE FOR PICK UP 
__ U.S. MAIL (Postage Prepaid) 
FAX TRANSMISSION 
x HAND DELIVERY 
--- \ 
Legal Assistant 
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Judge Michael Mclaughli!ic Nelson - Dianne Cromwell - 05/-~ Courtroom400 
Time Speake Note 
2:10:10 PM Judge Calls CV-PC-2013-00248 Pentico vs. State of Idaho Motion 
Hearing 
2:10:35 PM State Christopher McCudy present 
Attorney 
. 
2:10:51 PM Plaintiff Heidi Tolman Present 
Attorney 
.............. 
2:10:58 PM Judge court reviws, inquires 
2:11:16PM State comments 
Attorney 
2:11:19PM Defense no need to responds 
Attorney 
......... 
2:11:40 PM Plaintiff approaches with a clean copy, will hear oral arguement 
Attorney 
.................... 
2:12:06 PM Plaintiff hands court a chart 
Attorney 
2:12:33 PM Judge reviews on record, 
2:12:58 PM Plaintiff argues 
Attorney 
.............. 
2:16:04 PM Plaintiff comments on the amended complaint, comments regarding the 
Attorney summary dismissal 
...... 
2:17:29 PM Judge inquires on the petitioner 
2:19:00 PM Plaintiff continues arguments 
Attorney 
2:20:28 PM Judge scope of the prohobition 
......... 
2:20:40 PM Plaintiff continues arguements, 
Attorney 
2:23:35 PM State oral aguments, on the court of appeals oppion, 
Attorney 
........................................ 
2:26:00 PM State comments on the Motion in Limine 
jAttorney 
i 
: 
2:28:41 PM Plaintiff response 
Attorney 
.......... 
2:31:32 PM Judge comments 
5/1/2014 1 of 2 
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• Judge Michael Mclaughli!ic Nelson - Dianne Cromwell - 05.4 Courtroom400 
2:31:40 PM Plaintiff continue response 
Attorney 
2:32:15 PM Judge re-evaluate earlier decission, will take under advisement 
2:32:44 PM End 
5/1/2014 2 of 2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-PC-2013-00248 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
ON MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT: HEIDI TOLMAN 
ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT: CHRISTOPHER MCCUDY 
This case is before the court on the Petitioner's, (Mr. Pentico's), motion for 
reconsideration of the court's February 19, 2014, memorandum decision on appeal from 
the decision of Magistrate Judge, the Honorable Kevin Swain, summarily dismissing his 
petition seeking post-conviction relief. This court will affirm its earlier decision in this 
matter. 
Pentico's petition for reconsideration asserts five constitutional issues. Pentico 
admits that the fifth constitutional argument has been adjudicated fully. The Idaho Court 
of Appeals previously has held that a claim or issue which was or could have been 
raised on appeal may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings. See 
Whitehawk v. State, 116 Idaho 831, 832-33, 780 P.2d 153, 154-55 (Ct. App. 1989). 
MEMORANDUM DECISION - 1 
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Mr. Pentico's case was heard by the Court of Appeals as cited in State v. 
Pentico, :151 Idaho 906, 265 P.3d 519 (Ct. App. 2011). The Court of Appeals 
addressed the issue raised whether Idaho Code§ 18-7008(8) is facially unconstitutional 
or unconstitutional as applied. The Court of Appeals ruled that the statute was not 
overly broad. The Court of Appeals also addressed the issue of vagueness and 
determined that the statute was not vague as applied. 
The thrust of Pentico's reconsideration motion is his conduct on March 25, 2008, 
and whether or not any constitutional issues may arise from that incident. The Court of 
Appeals' decision in Pentico is clear that the March 25, 2008 issue was not preserved 
for appeal. However, as stated earlier, the Court of Appeals did address these points 
indirectly at pages 911-12 of the decision. As noted earlier in this court's decision, there 
is nothing in Mr. Derr's affidavit that establishes, based upon the undisputed facts in the 
record, that there was a reasonable probability that this argument would have been 
successful and led to a different outcome. 
For these reasons and those set forth in the court's earlier memorandum 
decision of February 19, 2014, the motion for reconsideration will be denied. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
-Dated this / ~ day of May 2014. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have mailed, 
by United States Mail, one copy of the MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER as notice 
pursuant to the Idaho Rules to each of the parties of record in this cause in envelopes 
addressed as follows: 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
VIA INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
VIA INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
Date: 1/!¾:> ?-0 1 ?O { If' 
MEMORANDUM DECISION - 3 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
Ada County, Idaho 
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SM 
NO·---~~-----
A.M. ____ FrL~-~ <-\ -a:\ 
JUN 2 0 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By KATRINA THIESSEN 
DePUTV 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellant 
HEIDI M. TOLMAN, ISB #8478 
Deputy Public Defender 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent-Respondent. 
Case No. CV-PC-2013-000248 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE CLERK 
OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1) The above-named Appellant appeals against the above-named respondent to 
the Idaho Supreme Court from the final decision and order entered against 
him in the above-entitled action on May 20, 2014, the Honorable Michael R. 
McLaughlin, District Judge presiding. 
2) That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders 
under, and pursuant to, IAR 11 (a)(1-9). 
3) A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the Appellant then 
intends to assert in the appeal, provided any such list of issues on appeal 
shall not prevent the Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal is: 
a) Did the trial court err by granting summary dismissal without a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard? 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 1 
000190
' l:. ~ " 
4) Reporter's Transcript. The Appellant requests the preparation of the entire 
reporter's standard transcript as defined by IAR 25(c). The Appellant also 
requests the preparation of the additional portions of the reporter's transcript: 
a) Oral Argument held February 13, 2014 (Court Reporter: Susan Gambee. 
Estimated pages: 100). 
b) Oral Argument held May 1, 2014 (Court Reporter: Dianne Cromwell. 
Estimated pages: 50). 
5) Clerk's Record. The Appellant requests the standard clerk's record pursuant 
to IAR 28(b )(1 ). In addition to those documents automatically included under 
IAR 28(b)(1), Appellant also requests that any briefs, statements or affidavits 
considered by the court, and memorandum opinions or decisions of the court 
be included in the Clerk's Record. 
6) I certify: 
a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Court 
· Reporter(s) mentioned in paragraph 5 above. 
b) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the record because the Appellant is indigent. (1.C. §§ 31-
3220, 31-3220A, IAR 24(e)). 
c) That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in a criminal 
case (I.C. §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, IAR 23(a)(10)). 
d) Ada County will be responsible for paying for the reporter's transcript, 
· as the client is indigent (1.C. §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, IAR 24(e)). 
e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to IAR 20. 
DATED this it/; day of June 2014. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Heidi M. Tolman 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this J.j__ day of June 2014, I mailed (served) a true 
and correct copy of the within instrument to: 
Idaho Attorney General 
Criminal Division 
Joe R. Williams Bldg., 4th Fir. 
Statehouse Mail 
Susan Gambee 
Court Reporter 
Interdepartmental Mail 
Dianne Cromwell 
Court Reporter 
Interdepartmental Mail 
Stacy Langton 
Ada County Prosecutor's Office 
Interdepartmental Mail 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 3 
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TO: Clerk of the Court 
Idaho Supreme Court 
451 West State Street 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
(208) 334-2616 
NO.,-=:---"='==-----o I OO FILED A.M. Q • P.M, ____ _ 
AUG 2 1 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By BRADLEY J. THIES 
DEPUTY 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x Docket No. 42242 
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent-Respondent. 
X 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT OF 29 PAGES LODGED 
Appealed from the District Court of the 
Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, 
Michael R. McLaughlin, District Court Judge. 
This transcript contains hearing held on: 
February 13, 2014 
DATE: July 11, 2014 
~ Susan G. Garn ee, Official Court Reporter 
Official Court Reporter, 
Judge Deborah Bail 
Ada County Courthouse 
Idaho Certified Shorthand Reporter No. 18 
Registered Merit Reporter 
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Stephen W. Kenyon 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
451 W State Street 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
-
N0·--.~~~~---8: 00 FILED A.M·---=---P.M. ___ _ 
AUG 2 1 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By BRADLEY J. THIES 
DEPUTY 
In re: Penitco v. State of Idaho, Docket No. 42242 
Notice is hereby given that on Wednesday, August 20, 2014, I lodged a 
transcript of 20 pages in length for the above-referenced appeal with 
the district court clerk of Ada County in the Fourth Judicial District. 
The following files were lodged: 
Proceeding 04/30/2014 
David Cromwell 
Tucker & Associates 
cc: sctfilings@idcourts.net 
PDF format of completed files emailed to Supreme Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO, 
Supreme Court Case No. 42242 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
STA TE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 21st day of August, 2014. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO, 
Supreme Court Case No. 42242 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
Date of Service: AUG 2 1 2014 
---------
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO, 
Supreme Court Case No. 42242 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
VS. CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in 
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true and correct record of the 
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, 
as well as those requested by Counsel. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
20th day of June, 2014. 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
